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Abstract 
 
My dissertation uses film to shed new light on our understanding of postwar Hong Kong 
and the colonial history of community building. The 1950s and 1960s was a period of social 
turmoil and enormous uncertainty for the colony; it is however, also a period little understood in 
relation to Hong Kong’s development from a remote British colony into a hypermodern global 
city in the 1980s and 1990s. Ideological struggles in Cold War Hong Kong were waged in the 
realm of an increasingly politicized local society, as Hong Kong became a battleground for the 
ideological struggles between pro-Communist and pro-Nationalist sympathizers, both vying for 
the allegiance of the Hong Kong public. Using film as archival evidence, I aim to explore the 
relationship between British colonial rule and Hong Kong’s grassroots population, on the one 
hand, and on the other hand, to foster an alternative understanding of being Chinese in the Cold 
War. 
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Introduction: Colonial Myths, Nationalist Politics, and Postwar Hong Kong Cinema 
   My dissertation privileges film (chapters 1, 2, 3) and its rival and savior, television 
(chapter 4) as the objects of historical analysis, as archives and as the critical lens through which 
to examine the history of postwar Hong Kong culture and society under British colonial rule. The 
history of colonial Hong Kong in the postwar period is complicated by the struggles between 
various stakeholders (the colonial government in Hong Kong, the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP), the Nationalist Kuomintang Party (KMT) and the local Hong Kong Chinese film artists 
and grassroots audiences) over the power to produce, screen and project their political positions 
locally and globally.  But the history of postwar Hong Kong is also a narrative of the strategies 
taken by different political camps to manipulate local and transnational audiences’ consumption 
of visual culture in the bipolar world order of Cold War Hong Kong. As Hong Kong was 
embroiled in the ongoing ideological struggles of the Cold War, film became a weapon not only 
for imperial survival but also for the expressions of nationalism, patriotism, citizenship and 
ultimately a distinctive local community and identity. 
My project focuses on an important historical period of Hong Kong history between the 
conclusion of the Second World War to the mid-1970s, which welcomed the gradual dissipation 
of the intensity of the Cold War in East Asia. These three decades mark a transition in the 
political, cultural and industrial realms for Hong Kong societal developments. Various scholars 
of Hong Kong studies have argued that the emergence of Hong Kong’s distinctive identity took 
place in the 1970s.1  If this is true, it is important that we outline how this process took place by 
tracing our steps back to the immediate postwar era. The development of Hong Kong’s unique 
identity had its germs in the postwar period amidst the struggles between the CCP and the KMT 
                                                 
1 Gordon Mathews, Eric Kit-wai Ma, and Tai-lok Lui, eds., Hong Kong, China: Learning to Belong to a Nation 
(London and New York: Routledge, 2008), 29. 
 2 
as well as the desire of Great Britain to salvage the remnants, if only an illusion, of its past 
prestige of Pax Britannica.  
Following the end of WWII, the continued status of Hong Kong as a British colony was 
still very uncertain. This precarious nature of British Hong Kong was partly due to the declining 
prestige of Great Britain in the immediate postwar period. In particular, Great Britain’s failure to 
protect Hong Kong and other British colonial territories in East and Southeast Asia against 
Japan’s imperial designs during WWII became a humiliating stigma to the Empire’s public 
image of invincibility. In order to salvage its waning preeminence as the legitimate ruler of Hong 
Kong, the British colonial government resorted to the manipulation of film censorship, 
production, distribution and consumption to secure and sustain its image as the benevolent 
colonial ruler of Hong Kong par excellence. Although the war had already ended, the ideological 
struggles in Cold War Hong Kong continued to be waged in the realm of cinematic 
representations of an increasingly politicized Hong Kong society. In the bipolar reality of the 
new global world order, Hong Kong became a battleground for the ideological struggles between 
pro-Communist and pro-Nationalist sympathizers, both vying for the allegiance of the ethnic 
Chinese population in Hong Kong. Indeed, the British colonial government in Hong Kong had to 
create the myth of an apolitical Hong Kong in the Cold War in order for it to remain a central 
player in the new world order. 
My study is inspired by Edward Said’s conception of cultural imperialism in 
understanding the differential relationships between the colonizer and the colonized.2 This 
project also drew from Benedict Anderson’s understanding of the formation and construction of 
                                                 
2 Edward Said, Orientalism (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978). 
 3 
an “imagined community” in and through print capitalism.3 In my project, I take film and 
television as the critical sites and objects of analysis in uncovering the history of colonial Hong 
Kong in the Cold War. It may be true that British Hong Kong waged a war of ideological 
dimensions in and through visual representations. Yet, I would argue that in the ongoing 
discursive struggles in the cultural realm of Hong Kong, colonial subjects were not always 
complicit in the colonial encounter. It is my contention that a focus on the cultural work of visual 
media production and distribution reveals that the imperial project of disciplining and 
domesticating the colonial subjects in Hong Kong was never a fait accompli. But rather colonial 
rule in Hong Kong was always faltering in its steps in exerting its governance over the Hong 
Kong Chinese colonial subjects. It is through the analysis of the political work of visual culture 
that we can demystify the juggernaut of colonial authority and render naked the fears and 
anxieties of its own inevitable demise. This study is therefore interdisciplinary by methodology 
in order to expose the multifaceted contours of colonial encounters as well as the shifting power 
relations between the colonizer and the colonized amidst the decolonization process around the 
world. 
In order to unravel the intricate relations between colonial governance and colonial 
subjectivities in Hong Kong Cold War politics, I privilege film as archives. In this project, I 
interpret film archives as not only the physical celluloid objects, but also the historical, political 
and economic conditions of production and distribution networks, and the physical locales where 
film projections were consumed. This interdisciplinary approach challenges the boundaries of 
history and film studies, which in turn allows us to shed new light on the cultural politics of 
Hong Kong postwar history and the transnational implications of its filmic tradition. It is my 
                                                 
3 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London and 
New York: Verso, 1983). 
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hope that when film is seen as archival evidence, postwar Hong Kong cinema becomes an 
analytic site and a vantage point to explore the relationships between British colonial rule and 
Hong Kong’s grassroots population on the one hand, and on the other hand, foster an alternative 
understanding of being Chinese in the Cold War era amidst the struggles between Communist 
and Nationalistic elements.  
To justify its continuing presence in Hong Kong amidst worldwide decolonization, the 
British had to create “myths” to flaunt its imperialist benevolence, to gain legitimacy among its 
colonial subjects and to make its rule seem natural. The history of Hong Kong has been 
described as a barren rock turned industrial metropolis because of the laissez-faire and positive 
non-interventionist policy of the British colonial government.4 This success story of Hong Kong 
was, according to many previous scholars on Hong Kong partly due to the stability of the colony 
which had often been attributed to the political apathy of its Chinese residents and their refugee 
mentality.5 Yet this teleological narrative of economic success, while justifying and legitimizing 
colonial history and colonial rule, downplays the violence and struggles that existed in the 
colonial encounters between the Chinese Hong Kong people and the Hong Kong government.  
One of the goals of this project is to debunk precisely these various myths that the 
colonial government in Hong Kong and subsequent colonialist scholars told themselves and to 
others to justify the legitimacy of their imperial rule in postwar Hong Kong. These myths were 
not only produced on the colonial ground, but they were also projected and reproduced again and 
                                                 
4 See Tak-wing Ngo, ed., Hong Kong’s History: State and Society under Colonial Rule (London and New York: 
Routledge, 1999). 
5 Lau Siu-kai and Kuan Hsin-chi, The Ethos of the Hong Kong Chinese (Hong Kong, 1988). 
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again beyond the borders of the British Crown Colony of Hong Kong in the international arena 
amidst the painful realization of decolonization and third-world national self-determination.6  
The history of Hong Kong recounted by many expatriate British scholars and officials 
often begins with 1842, the year that Hong Kong Island was ceded to the British following Qing 
China’s defeat to British forces in the first Opium War (1839-1842) and ends on July 1, 1997 
(the day when the British 99-year lease of the New Territories expired) when Hong Kong was 
returned to China. Hong Kong Island was first occupied by British forces on January 26, 1841 
and subsequently was ceded “in perpetuity” to Great Britain by the Treaty of Nanjing in 1842. In 
the Second Opium War (also known as the second Anglo-Chinese War; Arrow War, 1856-1860), 
Kowloon was ceded to Britain by the Convention of Beijing. In the late 1890s, amidst the height 
of European imperialism, where Euro-American imperialist powers acquired colonies in Africa 
(1870s and 1880s) and other parts of the world, British took advantage of the already weakened 
Qing government following China’s defeat in the first Sino-Japanese War (1894-95) by seizing 
the New Territories in 1898 under a 99-year lease (this was a move which was as much an 
aggression on Qing China as it was against France and Russia, in order to check their imperialist 
designs on China). In this conventional colonial narrative7 of Hong Kong history, Hong Kong is 
stigmatized as a “barren-rock-turned-capitalist-paradise”8 without any account of the 
                                                 
6 Benedict Anderson argues that nationalism is created in and through print capitalism whereby people who have not 
seen each other imagine themselves as being part of a nation-state. I would suggest that this can be extended to the 
creation of an imagined empire through the imperialist state apparatus of not only print but also celluloid fantasies. 
Anderson, Imagined Communities. 
7 According to Tak-Wing Ngo, the two main narratives of Hong Kong are colonialism versus nationalism. Hong 
Kong is either “apart from China” or “a part of China”. Ngo, ed., Hong Kong’s History: State and Society under 
Colonial Rule, 1. See also, Gordon Mathews, ‘Heunggongyahn: On the Past, Present, and Future of Hong Kong 
Identity,” Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, vol. 29, no. 3 (1997), 5; Yuen Kwok Keung, “The Writing of 
Competing Histories of Hong kong, with Special Reference to the Perspectives from Britain, Mainland China and 
Hong Kong,” PhD. Dissertation, Department of East Asian Studies, University of Waikato, New Zealand, 2003.  
8 Ngo, ed., Hong Kong’s History: State and Society under Colonial Rule, 1. Ngo’s work is one of the first revisionist 
histories of Hong Kong. His goal is to complicate the history of state-society interactions in various sites. 
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contributions of local society and actors to this process.9 The Foreign Secretary of Great Britain, 
Lord Palmerston described Hong Kong as “a barren island with hardly a house upon it.”10  In this 
colonial narrative, British rule in Hong Kong is seen as one of benevolence, administering Hong 
Kong, a colony characterized as an apathetic society by laissez-faire (positive non-
interventionism) governance. Hence, under the benevolent rule of the British colonial 
government, Hong Kong was successfully transformed from “a barren and practically 
uninhabited island” into an international commercial and financial center.11 
The violence as exercised over Hong Kong by these historical narratives is that Hong 
Kong is forever banished within the historical vacuum of having “no precolonial past to speak 
of.”12 Even Hong Kong’s path toward globalism is seen as the sole paternalistic work of the 
Empire.13 The implication of this narrative is that the economic miracle of Hong Kong should be 
celebrated as the success of British laissez-faire administration and its benevolence on the 
colonial ground. The above depiction of Hong Kong from a “barren rock” to a flourishing 
international financial center is the myth of a “colonial city.”14 The representation and retelling 
of the myth of Hong Kong’s success story is manipulated by the colonial government to 
dominate the populace and to project a singular image of benevolence and laissez-faire approach. 
This dissertation therefore attempts to show that colonialism had many faces. Indeed, it is my 
                                                 
9 John M. Carroll’s Edge of Empires is admirable in that he examines the contribution that the Chinese elites 
following the Opium War to the making of colonial Hong Kong. See John M. Carroll, Edge of Empires: Chinese 
Elites and British Colonials in Hong Kong (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2005). 
10 David Faure, ed., History of Hong Kong, 1842-1984 (Hong Kong and London: Tamrind Books, 1995), 4. This 
quote implies that the land of Hong Kong before colonial rule was non-productive 
11 Cited in Edvard Hambro, The Problem of Chinese Refugees in Hong Kong: Report Submitted to the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (Leyden, Holland: A.W. Sijthoff, 1955), 10. 
12 Ackbar Abbas, Hong Kong: Culture and the Politics of Disappearance (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1997), 2.  
13 Abbas, Hong Kong: Culture and the Politics of Disappearance, 3. 
14 There is a large body of literature on the features of a “colonial city”, from the phenomenon of a dual city to  
East/West divide and racial segregation as means for social control and protection of the imperial body from the 
non-hygienic and dangerous colonized bodies. See Alan Smart’s chapter 2, “Colonial Cities, Illegal Spaces,” in Alan 
Smart, The Shek Kip Mei Myth: Squatter, Fires and Colonial Rule in Hong Kong, 1950-1963 (Hong Kong: Hong 
Kong University Press, 2006), 21-38. 
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hope that my project will unearth the lived realities of colonial voices and colonial designs, 
which were never uniform and fixed. 
***** 
Politics and film had always had an intimate relationship with each other, especially in 
times of war and political turmoil and national crises. During the Second World War, both the 
allies and axis powers used films to influence public opinion and to wage ideological battles that 
both boosted the morale of their troops as well as undermined their opponents’ cause. In the 
1950s, Hong Kong found itself in an increasingly politicized local society. This bi-polar milieu 
was affected by Cold War politics on the world stage. It was a time when imperialism was 
frowned upon by the international community. As a British colony in the time of decolonization 
processes around the world, Hong Kong’s continued existence presented a challenge for the 
colonial administration in this last British Crown colony. The manipulation of film, therefore, 
would play an important role in the ongoing struggles for allegiance between the PRC, KMT, the 
colonial government in Hong Kong, as well as the covert presence of the Americans in the 
colony. 
Very little study had been conducted regarding the influence of the United States in 
China and in Hong Kong during the Cold War period. Although this study does not cover the 
information warfare conducted by the United States in other parts of the world including Hong 
Kong during the early Cold War period, it is worthwhile to further expose the intersections 
between political culture and film culture by examining the potential influence of the United 
States Information Agency (USIA; also known as the USIS abroad).15 Here I would like to 
briefly introduce the operations of the USIA in order to suggest how the American government 
also complicates the picture of the cultural and ideological cold warfare in the Far East and Hong 
                                                 
15 In the same year, coincidentally or not, the censorship regulations were founded in Hong Kong. 
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Kong in particular. First established by President Eisenhower in August 1953 as an independent 
foreign affairs agency to carry out “public diplomacy,” its mission was to “understand, inform, 
and influence foreign publics in promotion of the U.S. national interests” namely to promote 
democracy around the world through the dissemination of information (via overseas information 
programs, educational and cultural activities) about “the rule of law, a free market economy, an 
independent judiciary, an open and fair electoral system, and a free and independent media.”16 
Interestingly, this flow of information about the so-called way of life of the Americans was 
unidirectional, because congress had prohibited the USIA to direct its programs to the US 
citizens. In fact, domestic dissemination of information produced by the USIA was only allowed 
starting in 1990.  
The work of the American government during the Cold War was called “public 
diplomacy” and not “propaganda.”17 The motto of the USIA (1953-99) was “Telling America’s 
Story to the World.”18 But this story is one of “containment” veiled beneath the project of 
disseminating democracy. The project of the USIA in Asia is one of containing China and of 
containing the dangers of global communism.19 But local conditions had to be heeded. For 
instance, the presence of the Voice of America radio program was especially pronounced in Asia. 
Its goal during the 1960s Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution was precisely to contain 
Communist China. Just as the Hong Kong’s film censorship board needed the assistance of local 
Chinese film censors in reviewing Chinese language films (chapter 1), the VOA would also 
solicit local stars in its propaganda work. For instance, on February 24, 1967, in its 25th 
                                                 
16 United States Information Agency, USIA Overview Brochure (Manila: USIA’s regional service center, Oct 1998), 
19 (in United States Information Agency, USIA 1953-1999: A Commemoration, February 1999: 3503-3542, pdf 
format). 
17 Nicholas J. Cull, The Cold War and the United States Information Agency: American Propaganda and Public 
Diplomacy, 1945-1989 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), xvi. 
18 Cull, The Cold War and the United States Information Agency, 1. 
19 Cull, The Cold War and the United States Information Agency, 123. 
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anniversary celebration, VOA solicited such stars as Louis Armstrong and Frank Sinatra as well 
as the Chinese actress Li Li Hua.20 
A number of studies explored the work of the USIA, but very little has touched on the 
effects of the USIA’s proselytizing effects on the colonial ground.21 In my discussion of the 
mobile film team in chapter 3, we get a brief glimpse of how the USIS produced films also made 
their way to the grassroots audiences living in the resettlement housing estates.22 The 
intersections of political and film cultures are most pertinent in chapters 1 and 3, where I discuss 
the role of the colonial state in film consumption, film censorship and government funded film 
productions. 
Understanding the political milieu surrounding the industry conditions of postwar Hong 
Kong cinema is important for our appreciation of its role in the construction of Chinese identity 
from the 1950s through the 1970s. In addition to exposing the Cold War and colonial politics of 
Hong Kong cinema in the relationships between state and society, my project also centers on 
Hong Kong and its ethnic Chinese population not only as migrants and refugees but as audiences 
who did not passively absorb movies that were screened in the theaters at the time but whose 
tastes had an effect on what films the Hong Kong filmmakers decided to produce and how 
colonial policy makers dealt with film culture in the colony. As such, my study does not focus 
merely on the aesthetics of postwar Hong Kong cinema, but how film culture shaped the making 
                                                 
20 Cull, The Cold War and the United States Information Agency, 263. 
21 See Reinhold Wagnleitner, trans. by Diana M. Wolf, Coca-Colonization and the Cold War: The Cultural Mission 
of the United States in Austria after the Second World War (Chapel Hill & London: The University of North 
Carolina Press, 1994); Kenneth Osgood, Total Cold War: Eisenhower’s Secret Propaganda Battle at Home and 
Abroad (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2006). 
22 Hong Kong was only one of many overseas places that the USIS made their mark. According to Cull, “By the end 
of 1953, USIA film claimed an annual audience worldwide of 500 million. The USIA served 210 U.S. film libraries 
around the world. USIS posts had a total stock of 6,000 projectors and 350 mobile motion picture units equipped to 
take film to the people.” See Nicholas J. Cull, The Cold War and the United States Information Agency: American 
Propaganda and Public Diplomacy, 1945-1989 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 108. 
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of Hong Kong’s state and society relations and the construction of Hong Kong’s collective 
memory. 
As a migrant society, Hong Kong saw a large influx of people from the mainland before, 
during and after the War of Resistance against the Japanese (1937-1945). Another large wave 
took refuge in Hong Kong following the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949. 
Among this large influx of migrants entering Hong Kong included not only laborers from South 
China, but also businessmen and filmmakers from Shanghai. An important question that chapter 
2 attempts to answer is the changing roles of the filmmakers as they traveled to Hong Kong as 
well as the ways they shaped the sense of Chinese national identity of the ethnic Chinese living 
in Hong Kong in times of war and turmoil. It is my contention that amidst political crises and 
social displacements and economic hardships, filmmakers would become the new cultural elites 
and leaders who attempted to forge an alternative set of moral ethics amidst other competing 
political and nationalistic ideologies in Cold War Hong Kong. 
As postwar Hong Kong cinema was influenced by the cinematic tradition on the 
mainland, I will provide a brief overview of the developments of Chinese national cinema prior 
to 1949. Chinese national cinema, according to Jubin Hu, was part and parcel of the nation 
building project and the construction of Chinese nationalism in China in the pre-1949 period.23 
This process was complicated and imbricated within the development of the Chinese film 
industry as well as the politics of foreign relations and incursion.24 Hu posits that the pre-1949 
Chinese national cinema was a “fundamentally political cinema.”25 Most importantly, what Hu 
                                                 
23 See Jubin Hu, Projecting a Nation: Chinese National Cinema Before 1949 (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University 
Press, 2003). 
24 Jubin Hu divides the different stages of national cinema construction by time periods (cultural awareness, pre 
1920s; industrial nationalism, the 1920s, colonial and anti-colonial nationalisms, 1937-1945, and nationalism and 
modernization, 1946-1949). See Hu, Projecting a Nation, 192. 
25 Hu, Projecting a Nation, 194. 
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argues is that the political parties in China also shaped the emergence of the Chinese national 
cinema. In her discussion of the nationalistic tendencies in Chinese cinema in the 1930s, Hu 
identified two parallel movements yet diverging discourses of Chinese national cinema which 
were associated with two political parties: the Left Wing Film Movement of the CCP and the 
Nationalist Film Movement (minzu zhuyi dianying yundong) of the KMT which started in 
1930.26 
Both movements were sparked off by the Japanese imperialist incursion, evoking 
nationalistic and patriotic sentiments; however, each discourse would serve the interests of the 
party and the legitimacy of its authority amidst China’s uncertain fate in the face of ongoing 
onslaughts of both Japanese and Euro-American powers. The leftist nationalistic discourse, 
represented by the Mingxing film company and such left-wing activists as Xia Yan, Qian 
Xingcun and Zheng Boqi focused on class struggles, anti-imperialism,27 anti-feudalism, and anti-
propertied class.28 Mingxing’s films portray the vicissitudes of the underprivileged (in particular, 
rural peasants, and urban working class) vis-à-vis the corruption of the propertied class, and the 
imperialist incursions in the economic and social fabric of Chinese society.  
On the other hand, the KMT discourse, which emphasized “internal pacification before 
resistance to external attack,” alienated many film audiences at the time who were consumed by 
patriotic zeal.29 The Nationalist Film Movement started by the KMT in 1930, and represented by 
                                                 
26 Hu, Projecting a Nation, 75. 
27 Hu, Projecting a Nation, 77. 
28 Hu, Projecting a Nation, 79. 
29 Even after the Japanese imperial troops attacked Shanghai on January 28, 1932, the KMT, who was the ruling 
party in China at the time, did not fight back but retreated. Furthermore, the KMT government signed the Shanghai 
Truce Agreement with Japan on 5 May 1932, and demanded openly that the Chinese public not to resist Japanese 
incursion. The following is the notice issued by the KMT Ministry of Propaganda to all Chinese film companies: 
From now on, all films relating to the war or containing revolutionary themes will be banned. The government is 
seeking peace with foreign countries and a truce agreement has been signed. As a result, a round-table conference 
will be held in the near future and the world is imbued with a peaceful atmosphere. Under such circumstances, any 
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Luo Mingyou’s Lianhua film company had as its goal to advance the interests of the party 
through the promotion of a set of traditionalist Chinese cultural ideologies and moral values in 
the name of re-establishing social harmony needed for a strong Chinese nation.30 Despite the 
different discourses promoted by the various film companies, each sought to use films to 
promote a Chinese nation that would be able to win its struggles against the political, cultural 
and economic assaults of the Euro-American and Japanese imperialist powers. 
When the war broke out, the film industry in China went into disarray. During the war, 
the Chinese film industry was divided up into three film production centers, Shanghai, 
Chongqing (wartime capital) and Japanese occupied Manchuria. The Japanese full scale attack in 
1937 wrought havoc in the Shanghai film industry. While the Mingxing studio was completely 
demolished by a fire, many filmmakers from Lianhua, which was also destroyed during the war, 
left Shanghai for the interior (in Chongqing) and to Hong Kong.31 Both film companies failed to 
rebuild themselves and subsequently folded.32 Though many left the war torn Shanghai, the 
Orphan Island years (1937-1941) would witness a boom in its film industry.33 Many pro-left 
leaning and progressive artists and intellectuals including Tian Han, Yang Hansheng, Shen 
Xiling, Yuan Muzhi, Cai Chusheng, Sun Yu and Shi Dongshan would make their way to 
Chongqing in their efforts to produce self-defense films in their resistance against the Japanese 
occupation of China.34  
While the Chinese film industry on the mainland would continue precariously in its three 
production centers, namely Shanghai, Chongqing and Manchuria, the film industry in Hong 
                                                                                                                                                             
film that contains provocative themes will affect the peaceful atmosphere and will go against the real intention of the 
government. See Hu, Projecting a Nation, 78. 
30 Hu, Projecting a Nation, 86. 
31 Hu, Projecting a Nation, 120. 
32 Hu, Projecting a Nation, 120. 
33 For an in-depth discussion of the film industry in the orphan island in Shanghai, see Fu, Poshek. Between 
Shanghai and Hong Kong: The Politics of Chinese Cinemas. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003. 
34 Hu, Projecting a Nation, 139. 
 13 
Kong would be greatly enriched by the influx of various waves of cultural workers from the 
mainland. The war in China had brought about much political turmoil as well as social 
displacements to the Chinese people. Amidst the political upheavals on the mainland, many 
filmmakers and cultural workers would take refuge in Hong Kong in order to continue their 
intellectual and artistic crusade for national salvation through film, which they believed had the 
potential to not only entertain but also educate the masses. Within this traveling and moving 
context between the mainland and Hong Kong, the filmic discourse of Chinese nationalism 
would find new expressions. It was during the period of wartime turmoil that we first witnessed 
the co-operation of Shanghai and Hong Kong filmmakers (1938-1941), a period that also saw the 
flourish of “National Defence Cinema.”35 The progressive filmmakers who came to Hong Kong 
from China, including Xia Yan and Sima Huimin who would contribute to the film clean-up 
movements in Hong Kong also brought to the colony’s film industry, the May Fourth cultural 
tradition.36 This progressive filmic tradition salient within 1930s Chinese leftist films37 sought to 
battle against imperialist incursion as well as challenged archaic traditional Confucian moral 
ethics. These filmmakers would use film to lead China toward the path of modernization and 
national salvation. This May Fourth film tradition would in turn inspire the founding of the 
Zhonglian film cooperative, which would carry the torch of the wenren (elite/literati) service 
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mentality of the progressive cultural and film workers to educate the Chinese people through 
their colloquial indigenous language, namely Cantonese (chapter 2).  
When Hong Kong fell to Japan in 1941, Hong Kong had already become an important 
and flourishing headquarter for Cantonese film production, distributing its films to the Chinese 
diasporic audiences in Macau, and parts of the Indies, Burma, the Philippines, and the 
Chinatowns in Australia, the United States and even Canada.38 Between 1931 and 1941, there 
were close to 400 Cantonese films produced in Hong Kong.39 However, the film industry in 
Hong Kong which came under the stringent censorship control and regulations of the Japanese 
occupation government came almost to a standstill. The fall of Hong Kong caused many who 
had originally come to Hong Kong from the mainland to flee to such places as Macao and 
Guangzhou in order to avoid collaborations with the film division of the Japanese imperial 
government in Hong Kong. The only film that was produced in Hong Kong during the three 
years and eight months of Japanese occupation was the propaganda film praising Japan’s Greater 
East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere titled, Attack on Hong Kong (1941). This film was shown on 
December 8, 1942, on the anniversary of the Asia-Pacific War.  
Although the occupation government recognized the potential of film to win the hearts 
and minds of the colonized people, in Hong Kong the Japanese imperialist force encountered 
many difficulties and was in the final analysis ineffective in garnering the popular support of the 
Hong Kong Chinese people via the manipulation over film culture. In early 1943, the Japanese 
imperial power had a stranglehold over the Hong Kong film industry, whereby all films entering 
Hong Kong had to be registered. This strategy was to prevent any anti-Japanese films to be 
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shown in Hong Kong.40 However, since many Chinese actors fled Hong Kong, the Japanese 
occupation government failed to solicit any Hong Kong’s actors to produce new propaganda 
films exulting Sino-Japanese relations. In fact, many films that were shown in Hong Kong during 
Japanese occupation were not new film productions at all but old Chinese films, newsreels and 
old American films.41  Not only did the Japanese rulers find it difficult to recruit Hong Kong 
Chinese actors with whom they could collaborate, due to the fact that Japan was overextending 
its imperial armed forces against the United States and Great Britain, there was continuously a 
shortage of electricity in the colony. This led to limited opening hours of Hong Kong’s theaters 
beginning in September 194342 and again in July 1944 for a total of nine months.43 
In the postwar era, the Hong Kong film industry recovered rapidly and film companies 
struggled to survive within the cutthroat film industry. During the 1950s, the four major 
Cantonese film companies included Xinlian, Zhonglian, Huaqiao (Overseas Chinese) and Kong 
Ngee, while the major film companies producing Mandarin films included Great Wall, 
Fenghuang (both of which are left-wing companies), MP & GI and Shaw Brothers (which were 
backed up and supported by the KMT government).44 The productions of these film companies 
would be dictated by both colonial and Cold War politics and by which side they allied with. 
What distinguishes the film work of these film companies was not only the use of different 
Chinese dialects in their films or the different film genres they focused on. More importantly, 
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these companies differed in the way Chinese morality and Chinese identity were promoted and 
expressed. 
 In his study of the Shaw Brothers film studio, film historian Poshek Fu noted how the 
Shaw Brothers in the 1960s disseminated an “imagined changeless China” and a “China 
forever”45 to the “global pan-Chinese public.”46 In their Mandarin language films, which the 
Nationalist government in Taiwan saw as representative of “Free China,”47 the “modern 
nationhood of China”48 was exulted through folkloric romances and images of a “mythical 
China,”49 where characters are imbued with virtues of traditional Chinese “idealized morality.”50 
The ideology promoted by Shaw Brothers’ film productions in the 1960s was just one of the 
many discourses of Chinese nationalism circulating in colonial Hong Kong. Postwar Hong 
Kong’s film industry witnessed an outburst of competing discourses produced by different film 
companies on what it meant to be Chinese for those living on the mainland, but also in Taiwan, 
Hong Kong and the diasporic Chinese communities in Southeast Asia and North America. 
Within Hong Kong’s cutthroat competition in the film industry Chinese nationalism and 
morality became reconfigured not only over time but also across geopolitical space. This shifting 
nature of Chinese nationalism is discussed in chapter 2, which focuses on Zhonglian and its role 
as postwar Hong Kong’s new cultural elites as opposed to the textile industrialists coined as “an 
economic elite in flight” by Wong Siu-lun.51 To a certain extent, Zhonglian film workers could 
be said to have continued the work of the May fourth progressive cultural workers on the 
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mainland during the 1930s and 1940s. Although the language of patriotic expression had now 
become Cantonese, the preoccupations of the Zhonglian film cooperative continued to revolve 
around stories of the underprivileged and themes about the potential danger of dated Confucian 
family ethics told in a Soviet-inspired social realist cinematic style. 
Hong Kong gradually emerged as a world city in the period from the 1950s through the 
1970s. In many ways, it was already a postcolonial city in the period of decolonization processes 
around the world. Interesting, this movement of Hong Kong toward a global city was parallel to 
its development into a unique local community. It is on the argument of exactly when the Hong 
Konger emerged and a unique Hong Kong identity developed that I differ in opinion from 
Ackbar Abbas.52 As my dissertation hopes to demonstrate, the feverish search for an identity of 
local experience did not first begin as Ackbar Abbas claimed to take place, that is, only after the 
signing of the Sino-British joint declaration (1982-1984) which decided the fate of Hong Kong 
after 1997. Rather, as Hong Kong’s status as a British colony was never certain or a fait 
accompli and as the anxiety of Hong Kong’s colonizers increasingly became aggravated in the 
1950s during the Cold War, Hong Kong’s sense of urgency to becoming something different had 
been fomenting since the immediate postwar period.  
Paradoxically, the process of Hong Kong’s identity formation was intricately imbricated 
within both regionalism and globalism. One significant characteristic of Hong Kong’s local 
identity is the languages that the ethnic Chinese people spoke. Despite the fact that Cantonese 
was the dialect spoken by the majority of the ethnic Chinese living in Hong Kong, a number of 
different Chinese dialects were spoken in postwar Hong Kong as successive waves of migrants 
and refugees sought refuge in Hong Kong prior, during and after WWII. These dialects included 
                                                 
52 Ackbar Abbas, Hong Kong: Culture and the Politics of Disappearance (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1997). 
 18 
Mandarin (or the national language of mainland China), the Wu dialect from Shanghai, as well 
as the Amoy dialect from Xiamen and the Chaozhou (Chiuchow) dialect from the eastern part of 
the Guangdong province and Hakka from the northeastern part of the same province. Despite the 
diversity of regional identities in Hong Kong, Cantonese would gradually emerge as the 
language of postwar Hong Kong popular culture par excellence to become Hong Kong’s 
linguistic expression of local community and identity. 
However, the rise of the status of Cantonese as the lingua franca of Hong Kong’s popular 
culture was not without a struggle and competition with other Chinese dialects such as Mandarin, 
the Wu and Chiuchow dialects. Mandarin films were produced as soon as postwar Hong Kong’s 
film industry recovered, existing alongside Cantonese films until the demise of Cantonese 
cinema in the late 1960s. In fact, Mandarin films would dominate Hong Kong’s film industry 
until the revival of Cantonese cinema in the late 1970s. As for the other dialect films, the first 
Chiuchow movie was produced in Hong Kong in 1955.53 Amoy films were also produced in 
Hong Kong. In 1955, there were roughly eighteen Amoy dialect films produced in Hong Kong, 
and were distributed to such places as Singapore, Taiwan and the Philippines.54 In 1955, only 
one Amoy film was shown in Hong Kong. This is due to the fact that the population of Amoy 
speakers in Hong Kong was small and that Amoy films were not as popular in Hong Kong as 
they were amongst overseas Chinese audiences abroad. 
In the 1950s and 1960s, Mandarin and Cantonese films existed side by side. However, 
with the changing demographics of Hong Kong, and the emergence of Hong Kong’s first free-to-
air television station (Hong Kong Television Ltd., TVB) among other factors, Cantonese film 
came to a gradual demise in the late 1960s and early 1970s (chapter 4). The new medium of 
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television which increasingly brought images from around the world into the homes of many 
Hong Kong people would ironically become the medium that catapulted and solidified 
Cantonese as the language of Hong Kong’s popular culture. In 1968, a year after the founding of 
TVB, 12.3% of households owned television sets (97,000 sets). By 1972, 72% of households 
owned televisions (609, 000 sets).55 It would be in the comfort of their own homes that the Hong 
Kong family found leisure and entertainment in watching Cantonese movie reruns and Cantonese 
live variety shows.  
It was also the Cantonese television stars that revived the Hong Kong’s Cantonese film 
industry with the film, The House of 72 Tenants (1973), which starred Cantonese movie stars 
from the 1960s who had migrated to television and now bringing talent back onto the big screen. 
Subsequently, the world’s audiences would identify Cantonese as Hong Kong’s film language. 
Indeed, Hong Kong’s global and local identities came into being at the very crossroads that 
conjoin both cinema and television cultures in the living rooms of the Hong Kong families. 
Globalism therefore was facilitated and made possible not only by the migration of people, but 
also by the traveling of ideas, talent, capital as well as the fluidity of film and television media. 
Finally the story and history of colonial Hong Kong exposes precisely the intimate 
interrelationships between the local and the global. In this dissertation, it is my argument that the 
local is always in the process of “becoming” within the global forces of colonial and Cold War 
politics. 
***** 
I conclude this introductory chapter with detailed descriptions of the four core chapters of 
my dissertation. Chapter 1 attempts to debunk the myth of the laissez-faire policy of the colonial 
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government in Hong Kong by examining British Hong Kong’s film censorship machinery during 
the Cold War period. The first chapter presents the imperial visual culture of postwar Hong Kong 
as one embroiled in both colonial and Cold War dynamics. The nature and style of colonial 
governance evolved depending on the historical circumstances surrounding the continuing 
possession of the Crown Colony of Hong Kong. Prior to the end of WWII, the British Empire 
was one of the uncontested expansionist colonial powers in Europe. Its imperialist assertion in 
Hong Kong rested on the racial arrogance and elitist mentality of its colonial administrators. As 
such, Hong Kong’s ruling elite did not feel obligated to heed the social welfare and civic liberties 
of its colonial subjects as long as Hong Kong remained stable and prosperous for their 
prerogatives and privilege. However, as a result of Japan’s swift occupation of Singapore, Hong 
Kong and other former British colonies in the Far East during the Pacific War (1941-45), the 
myth of British imperial invincibility began to crumble. The British Empire, though in decline, 
frantically held on to Hong Kong for postwar prestige, hoping that it would continue its influence 
in the new global order. Yet in the age when overt colonialism was frowned upon, the British 
had to exert its influence and justify the legitimacy of its colonial rule in Hong Kong not so much 
through military might and political diplomacy, but rather through the “soft power” over leisure 
and culture. In my study, I focus on the colonial policy over the production and consumption of 
visual media.   
In addition to combating against the debilitating effects of the decolonization process, 
Great Britain had to deal with the anxieties and uncertainties of the Cold War. The retention of 
Hong Kong was complicated by the ongoing ideological warfare amidst the Cold War. In order 
to maintain its presence as a global “Third Force” in the new world order, Great Britain found 
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itself joining the United States in the Cold War battle against communism.56 This partnership 
was due to the fact that Great Britain needed the financial backing of the U.S. in order to secure 
Hong Kong. Not only did Britain have to allow the United States to station its nation’s consular 
officers in its Crown Colony to conduct propagandistic work, but increasingly, Hong Kong also 
became the symbol against global communism and was mobilized by British politicians as the 
“Berlin of the East.”57 In the same period, Britain also found itself combating against the 
Communist-led anti-colonial insurgencies in Malaya and Singapore.58 Therefore, maintaining 
political status quo in Hong Kong became all the more important to ensure British morale and 
prestige during the Cold War. However, this political landscape was further complicated by the 
continuous anxiety that the colonial government in Hong Kong felt vis-à-vis the Communist 
government in mainland China, for the PRC was capable of taking back Hong Kong if it had 
wanted to. In order for Great Britain to defend Hong Kong through diplomatic means, the British 
government had to accommodate the PRC on the one hand and restrain the covert actions of the 
United States on the other.59 It is through an examination of Hong Kong’s censorship policies 
that we discover British Hong Kong’s intention in taming the local forces that was at once 
influenced by the larger political repercussions of the Cold War but in turn shaped the very 
contours of the Cold War dynamic. 
In contrast, chapter 2 presents the history of the cinematic tradition of Cantonese cinema 
in Hong Kong as part of colonial Hong Kong’s local resistance and an alternative expression to 
the representations of Hong Kong’s lived realities produced by the Hong Kong Film Unit (an 
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arm of the Hong Kong government’s Information Services Department). Chapter 2 focuses on 
close analyses of the film work of one important Cantonese film cooperative, Zhonglian (1952-
1967). I argue that as the new cultural elites of postwar Hong Kong, the film workers at 
Zhonglian created an alternative universe, infused with leftist ideology and patriotism that 
traversed beyond the geopolitical boundaries of Hong Kong to reach Southeast Asia. 
Furthermore, their film work and idealism also provided an alternative structure of patriarchy 
that challenged both the imperialist and colonial rhetoric of paternalistic benevolence as well as 
traditional Chinese Confucian ethics of patrilineal dominance. 
One central query that chapter 2 seeks to unravel is how the new arrivals to Hong Kong 
contributed to the construction of postwar Hong Kong community in both cinematic 
representations and bodily lived experiences. Among those who would eventually call Hong 
Kong their home were émigré filmmakers and film artists from Shanghai and Guangzhou as well 
as laborers from the provinces in South China such as Guangdong and Guangxi. These new 
arrivals brought to Hong Kong their unique cultural sensitivities, intellectual and political 
ideologies, capital and labor as well as business and entrepreneurial ambitions and aspirations. 
They were those who experienced the war, tasted the ravages of losing one’s homeland to 
internal turmoil and foreign encroachments, and at the same time, witnessed their former familial 
relations disrupted. Those who came to Hong Kong wanted not only to survive and make a better 
home for themselves and their families, but also to reconstitute the moral fabric of their 
community, family and home in the precarious reality of the Cold War order in colonial Hong 
Kong. 
In addition to presenting a thematic analysis of the corpus of Zhonglian, chapter 2 
deciphers the fan letters to Zhonglian’s trade journal, the Union Pictorial in order to re-
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conceptualize the role of the audiences in Hong Kong as well as those in Macau, and in 
Southeast Asia in the construction of an alternative cinematic community and moral universe of 
pan-Chinese patriotism in and through Cantonese filmic imaginary. In this very process of 
reinventing a moral universe amidst the new bipolar world order, Zhonglian and by extension, 
postwar Hong Kong, became a nodal site where the didactic and moral message of Chinese 
patriotism was produced and from where such ideological ideas were disseminated to overseas 
Chinese communities beyond this British Crown Colony. 
Visual culture or more specifically, filmic representations played a huge role in how the 
British Empire sought to continue its influence in Hong Kong. In particular, both the British 
government and the Hong Kong government attempted to project the image of its prestige and 
benevolence through cinematic representations for local and global consumption on the one hand, 
and on the other maintain the myth of an apolitical Hong Kong. In the 1950s, the Hong Kong 
government was in the midst of establishing its own film unit. At first, it produced very little of 
its own promotional and publicity films for educating (civilizing) and propagandizing to its 
colonial subjects. It continued to rely heavily on the film productions of the Central Information 
Office in London. Chapter 3 not only discusses the emergence of the Hong Kong Film Unit, but 
also its interactions with the audiences of Hong Kong, and the agency of the sheer force of 
colonial bodies in the 1950s and 1960s. It retells the history of the interaction between the 
government and the growing population of Hong Kong in cinematic representation, where the 
Hong Kong people were represented as the problem and menace to colonial establishment, but at 
the same time recognized and praised as the very labor, expertise, strength, and collaborative 
force much needed to uphold the order and security of colonial rule in Hong Kong.  
Anthony Sweeting argues that: 
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Laissez-faire is probably the most commonly used term to describe the general attitude of 
the Hong Kong government. Perhaps equally strong claims could be made for “benign 
indifference” or “enlightened inertia.” Except when faced with threats to its own survival 
(and sometimes threats to its “face”), the Hong Kong government has usually taken a 
noninterventionist stance until some form of crisis management has indicated the 
desirability of action. This has been particularly important in a society that has resembled 
a confederation of communities characterized by energy, disparateness, cultural self-
confidence, and transience.60 
 
But this laissez-faire attitude was not applied to British’s desire over spatial politics of Hong 
Kong. In fact, housing is one area where racial differential treatments between the colonizer and 
the colonized are most prevalent. This chapter also explores the colonial state and society 
relations by focusing on how the colonial government dealt with the large influx of refugees in 
postwar Hong Kong through both housing initiatives and the production of cinematic 
representation to uphold its prestige as the benevolent colonial ruler par excellence amidst the 
uncertain times of decolonization processes around the world. 
Of interest to me are the narrative and representational strategies found in publicity films 
produced by the Hong Kong government in the 1960s. In particular, I examine how and for what 
purposes the problem of overcrowding and housing shortage in postwar Hong Kong was 
represented cinematically by the government. Due to a large influx of people coming from China 
to Hong Kong after WWII and the Communist takeover of the mainland, the management of 
overcrowding was one of the main concerns of the colonial government. To a certain extent, the 
problem of overcrowding and the growth of squatter areas in the postwar period were resolved 
by the Hong Kong government’s resettlement and public housing projects beginning in the mid-
1950s. Subsequently, this success story was reinforced by the film production and publicity 
efforts of the Hong Kong government’s Information Services Department’s (GIS) own film unit 
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(the Hong Kong Film Unit was first established in 1959). In these docudramas, the government 
attempted to create an image of benevolent paternalism that aided Hong Kong in achieving 
modernity and urbanity, even civility and sense of citizenry. Indeed, the history of Hong Kong’s 
postwar miracle and success was retold in a cinematic fashion to help the government project 
locally and globally its prestige in times of British imperial decline during the postwar period. 
However, my analysis will suggest that the government’s attempt to hail the perfect modern 
spectator, and by extension, the modern Hong Kong citizen into being through such filmic events 
might not always be complete or successful. 
Interestingly, the problem of housing, which was resolved by the resettlement housing 
projects in the rural outskirts of new Kowloon and New Territories, created a new grassroots 
community in the periphery of the metropolitan urban core around the Victoria Harbour, which 
was considered by the government as a cradle for unrest, social instability and potential threat to 
colonial rule. Following the pro-Communist-led anti-colonial1967 riots in the streets of Hong 
Kong, the myths of British colonial invincibility and the ethos of Hong Kong’s political apathy 
were debunked once and for all. To prevent future unrests at the resettlement areas, the 
government attempted to deracinate the possibility of future riots and bring the Hong Kong 
populace back to the logic of benevolent paternalism via its mobile film programs. In order to 
reincorporate these resettlement residents into the control of colonial governance, the 
government sent out mobile film teams beginning in the mid-1960s and more so toward the late 
1960s to discipline and educate them through the very publicity films that were produced in the 
early to mid-1960s and which were also projected to audiences overseas. 
This government initiative suggests that the colonial rulers recognized that their 
governance and imperial prestige could not be easily imposed from the top. Rather, its existence 
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was predicated on a negotiation process between the colonial state, the grassroots populace and 
the collaborators of the government as represented by the Mobile Film Team. As huddled masses 
attending such government film screenings, the residents of the public housing complexes re-
conceptualized colonizer/colonized relations through the very act of film viewing in the exterior 
spaces surrounding their residences in the late 1960s. Imperialism was not an uncontested 
sovereign entity but was constructed and conceptualized by all the actors and players on the 
colonial ground. The colonial government was not a supreme power who exercised complete 
control over the bodies and minds of its colonial subjects. Rather, its continuous survival 
depended on the colonial state’s success in co-opting the sheer and affective force of the physical 
bodies on the colonial ground. Furthermore, by interrogating the historical contours of the 
exterior spaces of the government public housing blocks and the interiors of homes as archival 
sites where Hong Kong audiences consumed filmic experiences, I argue that filmic 
representations often exceed the very temporal and spatial continuum bounded by the cinematic 
frame. 
The final chapter examines the interplay between media imperialism and localization in 
and through Hong Kong’s commercial television. This chapter ventures into the realm of the new 
communication technology of television. Why television? Both the social makeup and the 
political concerns in the late 1960s led to the declining popularity of moviegoing in Hong Kong. 
The Cantonese cinema industry suffered a huge setback, which led to its production dwindling 
down to single digits in the early 1970s. However, our narrative of the colonial encounters 
between British Hong Kong and the young generation of Hong Kong people who were born and 
raised in the colony did not end when Cantonese cinema met its brief demise in the late to early 
1970s. In fact, with the advent of “free to air” television in Hong Kong, television viewing 
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became not only a new modern leisure for the Hong Kong family, but also the medium through 
which Hong Kong’s distinctive identity was constructed.  
This final chapter therefore interrogates the extent to which Hong Kong society and 
identity politics became increasingly localized in the late 1960s and early 1970s following the 
watershed event of the Communist-inspired anti-colonial 1967 riots, which was a spillover of the 
Cultural Revolution on the mainland. What was the role of televised images in the making and 
remaking of local Hong Kong community? Was television a communication technology that 
represented a democratizing medium for the construction of citizenship for the Hong Kong 
people in the post-1967 riots period? More importantly, how did colonizer/colonized relations 
change and how colonial governance transformed itself amidst the popular rise of television as 
Hong Kong’s new leisure activity amongst first the middle-class then grassroots audiences? 
The emergence of television did not lead the new generation of television audiences to 
break entirely from Hong Kong’s cinematic traditions. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, when 
box-office receipts for Cantonese cinema declined, the narratives and affects promoted on the 
silver screen did not disappear all at once. Instead, Cantonese cinema, which included the 
productions of Zhonglian and Kong Ngee, found new life and renaissance on first wired and later 
wireless television stations (Rediffusion Television and Television Broadcasting, Ltd.) in the 
form of movie reruns. The birth of television also created new opportunities for Hong Kong 
people to construct a distinctive local identity as well as a means for the recalibration of 
colonizer/colonized relations.  
Firstly, television provided a new technology for the resurgence of local culture and the 
consolidation of the status of Cantonese as the language of Hong Kong’s popular culture par 
excellence. Secondly, television provided a site for the construction of a local sense of belonging 
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by connecting the Hong Kong people to the needs of their community. Thirdly, through 
television, the colonial government could for the first time penetrate into the homes of Hong 
Kong families through the display of Hong Kong’s collective memory in the government 
produced Below the Lion Rock television series. But through the very act of watching television, 
grassroots spectatorship provided a new access point for potentially subverting and 
deconstructing the colonialist discourse of the many myths of Hong Kong’s postwar struggles 
and success now being historicized on television. 
In the four chapters which follow, I trace the history of Hong Kong in and through 
cinematic and televisual images. This is not merely a history of Hong Kong’s cinematic and later 
televisual tradition. But rather, it is a history of colonial encounters that reveals how colonial 
governance was shifting in style and the experiences of colonial encounters was not always a 
top-down construction. It is my contention that the subaltern did speak, if only in imaginary 
terms and through celluloid realities. I hope that my dissertation will have provided a fuller 
reconstruction of a “new” Hong Kong history in colonial modernity, one that is not predicated on 
and confined by state archives, but infused with interdisciplinary sensitivity. It is through visual 
representations where multiple modes of interdisciplinary interrogations begin to intersect. By 
recognizing that the filmic moment is never a fait accompli, but rather a fermenting site where 
new narratives arise, and where new subjects come into being, Hong Kong reclaims the agency 
to tell its own story. What I want to achieve is not only to complicate our picture of Hong Kong 
film and history, but also to enrich our understanding of postwar Hong Kong cinema beyond 
merely focusing on its aesthetics and to appreciate the struggles of the postwar Hong Kong 
society through myriad expressions of the filmic experience. 
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Chapter 1: Censoring Cold War Politics in British Hong Kong 
Introduction   
In the pages of the leftwing newspaper, Wen Wei Pao, the Chinese people who were born 
and raised in Hong Kong, cried out against the unfair treatment of the Hong Kong Film 
Censorship Board toward films from the mainland. They claimed that it is their “sacred right” 
(shensheng quanli) to watch films from the mainland, their “motherland” (zuguo). The press 
incident of September 1965 suggests the desires of a new generation of Hong Kong youths, who 
were ready to call for the recognition by the colonial government of their rights and needs as 
legitimate Hong Kong citizens. This press outcry suggests that a segment of the Chinese people 
in Hong Kong were dissatisfied with the censorship control of films under foreign rule. The 
complaint of the readers of such pro-Communist newspapers as Wen Wei Pao exposes the 
political opposition and the leftwing elements that the colonial government had to suppress in 
Cold War Hong Kong. In order to shed light on the historical significance of the press incident of 
September 1965, this chapter recounts the historical trajectory of colonial rule in Hong Kong 
from the postwar period up to the mid-1960s. It attempts to answer the following questions: Why 
did the government feel impelled to control the cinematic realm in Hong Kong? What were the 
values the colonial government attempted to impose on the people of Hong Kong through film 
censorship and why? What were the reactions of the various political camps in Hong Kong 
toward the film censorship policies of British Hong Kong? It is hoped that by way of answering 
these questions, we get a better understanding of the relationships between film and identity 
politics, colonial governance and popular culture. 
With this press struggle of competing ideologies as the center of our narrative, this 
chapter recounts the history of the ongoing struggles between leftist (Communist) and rightwing 
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(Nationalist Kuomintang) in the field of postwar Hong Kong cinema. In particular, it analyzes 
the ways the multifarious facets of the contentious Cold War period in Hong Kong gave rise to 
the above press incident. It is important to note that the colonial government had to maintain 
order and stability through the political and ideological work of its censorship policies of both 
films imported into and produced locally in Hong Kong. The censorship decisions made by the 
Hong Kong government  exposes not only Great Britain’s struggle for imperial survival, but also 
the delicate postwar relations between Great Britain, mainland China, Taiwan, and even the 
United States in colonial Hong Kong during the 1950s and 1960s. 
Firstly, this chapter discusses the nature of local repercussions of Cold War politics in 
Hong Kong. This historical account reveals the ways whereby the colonial government struggled 
for international recognition and global power within the framework of cold warfare and 
decolonization in Hong Kong. In order to secure a position of global power within the Cold War 
world order that increasingly battled against the United States’ seemingly progressive and 
humane disapproval toward older remnants and vestiges of euro-colonial rule, British 
imperialism had to reinvent itself in a new form. This new form of British imperialism did not 
function so much as a political regime ruling over colonial subjects through firearms, but rather 
as a “soft power” that exercised cultural hegemonic influence over its colonies by adopting a 
veneer of good service, of transparent communication, and of effective rule that led its colonial 
territories toward the building of modern infrastructures which were conducive to the continuing 
growth of industrializing urban milieus.  
Secondly, this chapter seeks to unravel the politics behind the colonial machinery of film 
censorship as administered by the Hong Kong Public Relations Office (PRO, 1946–1959), which 
was later renamed the Information Services Department (or the Government Information 
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Services (GIS), 1959- ). It is by way of the censorship and production activities under the 
PRO/GIS that the British imperial government gained access to the information machinery on 
the colonial ground of Hong Kong not only to legitimize but also to publicize its colonial rule in 
a more flattering guise. After a discussion of the political and historical frameworks of 1950s and 
1960s Hong Kong, my chapter returns to a closer analysis of a few examples of film censorship 
in Hong Kong between the late 1940s through to the mid-1960s, culminating in the press 
incident of September 1965. Finally, to further expose the racial arrogance and exclusivity of 
colonial rule and the differential treatments by the colonial government of the Chinese audiences 
in Hong Kong, this chapter ends with a short discussion of the contentious relationship between a 
private film society, Studio One, and the Hong Kong Film Censorship Board. 
This chapter narrates the historical narrative of film censorship and colonial governance 
within the backdrop of the competing political and cultural forces in Cold War Hong Kong. The 
Cold War drama in Hong Kong was characterized by the following struggles. On the one hand, 
the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Nationalist Kuomintang Party (KMT) rallied the 
Hong Kong Chinese to support its legitimate status as the true leader of one China. On the other 
hand, British Hong Kong not only had to counter the threats of leftist anti-establishment 
elements in Hong Kong but also had to control the overt intervention of the United States’ global 
combat against communism in the colony by fabricating the cinematic façade of an impartial, 
apolitical and modernizing colonial Hong Kong. The central question that concerns us here is not 
only why and how Hong Kong remained a British Crown Colony amidst the decline of the 
prestige of European imperialism following WWII, but also what implications and repercussions 
this had for the Hong Kong people in their interaction with their colonial ruler. In order to 
explore the drama, struggles and complexity behind how the Hong Kong government dealt with 
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its colonial subjects in the imminent decline of imperial prestige, my chapter revisits the 
transitional period of 1950s and 1960s Hong Kong from the privileged vantage of the 
contentious realm of postwar Hong Kong cinema. 
 
Colonial Governance and Film in Cold War Hong Kong 
Hong Kong became a British Crown Colony after the defeat of Qing China to Great 
Britain’s military forces in the first Opium War (1839-1842). From the outset, the raison d’être 
of this British imperial outpost was the strategic position it offered for the British imperialist 
designs on trade and military expansion in the Far East. Hong Kong was administered by an 
appointed governor who was assisted by the executive and legislative councils. The ruling elite 
were a small group of European expatriates, administering over an overwhelming majority of a 
Chinese population. The colonial administrators who discharged the daily routine duties in the 
colonial government were called cadets and since 1960 were renamed as administrative officers. 
Entrance into the colonial administration of Hong Kong was racially exclusive. In fact, since 
1904, it was a requirement for all civil service examinees to be descendants of pure European 
blood.61   These early cadets formed an elite ruling class, whose pride and arrogance imposed a 
patronizing worldview upon the Chinese population of Hong Kong that was at times racist and 
exclusive.  
Due to both external political forces as well as the politicized actions of local actors, such 
as film producers and audiences on the colonial ground in the postwar period, the interactions 
between the ruling elite and Hong Kong society witnessed a gradual change in the cultural realm. 
Postwar Hong Kong in the 1950s and 1960s marked a transitional period and a pronounced 
change in the way that the colonial government managed its subjects. The makeup of the colonial 
                                                 
61 See Norman Miners, Hong Kong under Imperial Rule, 1912-1941 (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1987), 
85. 
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government became gradually localized beginning in the late 1960s. As Hong Kong’s population 
grew in number, and a new generation of Hong Kong born constituency gradually became more 
and more engaged in local politics and affairs, the colonial government had to devise new 
strategies to sustain its privileges in an increasingly polarized Hong Kong society. Prewar 
colonial governance of racial exclusivity, laissez-faire, and indifference began to incorporate 
postwar policies of local cooptation and more overt social welfare initiatives of benevolent 
paternalism. As such, the contours of colonial governance were not fixed or stable, but were 
constantly transforming, being debated about and challenged against, as well as responding to 
cultural and political forces that were potential, real and imaginary.  
Although Great Britain and the allies came out as victors following WWII, the British 
Empire suffered not only capital and bodily losses, but also a decline of its imperial prestige. Due 
to the swift defeat of the British forces in Singapore, Malaya and Hong Kong in the Pacific War 
to the Japanese, the myth of Great Britain’s invincibility was tarnished. In order to salvage its 
influence in the new world order, Great Britain fought to retain Hong Kong amidst the 
democratic call for decolonization. Due to a series of political uncertainties risen from the 
Chinese Civil War (1946-1949), the ascendancy of the Communist Party in China, and 
subsequently, the Korean War (1950-53), the issue of Hong Kong’s return was indeterminately 
placed on the wayside and remained an unresolved concern for Great Britain, Communist China, 
and Hong Kong, whilst other former imperial territories eventually gained their own 
independence.     
Though Hong Kong remained a British colony, the post-WWII Cold War milieu in Hong 
Kong saw the potential and constant menace emanating from Communist China. One of the main 
concerns for British policy makers and Hong Kong’s colonial administrators in the Cold War 
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period was the growing influences of communist factions in Hong Kong, which penetrated in the 
areas of politics, commerce and education. The CCP also sought to gain influence in Hong Kong 
by spreading its leftist ideology in Hong Kong as well as encouraging Hong Kong’s labor force 
to support activities in Southern China.62 The CCP also exported its ideology and provided 
financial aid to political groups in former colonial territories in Southeast Asia, such as Vietnam, 
Cambodia, Burma, Thailand, the Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia.63 The most vexing 
concern for the British government was twofold: firstly, the rise of communist forces in former 
colonial territories that would present potential challenge to the British government’s new found 
role on the new democratic and capitalist world stage; and secondly, the spread of leftist 
elements that might potentially engender the rise of indigenous national sentiments in Hong 
Kong.  
Nonetheless, communist influence in Hong Kong remained quietly and delicately 
contained. This is due to the reality that Great Britain, in the aftermath of the two great wars, 
could not afford to alienate yet another potential diplomatic relation. Shortly after the founding 
of the People’s Republic of China, Great Britain recognized the government of the mainland, 
while other countries refused to establish official diplomatic relations with Communist China. 
Paradoxically, in the midst of the struggles of the Cold War period, where the Soviet Union and 
the United States were great rivals, Great Britain was an ally of the United States in the fight 
against communism and the growing power of the communist bloc of nations. Although Great 
Britain was extremely anxious about diminishing the influence of communism in its last colony, 
namely, Hong Kong, the British government could not ignore the undeniable strength and power 
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of the CCP. Due to various factors, the most important of which was the continuing economic 
interests that Britain had in China and the Far East, the British government adopted the 
diplomatic policy of “keeping a foot in the door” in China, and “attempted to accord formal 
diplomatic recognition to revolutionary China in order to preserve British interests there.”64 On 
the other hand, Great Britain could not antagonize the United States for the declining British 
Empire needed the support of this rising new power to secure its interests in East Asia and most 
importantly to secure its rule over Hong Kong.65 Interestingly, it is in Hong Kong where all these 
forces and political interests found expression. In the safe haven of colonial Hong Kong, 
communist elements, Nationalist rightwing forces, as well as American intelligence were able to 
exist side by side, and struggled against each other in both political and cultural spheres.  
Despite the potential threat from the mainland, the leader of the People’s Republic of 
China, Chairman Mao Zedong had expressed his desire to maintain the status quo in Hong 
Kong.66 For Communist China, the ongoing colonial status of Hong Kong offered the mainland a 
window onto the West. Though it may be true that the traverse of people between China and 
Hong Kong following October 1949 became more and more regularized and controlled, Hong 
Kong’s entrepôt economy maintained close ties with the mainland for a short while until the 
American-induced United Nations embargo on the export of strategic goods to China during the 
Korean War was imposed. Following the takeover of the Communist regime on the mainland 
and later the Korean War (1950-1953), the United States also played a crucial role in the Cold 
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War in Hong Kong.67  On the one hand, the threat of potential attack and retaliation from the 
PRC dictated how Great Britain ruled Hong Kong. On the other hand, in order to ensure that the 
Communist regime on the mainland did not retaliate and attack Hong Kong with arms, the 
colonial government in Hong Kong felt that it was crucial that the United States did not tilt the 
boat too much by their anti-Communist initiatives and intelligence work in the Colony.68 One 
way to ensure that Hong Kong’s continuing stability was to control the ideological battle 
between forces of various political persuasions through censorship. Indeed, within these various 
forces, the fate of Hong Kong as a British Crown Colony continued to exist in a precarious 
balance. Colonial rule in Hong Kong was neither undisturbed nor unchallenged. In fact, the study 
of the history of postwar Hong Kong cinema exposes how Hong Kong’s stability and prosperity 
were on numerous occasions, threatened and affected. 
The contribution of this chapter to the history of colonial rule in Hong Kong lies in 
reassessing the importance of filmic representation to the maintenance of colonial prestige in the 
postwar era. How did the manipulation of film production and censorship as a form of 
psychological or ideological warfare play a role in colonial governance? As noted above, Cold 
War Hong Kong society was in a precarious position, for its fate as a British colony was not 
guaranteed. In order to counter the ideological threats from Communist China, British Hong 
Kong became a censoring state, as well as a film production factory. On the one hand, British 
Hong Kong’s censorship policies expose the concerns of Great Britain in maintaining stability in 
postwar Hong Kong. On the other hand, the draconian and interventionist censorship control of 
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colonial Hong Kong over film distribution reveals the government’s plan to erase any apparent 
struggles between the Communists and Nationalists in Hong Kong in order to fabricate the 
façade and myth of Hong Kong and its people as politically apathetic.  
 
The Censorship Machinery in the Postwar Hong Kong 
The Hong Kong government recognized the importance of film censorship immediately 
following WWII. Censorship was an integral part of the problem of imperial survival, as 
illustrated by the urgent memo from the official film censor for the Colony and Federation of 
Malaya, Jack Evans, to J.W. Wilson of Hong Kong’s Education Department asking for advice on 
“titles of films presented for Hong Kong Censorship,” “[d]ecision of [the] Hong Kong Censor 
board of [the] same [titles],” “[and] [d]etails of cuts and bans if any.”69 This information was 
crucial, according to Evans.  Not only did most Chinese films enter the Malaya via Hong Kong, 
but film censorship decisions affected their “common interests” as British colonial territories.70 
Indeed, the heart of the Cold War problem and solution in colonial Hong Kong lies in the control 
over political censorship. Hong Kong’s film censorship machinery reveals the problems and 
concerns that were unique to this Crown Colony, its government and local people during the 
postwar period. Amidst the uncertainties and anxieties of Cold War politics, the colonial 
government controlled which films could and could not be shown in Hong Kong through their 
often draconian censorship policies, and dictated the filmic representation of what it meant to be 
living in Hong Kong in the 1950s and 1960s. The main objective was to create a seemingly 
apolitical Hong Kong as to maintain law and order and stability so that the colonial government 
could continue to reap benefits as long as they could in the free port of Hong Kong. Film 
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censorship also ensured that the ideological contest between proponents of leftwing and 
rightwing forces on the colonial ground did not get out of control. Furthermore, the structure and 
practice of Hong Kong’s film censorship suggests the extent to which racial exclusivity 
continued to figure into colonial governance on the one hand, and how colonial arrogance and 
differential treatments of various segments of film audiences were based on imperial designs and 
left-right politics on the other. Indeed, in the 1950s, the colonial control over film viewing was 
increasingly enmeshed in various negotiation processes whereby the Chinese people in Hong 
Kong redefined their allegiance, loyalty and identity as Chinese, as British subjects and as 
modern filmgoers.  
The Public Relations Office began to administer the Hong Kong censorship division in 
1953 when the Film Censorship Regulations became part of the official legislation of the Hong 
Kong government. First established immediately after the war in 1946, the PRO fostered and 
maintained transparent communication networks and relations between the Hong Kong 
government and the English and Chinese press. The PRO was also charged with the mission of 
ensuring that there was a transparent communication flow between the Hong Kong Government 
and the citizens of the colony, in regard to the activities of the colony and those of Her Majesty’s 
Government, through all forms of “mass communication,” such as the local press, broadcasting, 
film, and visual display.71  
Censorship policy, or rather “political censorship,” in the parlance of colonial Hong Kong, 
was paramount to and an integral part of the authority of the colonial government of Hong Kong 
after the war. It was also part of the defence of the British government and its colonial territories, 
such as Hong Kong. A façade of peace and order also had to be refashioned in Hong Kong in the 
aftermath of the shame of the swift defeat endured by the British when Japan attacked first Pearl 
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Harbor, then Shanghai and Hong Kong thereafter. Censorship was an integral part of imperial 
survival and security and played a huge part in the reemergence of British power in Hong Kong. 
Recognizing that “[t]here are a number of cinema films in the Colony since before the war, and it 
is probable that new films will soon start to come in from China,” the colonial government 
decided that film censorship had to be firmly reestablished as early as September 1945.72 In the 
postwar period, once the foreign film industries began to recover, in addition to films from the 
mainland and Taiwan, films from countries such as France, Italy, Japan, India and the Soviet 
Union were also allowed to be distributed to Hong Kong.  
Not all films from these countries were allowed to be shown in Hong Kong. Before any 
film could be screened and exhibited in British Hong Kong, it had to pass through the purview of 
the Hong Kong film censors. As such, the film censorship board had the full authority to dictate 
which films the Hong Kong people could see. The Hong Kong Film Censorship Regulations of 
195373 standardized the procedures for the composition of the panel and for appeals against the 
censors’ decision. Furthermore, the regulations empowered the Colonial Secretary to chair the 
board of appeal on the occasion that the Film Censorship Board received any complaints from 
the public. Prior to 1953, film censorship was administered by the Commissioner of Police. From 
the very outset, film censorship policies in Hong Kong were concerned with issues of stability 
and order, local morality, the maintenance of friendly relations with other neighborly nations, 
and potential threats to the colonial government.  
First drafted on February 22, 1947 by the Commissioner of Police, and later distributed to 
all Censors of Cinematograph Films by the Film Censoring Panel, the Terms of Reference for 
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Film Censors of 1947 provided the following eight points when reviewing a film for local 
screening:74 
To view and examine films and posters for exhibition to the public in Hong Kong for the 
purpose of eliminating any film or portion of a film or poster or sound track which is 
calculated to: 
1) offend against or bring into contempt the accepted rules of morality or decency; 
2) provoke feelings of racial or national hostility or any resentment on religious grounds; 
3) exacerbate political rivalries; 
4) prejudice unfavourably relations with friendly powers; 
5) tend to corrupt the minds by examples of gross depravity or obscenity or sordidness; 
6) glorify crime, the use of violence and criminal methods; 
7) encourage the use of firearms or other lethal weapons to commit crimes of violence (or 
terrorism or overthrow the rule of law and order or established Government); 
8) incite any section of the community to attempt to overthrow by force the established 
Government.75 
 
The above unlegislated and internal directives sent to all film censors reflected key strategic and  
political concerns of colonial officials in Hong Kong in the postwar period, which extended into 
the 1970s.76 In the post-World War II period, the above eight guidelines indicate what the 
colonial government believed to be the ingredients and conditions for the maintenance of order 
and stability in and outside of Hong Kong that would ultimately affect the legitimacy of the 
British Empire. By administering such film censorship guidelines, and more concretely, 
monitoring the dissemination of visual information throughout the colony, the colonial 
government in Hong Kong ensured that the colonial image remained untainted by visual politics 
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spread by the enemies of the government, but at the same time attempted (but ultimately failed) 
to foster a politically and morally apathetic consumption environment where the Hong Kong 
audience would not be incited to action against the imperial government. 
The film censors of Hong Kong became potent and influential agents to implement such 
rules, as the interpretation of the above guidelines rested almost entirely at their discretion. 
Censorship policies were at once regulated by law, yet implemented by the subjective hands and 
interpretation of the few who were appointed to positions in the Film Censorship Board. 
Information available in regard to the makeup of the film censorship panel before the enactment 
of the 1953 regulations reflects the intricate ways that film censorship penetrated all aspects of 
social and political life of Hong Kong. Film censors appointed between 1945 and 1948 also 
occupied positions within the ranks of the Education Department, the police force, the Chinese 
Chambers of Commerce, the Po Leung Kuk and the Justice of Peace, all of which represented the 
upper echelons of economic, cultural and legal aspects of Hong Kong society.77 
Film censors held the position of power over the filmic representation field in Hong Kong 
and by extension had control over the definition of public morality. Their duty was to check  
anti-establishment threats and to enforce the image management of the colonial government. 
They were indeed among the top elite of bureaucracy. Their identities, however, were never 
disclosed to the public. It was not until the 1970s when the identities of the censors were 
revealed publicly in the local newspapers. We learn that Chief Censor, William Hung and the 
rest of the film censors, who were appointed in the 1950s, were already in their late sixties and 
close to their retirement age.78 British Hong Kong exercised control over the appointment of the 
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Censorship Board as well as the censorship guidelines which all censors had to consult when 
deciding which films should be banned or permitted to screen in Hong Kong. The process of 
their selection reveals the exclusivity and privilege in the censorship machinery and by extension 
the colonial governance of Hong Kong. As stipulated by section 2 of the Film Censorship 
Regulations, 1953, the Governor “may by notification in the Gazette appoint a panel of censors 
and make such amendments and additions to the composition thereof as he may deem 
necessary.”79 Film censors were chosen from the top tiered Hong Kong society, that is, those 
with political influence, or with reputable economic and financial status. Or they were chosen 
from established and influential organizations or associations. As such, access to positions in the 
film censorship board was limited by class and race. 
In the immediate postwar period, when the Chinese people in Hong Kong were still 
primarily excluded from the decision making process within the colonial administration 
(according to Hong Kong scholars Norman Miners and Steve Tsang, Hong Kong’s cadet system 
began to localize its recruitment toward the late 1960s), a segment of the Chinese population was 
nonetheless recruited to become film censors. When film censorship was resumed in 1945, film 
censors who understood Chinese films from the mainland were needed. The first postwar film 
censors responsible for the censoring of mainland Chinese films were Miss Helen Yu, Mr. Chan 
Kwan Po, and Mr. George She.80 Other Chinese people of influence were also invited to 
participate in the colonial machinery of censorship. For instance, in 1947, Dr. I. [Irene] Cheng, 
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who was recently appointed as Woman Inspector of Vernacular Schools and was the daughter of 
Sir Robert Ho Tung,81 was recommended to be a film censor.82  
The appointment of Chinese film censors was a necessity as Chinese films from 
Communist China had to be translated and interpreted by someone fluent in the language and 
understood the culture. It was perhaps in this one colonial division where Chinese people could 
have an active decision making position in what local Chinese people in Hong Kong were 
allowed to watch. They served as interpreters of Chinese films produced locally and in mainland 
China and Taiwan. As the colonial Hong Kong needed local Chinese to censor Chinese language 
films, Chinese people were able to enter into the ranks of political influence. But as part of the 
colonial machinery of political censorship, they also inadvertently became collaborators of a 
foreign rule. 
Yet these Chinese film censors who were part of the Film Censorship Board did not have 
the final veto power over which films could be exhibited, for their decision could be overturned 
by the Board of Review. The decision of the film censors could be appealed by the film company 
or the hirer of the film. When this happened, the film was forwarded to the Appeal Board of 
Review. The Board of Review consisted of the Commissioner of Police, the Director of 
Education, the Director of Social Welfare, and the Secretary of Chinese Affairs, who was also 
the Chairman of the Board of Review. The Review Board arbitrated the appeals made by 
distributors and the public in regard to the decision of the Censorship Board. Not only did the 
Board of Review have the power to veto and change the verdicts of the Film Censorship Board, 
its decision was deemed final and could not be further appealed. The Chairman of the Board of 
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Review was also the Secretary for Chinese Affairs, who served as the intermediary between the 
Chinese people and the British government Although some of the film censors had to be Chinese 
as they had to censor films coming from China and Taiwan, the officials who sat on the Board of 
Review were usually the heads of department who were always European expatriates and never 
Chinese.83 This cohort not merely reflected but had concrete power governing Hong Kong’s 
social, cultural and political life. 
At first glance, the censorship directives gave the impression that the Hong Kong 
government’s intention was solely to maintain peace and order in British Hong Kong and to 
ensure the moral wellbeing of its colonial subjects. However, when we take a closer look at a 
few examples of which films were in fact cut and or banned in their entirety, we begin to 
uncover the nuances of Cold War politics within the very functions of the Film Censorship 
Board. Below, I examine three censorship examples from the period between the late 1940s and 
mid-1960. From these examples, we identify the recurrent concerns of the colonial film censors 
as well as their changing attitudes toward locally produced and mainland Chinese films and the 
political elements of subversion that they saw in the films they banned. 
 
Three Cases of Film Censorship in Cold War Struggles 
The example of the censoring of the locally produced film, Broken Heart Flower (1948), 
which was made in the midst of the Chinese Civil War when the Communist Party of Mao 
Zedong and the Nationalist Kuomintang Party of Chiang Kai-shek were battling for supremacy 
in China provides a nuanced window onto the delicate situation that the Hong Kong government 
found itself vis-à-vis Western countries, such as the United States, as well as the important task 
of maintaining a positive image of its colonial rule. As the fate of Hong Kong was yet to be 
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determined and the leadership on the mainland was still unsettled, the main goal of British Hong 
Kong was to maintain political security, order and law as well as to minimize the risks of 
provoking other Western countries. At first glance, it would seem that the primary reasons for 
banning Broken Heart Flower was to prevent the spreading of moral degeneracy promoted by 
the film. From reading the summaries of the film censor, Helen Yu, we may have well settled 
with the explanation that this film would degrade moral standards among the youths in Hong 
Kong.84 However, on reading the handwritten notes accumulated in the censorship process, we 
discover that the desire to not disturb or provoke hostile relations with other Western countries 
was a factor that was just as important as the surface reason provided by Yu, that is, of upholding 
the standards of good morality in Hong Kong. It follows then that Broken Heart Flower can be 
categorized as a “political film,” not so different from the numerous mainland Chinese patriotic 
documentaries that often fell under the cold blades of Hong Kong’s film censors. 
What follows are quotations from the Chinese film script submitted to the Film 
Censorship Board for review. These two dialogue texts, which occurred in two separate scenes, 
were underlined in red ink by the film censor to note their vulgar nature and to serve as examples 
to support her argument and verdict of banning The Broken Heart Flower. 
Eight Auntie: Hmm, we have to hire Mr. Wong to teach you some English words. In 
Hong Kong, not understanding English is no good. Oh, you know what? Our company 
does business entirely with the foreigners.85 
 
Ai Li: Oh, let me tell you what business we do. It’s exactly the same as the butcher 
business. Instead of selling pork like a butcher does, here, we sell human flesh.86 
                                                 
84 HKRS 163-1-663, Film Censorship…of Duen Cheung Far, Item 4, Letter to Secretary of Film Censoring Panel, 
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This film tells the story of a young widow of a Chinese war hero, who, after being driven to 
poverty, turns to prostitution and in the end meets the sad fate of death by suicide. The film was 
censored in October; the reason was: “It all sounds a pretty unsavoury ‘flower’ & rightly 
banned.”87 According to the film censor, Helen Yu, the film is: “unsuitable for public exhibition 
in this Colony.” She further notes: 
The whole story is not clean but most scenes are offensive as well to Chinese as to 
English people and, after trying to cut the most objectionable scenes and dialogue in 
other parts, I finally deemed it better to ban the film as a whole, because, even if half the 
film was cut, the remaining part would still be centered on low aspects of a part of life 
which this Colony has been trying for years to eliminate and the entire action takes place 
in Hongkong.88 
 
Why was this film banned? It is certain that other films portraying women as prostitutes were 
shown in Hong Kong before and after the war.  
Helen Yu’s explanation points to the moral degradation of the film’s portrayal of 
prostitution. But the political implications of this film were not directly referred to in the film 
censor’s commentary. In fact, references to Westerners as the main customers of the brothel, 
which is compared to a butchery, were made throughout the film. As the clientele of the illicit 
house of disrepute, Westerners were by association implicated in the illegal act of symbolic 
cannibalism. Although the film censor banned this film by the reason of “taste” and “morality,” 
from the underlined quotations from the script which I translated above, what was at stake was 
beyond Hong Kong’s public morality, but rather, the utmost importance of not portraying the 
European expatriate community and perhaps other foreigners and Western countries in a 
negative light. 
Earlier in her commentary, Yu notes:  
                                                 
87 HKRS 163-1-663, Film Censorship…of Duen Cheung Far, Item 1, Memo from the Government Public Relations 
Officer in Hong Kong to the Secretary of Film Censoring Panel, 6 October 1948. 
88 HKRS 163-1-663, Film Censorship…of Duen Cheung Far, Item 1, Memo from the Government Public Relations 
Officer in Hong Kong to the Secretary of Film Censoring Panel, 6 October 1948. 
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Her first lesson from the man who owns the house consists of the minimum of 
expressions in the English language in order to allure European men from the streets and 
to bargain with them. He tells her plainly that his business is mainly with Europeans, 
therefore it is necessary for her to put her heart and soul to learn the following: --  
Hello, Open the door, Love me, Too Dear, Five dollar note etc.89 
 
Compared to the underlined section of the script, such observation indicates that the film 
censor was sensitive to any negative portrayal of the European expatriate community in Hong 
Kong. The following commentary from Helen Yu confirms our analysis: 
One conversation is about the hardships they have to endure in their profession, and how 
they lost business in being driven away from their posts in the streets by the police. One 
of them suggests, “We will try the DAI FUT, Wanchai” (“Big Buddah”), well known 
place for prostitutes for Europeans, especially men in HMG Services.90 
 
The conversation quoted above implies that Europeans and European expatriates serving 
Her Majesty’s Government were the main clientele of local prostitution. When the legitimacy of 
British colonial rule in Hong Kong was still in question, the portrayal of the ruling elite as the 
primary customers of the illegal sex industry in the colony would have defamed and insulted the 
authority of the colonial rulers. In this early postwar film, when the Communist Party and the 
Nationalist Party were still embroiled in the Civil War, the concerns of the film censors was not 
so much to control leftist elements and to contain the proliferation of such influences to be sown 
in Kong Hong. Rather, they were more concerned with eliminating any anti-Western propaganda. 
More importantly, as the fate of Hong Kong as a British colony was uncertain, the colonial 
government was desperate to stamp out any negative portrayals of its influence and presence in 
Hong Kong. Immorality was furnished as the reason for banning this film. But as the 
commentaries above suggest, “morality” was merely an excuse to ban this film and erase the 
negative portrayals of Americans and European expatriates sprinkled throughout the subtext of 
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this film. As the banning of this film illustrates, film censors were agents of the Hong Kong 
government, whose duty was to maintain political order on the cultural and ideological front, as 
well as to ensure the stable development of business and modern civic order in Hong Kong 
amidst the precarious position and power of the British Empire. Yet, “politics” could not always 
be contained in the fervent Cold War milieu of colonial Hong Kong. 
In the mid-1950s, when Cold War struggles became the main concern of the colonial 
administration and amidst Communist China’s efforts to industrialize and consolidate its 
revolutionary efforts across mainland China, the Chinese central government’s film organ also 
produced an increasing number of both full-length feature films and documentaries narrating and 
praising the progressive change brought by the Communist Party led by Chairman Mao Zedong. 
Documentaries and features alike were the foodstuff that fueled the ideological work of 
Communist China in the PRC. They were also meant to be distributed to other countries, 
especially to Hong Kong, as a way to garner support among the Chinese population for the 
Communist cause.  On the part of the PRC, in order to spread this earnest and sincere message 
from the motherland to the compatriots in such places as Hong Kong, these films had to be 
projected and screened there. The colonial government of Hong Kong on the other hand knew 
that its mission to publicize the reincarnation of its bureaucratic transparency and imperial 
benevolence would be compromised by the propaganda from Communist China. What the 
British government in London and more so the officials in colonial Hong Kong were concerned 
with was the rise of indigenous nationalism among the Hong Kong grassroots populace.  
After the Communist takeover of mainland China and the retreat of Chiang Kai-shek and 
his KMT Party to Taiwan, Hong Kong became one of the battlefields for the ongoing struggle 
between the two parties. Yet following the Korean War, when the United States sent out its fleet 
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to patrol the Taiwan Straits, Communist China could on longer liberate Taiwan via military 
attacks. Instead both the Maoist regime and the government in Taiwan began an ideological 
battle on celluloid as a means to garner support and allegiance to their individual party-state. As 
the main political struggle between the CCP-KMT contest over the throne to China became more 
and more intensified in the 1950s, the colonial government had to erase this struggle in Hong 
Kong for fear that any overt attacks from either side would cause disturbances in the colony. 
What were the films shown in Hong Kong in the 1950s? In addition to films produced 
locally, films from countries such as the United States, Soviet Union, France, Italy, India, Japan, 
mainland China and Taiwan, etc. were imported and distributed in Hong Kong. Just as locally 
produced films with political implications were monitored by the Film Censorship Board of 
Hong Kong, films from all other countries had to pass through the board before they could be 
shown to the general Hong Kong public. In the 1950s, government records on individual cases of 
films censored had been weeded out. It is not clear which films were censored and why. From 
the censorship data found in the tables published in the PRO reports, the bias of the film censors 
in Hong Kong becomes evident. In the early 1950s, films from the mainland and the Soviet 
Union were heavily censored, while films from other countries, such as the United States, and 
Italy among many others were not censored as much (table 1).  
As noted by the Director of Information Services, N.J.V. Watt in his 1970 assessment of 
the work of the Film Censorship Board of Hong Kong in the past twenty years, film censorship 
in the early 1950s was “draconian.” Before the Film Censorship Regulations were issued in 1953, 
censorship was undertaken by the Police. Just as political demonstrations in the Colony were 
prohibited, film footage of “Chinese leaders, political rallies and flags, Communist or Nationalist, 
 50 
were banned.”91 Films from both the mainland and the Soviet Union and other countries with 
overt social and political undertones were often banned. In the period since 1955 when the 
censorship duty was passed to the Censorship Board of Hong Kong, Watt observed that the Panel 
of Film Censors were more relaxed in its deliberations and applied the same standards toward 
both films from the mainland and Taiwan.  
As the titles of films banned and the contents that were excised are unavailable, it is 
difficult to make any conclusive assessment of the validity of Watt’s statements, which he made 
in retrospect in 1970. Were the film censors in the 1950s exercising fair and similar standards 
vis-à-vis Taiwan and mainland Chinese films? Was the colonial government in fact more strict 
toward mainland Chinese films? According to the local Hong Kong leftwing newspaper, Ta 
Kung Pao, there was obviously a bias of the Film Censorship Board against mainland Chinese 
films. On September 3rd, 1958, Ta Kung Pao, a leftwing newspaper (funded and supported by the 
Communist Party) published an article to protest against the Film Censorship Board on behalf of 
the employees of the Southern Film Corporation, which was at that time the sole distributor of 
mainland Chinese films in Hong Kong. The workers decried against the unreasonable actions of 
the film censors for cutting out scenes showing the PRC national flag, or presenting the national 
anthem, as well as scenes with Chairman Mao and other leaders. Films from the mainland listed 
in the newspaper include: The Happy Way to Lhasa, The National Day of 1952, The National 
Day of 1953, and The Glorious Fifth Anniversary. The injustice expressed by Ta Kung Pao was 
based in part by the fact that films produced by “the Chiang clique,” which include The Voice of 
the Free Front, Taiwan, the Treasure Island and Today’s Taiwan, where the flag of the Chiang 
regime and Chiang Kai-shek himself appeared were allowed to be screened in Hong Kong. 
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 51 
 This attack was not sustained and seemed to be an isolated attack from the Southern Film 
Corporation against the film censorship board of Hong Kong. Ten years later, in September 1965, 
only weeks before the October 1st national day celebration in Hong Kong, a sustained struggle 
between the colonial government as represented by the Film Censorship Board and the leftist 
elements as represented by the pro-Communist newspaper, Wen Wei Pao ensued. Unlike the 
news attack of Ta Kung Pao in 1958, the 1965 press incident lasted for almost two weeks and the 
voices of a segment of the Hong Kong’s audiences were represented. Beginning on September 
10th, Wen Wei Pao and other leftwing newspapers published a series of articles criticizing the 
unfair judgment of the Film Board toward films of all genres that were produced on the 
mainland.92 The press in Hong Kong at the time can be categorized into four camps:  pro-
Communist or leftist (Wen Wei Pao, Ta Kung Pao), pro-Nationalist (Kung Sheung Yat Pao),93 
neutral (Wah Kiu Yat Pao), and English language newspapers, such as the South China Morning 
Post, the Hong Kong Tiger Standard and the China Mail. The growing number of newspapers 
suggested an increasing number of readers in 1960s Hong Kong. These newspapers provided the 
new and engaging readers with a wider range of portals to stay informed of events and 
developments in their society. Furthermore, the various newspapers of different political 
persuasions provided the Hong Kong Chinese with diverse conduits to express their thoughts 
about certain policies of the government. More specifically, the press situation also meant that 
newspaper readers as well as the film going audiences became more and more in touch with the 
political situation on the mainland. By examining this print battle between the various 
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newspapers, we get a better sense of the leftist (PRC) and Nationalist (KMT) struggles in the 
field of film representation in Hong Kong.  
On September 10, 1965, the Hong Kong based leftwing newspaper, Wen Wei Pao 
published two letters from a “group of audiences” expressing their frustrations over the scant 
number of films from their “mother country,” Communist China being shown in Hong Kong.94 
These readers wondered why documentaries showing national day celebrations, which had been 
produced since the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, were not shown in Hong 
Kong for over ten years now, while audiences in Macau and Guangzhou were able to see them.95 
Other feature films from the mainland, such as The White Hair Girl, a 1950 film about the 
liberation of China’s countryside from corrupt landlords was also banned in Hong Kong. This 
film was one of a series of film titles that the leftist newspaper published as evidence against the 
unfair judgment of the Film Censorship Board vis-à-vis mainland Chinese films. According to 
the leftwing press, it was certain that Hong Kong’s readers yearned to see the high caliber films 
from their own country, because by seeing them, they could learn about the rapid developments 
and progress experienced by their ancestral home country. According to Wen Wei Pao and Ta 
Kung Pao, their readers demanded to know the “truth.”96  
In response to its readers’ demands, Wen Wei Pao’s journalists held an interview with the 
Mr. Xu Guole, vice president of Southern Film Corporation, which was at the time the sole film 
distributor of mainland Chinese films in Hong Kong. According to Mr. Xu, many mainland 
Chinese films submitted by Southern Film Corporation for review were banned by the Panel of 
Film Censors of Hong Kong.97 Once this situation was revealed in the pages of Wen Wei Pao and 
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97 Wen Wei Pao, 11 September 1965, 4. 
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Ta Kung Pao, streams of letters from audiences and readers flooded in and demanded to expose 
the rationale behind the “violent,” (cubao) and “discriminating” (dishi) treatments of mainland 
Chinese films by the Censorship Board.98 Audiences wanted to know in particular, why they 
were denied the pleasure of seeing their most esteemed leader, Chairman Mao, his words and 
images? Why were the filmic representations of the courageous deeds of the People’s Liberation 
Army often banned? Most importantly, why did the Hong Kong film censorship board rob them 
and the rest of the fellow compatriots in Hong Kong and Kowloon their joy and their “sacred 
right” of seeing films from China?99 
The film censorship board simply could not ignore or suppress the onslaught of such 
passionate and aggressive accusations any longer. This press incident culminated in a press 
conference in which the Director of Information Services held an interview on September 13, 
1965, where eight questions raised by the left-wing press were answered and subsequently 
published in various newspapers in the following days. One such question relates to the reason 
behind the banning of such Chinese films as Kai Mo-shun/Ji Mao Shin (Chicken Feather Letter) 
and Pak Mo-lui/Bai Mao Nu (The White Haired Girl, 1950).  The press asked why these films 
were allowed be shown in England but not in Hong Kong. Instead of directly addressing such 
discrepancies, the film censorship board noted that as such films were produced more then ten 
years earlier, the only files available noted that the films were banned and did not state any 
additional reasons. The Film Censorship Board also noted that “Cinema audiences in England 
are entirely different from those in Hong Kong.”100 From the perspective of the leftwing 
newspapers and audiences in support of mainland Chinese films, the banning of any mainland 
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Chinese films was unreasonable.  This statement not only exposes the different treatments of the 
panel of censors toward audiences in England and Hong Kong, but also suggests that the banning 
of these two films in Hong Kong did not necessarily stem from the inherent vulgar or political 
nature of the film in question, but rather the politics at play if the film was shown in Hong Kong. 
Another question posed by the leftwing newspaper was why the film censors banned the 
scientific film, Duen Shau Choi Chick (Grafting of a Broken Hand). While the film censorship 
board argued that the film was “too gruesome for showing to a lay audience,”101 the newspapers 
denounced this excuse and complained that the colonial government was intentionally denying 
the Hong Kong public the right to see the progress made in New China after liberation, and the 
self-sufficiency of Maoist China, which survived the corruption and evil of Western and 
Japanese imperialisms and capitalism.  
From the perspective of the Hong Kong government, this was obviously an “apparent 
organized campaign” by the left-wing proponents in Hong Kong.102 As revealed in the 
confidential files of the Hong Kong government on film censorship, through film censorship, the 
government in Hong Kong checked and controlled “the danger of violent right-wing reactions to 
left-wing propaganda [which] is a very real one here. They also ban anything in the nature of 
attacks on Governments with which H.M.G. [Her Majesty’s Government] is in friendly 
relations.”103 Their answers to the press remained vague and were as a result extremely 
unsatisfactory from the perspective of leftwing newspapers. It should be noted that the Appeal 
Board of Review was not required by law to disclose the rationale behind its decisions. As the 
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film censorship regulations did not stipulate that the Board of Review publicize its reasons for 
upholding or overturning the film censors verdicts, there was a lack of transparency in the 
decision making process of the censorship machinery, a process which now the leftist faction in 
Hong Kong attempted to expose through their press attacks against colonial Hong Kong’s film 
censors. 
In response to the above mentioned accusations from the leftwing newspapers to the 
unreasonable banning of mainland Chinese films, the film censorship board defended their 
verdicts by noting that if such politically infused films were shown, they would incite and 
provoke the public and would cause “public disturbances”104 in the “Hong Kong cinemas of 
mixed audiences.”105 The reason for banning mainland Chinese films which was often cited in 
the official records of the Hong Kong Censorship Board was the argument that the “political 
nature” of such films would “exacerbate political rivalries or arouse political controversy which 
might lead to disorder if exhibited in a crowded cinema.”106 Interestingly, what is not mentioned 
here is the potential clash between the KMT and the CCP and any negative comments about such 
Western countries as the United States. Public order within Hong Kong cinemas was not merely 
the microcosm of peace and stability in Hong Kong society at large, but also entailed the very 
authority of the colonial Hong Kong government and by extension the legitimacy and livelihood 
of British colonial rule and its uncontested presence in Hong Kong. 
By way of the real “voices” of local Hong Kong audiences, ones that were politically 
versed and in-tune with current political entanglements of the PRC-KMT struggles, albeit, 
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passionately and suspiciously so, the perspective and demands of China were nakedly positioned 
against the covert political interests and stakes of Great Britain, the United States and Nationalist 
Taiwan. The audiences further challenged the Film Censorship Board and the British colonial 
government by asking: “Was China not recognized officially by Great Britain? If there were 
diplomatic relations between China and Great Britain, why did Hong Kong’s censorship board 
ban films about new China from being shown in Hong Kong?”107 Following this logic, the film 
censors of Hong Kong were the ones who were being “political” (zheng zhi xing) by breaching 
the friendly relations between mainland China and the United Kingdom.108 Leftwing newspapers 
and audiences as one voice further protested that by allowing documentary films about national 
celebrations of Taiwan to be shown in Hong Kong while banning films about the progress of 
new China, as well as those that touched on the anti-imperialist sentiments against Japanese and 
American imperialisms, the British government was in fact trying to conspire with the United 
States and Chiang Cliques to a political plot of creating “Two Chinas.”109 
The accusation of leftwing newspapers was not unfounded and invalid. For instance, 
prior to this press incident, the following films were banned between January 1, 1964 and August 
31, 1965:  
China’s 14
th
 National Day (7.1.64); A Visit to Cambodge (7.1.64); Chen Cheng Kung, 
China’s National Hero (26.2.64); China Today No. 2 of 1964 (16.3.64; 23.3.64 by Board 
of Review); Support of American Negroes Struggle (23.4.64); Support South Vietnamese 
People’s Struggle (23.4.64); Premier Chou En-lai’s Visit to Albania (25.8.64); U.S. 
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Aggressors Get Out of Viet Nam (22.7.65); Lai Feng (Aug. 65); Pageant of the 
Revolution (Aug. 65);  Prelude to the Eastern March (July 65); Serfs (June 65).110 
 
From the titles alone, it is clear that the film censors wanted to downplay the political events in 
China, as well as the Communist Party’s interpretations of the country’s progress in the past ten 
years. More importantly, by filtering such titles from being screened in Hong Kong’s local 
theaters, the colonial government attempted to minimize the polarized emotions of the 
Communist-Capitalist struggle within the context of Maoist China and the emerging indigenous 
nationalist sentiment in Hong Kong. 
In addition to erasing the ongoing struggles between the Communist and Nationalist 
factions in Hong Kong, the Film Censorship Board also ensured that the presence of cultural 
America did not appear as a negative and aggressive form of imperialism. In a few articles 
published by Ta Kung Pao, Hollywood (which was politicized as the representative of the 
influence of the United States) was accused of bringing decadence and debauchery to Hong 
Kong society, and of creating a milieu of cultural desert within the colony through their films. 
Similar to modern Chinese writer Lu Xun’s call for the spiritual salvation of China amidst 
Western and Japanese encroachment, the readers of Wen Wei Pao called to arms against the 
degenerate milieu of Hong Kong’s “cultural desert” (wenhua shamo) brought by the 
encroachment of Hollywood’s cinematic obscenity and violence. In another news item from Wen 
Wei Pao,111 the journalist compared the statistics on the films from Hollywood and noted that 
American films and newsreels that overtly criticized Communist China were allowed to appear 
on Hong Kong’s silver screens yet were obviously just as “political” (zheng zhi xing) The U.S. 
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newsreels were also attacked as being a form of “political propaganda” (zheng zhi xuanchuan)112 
Episodes in such U.S. newsreels often conclude with a note on the achievement of American 
democracy, and the American government’s aid to former colonial territories such as Malaysia, 
Thailand, South Vietnam in building their infrastructures was often flaunted. So why were 
mainland Chinese films showing the building of factories, dams, railroads, and water irrigation 
by the Chinese people banned? By contrasting U.S. newsreels and mainland Chinese 
documentaries, Ta Kung Pao was suggesting that a politicized bias was imposed on the 
assessment of the contents of mainland Chinese films. In the pages of leftwing newspapers in 
Hong Kong, the U.S. was attacked as anti-China and anti-Communist on the one hand. On the 
other hand, the colonial government as represented by the Film Censorship Board was accused 
of violating formalized diplomatic relations with China. 
Furthermore, Wen Wei Pao argued that Hong Kong’s audiences were not “mixed.” Even 
if there were some anti-Communist audiences, they were of an insignificant number.113 Pro-
Nationalist audiences in Hong Kong were swept aside as not representative of the whole of Hong 
Kong. Wen Wei Pao argued that their audiences represented the voice of all the fellow audiences 
in Hong Kong, all of whom recognized PRC China as their motherland. Being a patriotic 
Chinese, as promoted by Wen Wei Pao, should be without a doubt unhindered by one’s 
geopolitical locale. The sense of love for one’s motherland should be carried by the diasporic 
Chinese populations in Hong Kong and elsewhere. To be a true Chinese patriot, one should also 
be concerned with the social developments in China, and should consume and imbibe the images 
and sounds extolling their eminent leader Chairman Mao. Indeed, to watch films produced by the 
mainland was a mark of being “Chinese” (one that was defined by party politics on the 
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mainland). Furthermore, leftist newspapers accused the censorship board of not only denying the 
pleasure of the Chinese people of Hong Kong to watch mainland Chinese films, but of robbing 
them the sacred right to be patriotic “Chinese.” If we take such accusations at face value, we 
would believe that “the subaltern” in Hong Kong, the voices of colonial subjects were united as 
one here in the pages of leftwing newspapers. However, on a closer analysis, we notice that 
letters published in Wen Wei Pao and Ta Kung Pao were often signed by “a group of workers,” 
(yiqun gongren)114 “a group of angry students,” (yiqun fengnu de xuesheng)115 “a group of 
mainland Chinese film lovers” (guochan yingpian aihao zhe)116 Because of the generic identity 
of the readers, and the monolithic and scripted tone of their reasons for loving mainland Chinese 
films, one wonders if these letters were in fact fabricated by leftwing Communist proponents in 
Hong Kong as a campaign against the colonial government in Hong Kong. Another objective of 
these leftwing newspapers may be to present Hong Kong as one monolithic audience, one that 
was not “mixed,” in order to foster an indigenous nationalism in Hong Kong in support of one 
legitimate China as represented by the Communist Party in the PRC.  
Yet, just as leftwing newspapers could publish their views against unfair censorship 
policies in Hong Kong, the pro-Nationalist newspaper, Kung Sheung Yat Pao furnished a 
counterattack against these “Mao newspapers” and the Maoist elements in Hong Kong.117 Kung 
Sheung Yat Pao wrote that the film censorship board of Hong Kong was in fact doing Chairman 
Mao a favor by censoring films about the progress of Red China. No Hong Kong audiences 
would waste money to watch such exaggerated realities boasting of the progressive successes of 
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the PRC, the Kung Sheung Yat Pao journalists berated.118 If pro-Mao groups wanted their films 
to make money, they should better reveal the truth about the blood and tears, hunger and death in 
mainland China.119 This article not only offers yet another perspective on the film censorship 
situation in Hong Kong, but also exposes the reality that “audiences” in Hong Kong were indeed 
“mixed,” both in the actual sense and in the politicized ways in which they were constructed by 
the pro-Nationalist and pro-Communist newspapers. Even if this struggle did not entirely allow 
us to hear the subaltern, it nonetheless exposes a rare occasion to appreciate the contesting 
perspectives of the different voices of various political persuasions in Hong Kong. 
Towards the end of September, this struggle was resolved to a certain extent when the 
decision on the showing of A Glorious Festival was announced. In tandem with this press battle, 
Southern Film Corporation submitted two films to the Panel of Film Censors for review: 
National Day of 1964: A Glorious Festival and The Red Detachment of Women (Hongse niangzi 
jun, 1961). It should be noted that Southern Film had often complained about the long wait 
required before the film censors came up with their decision. It begs the question as to whether 
the press incident was in fact a premeditated and planned effort from the Maoist camp to put 
pressure on the Film Censorship Board to pass these two films just in time for the October 1st 
national celebration in Hong Kong. The Red Detachment of Women,120 which would later 
become one of the model revolutionary operas during the Cultural Revolution,121 was banned 
and upheld by the Board of Review. 
                                                 
118 Kung Sheung Pao, 19 September 19 1965, 11. My translations and paraphrase. 
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 The chief film censor at the time, R.S. Barry wrote: “Exhibition on the Hongkong silver 
screens of warfare between the Chinese Communist Armed forces and the KMT armies will 
most likely lead to disorder. The dialogues, too, are likely to provoke unrest among the mixed 
audiences.”122  Red Detachment is set in the 1930s when China was still under KMT rule. The 
film narrates the story of a slave girl of an anti-Communist landlord who was later saved by a 
Communist officer disguised as an overseas Chinese. In the struggle between the Chinese 
Communist forces and the KMT troops, the latter was portrayed as the “central bandit troops” or 
“white troops.” At the moment when the Communist officer who has saved the slave girl faces 
execution, he shouts: “Down with the Kuomingtang rule;” “Long Live Chinese Communist 
Party!” Though the Board did not feel that the film “would be likely to cause a breach of the 
peace in Hong Kong,”123 the Board headed and chaired by Mr. J.C. McDouall, who was the 
Secretary for Chinese Affairs still upheld the decision of the Film Censorship Board to ban the 
film. The fate of the documentary was different. This time, although in the meeting of the Panel 
of Film Censors, it was decided that the documentary film on the PRC National Day 1964 film 
would be banned due to its “strong anti-Western propaganda it contained,” the Board of Review 
overturned this decision by the Film Censorship Board.124 The film was passed with the 
following excisions from the commentary track: “imperialists headed by the U.S. have tried to 
strangle us;” “U.S. imperialists have tried to isolate us during these 15 years;” “U.S. imperialism 
has ceaselessly smeared and cursed the people’s communes;” and “Government emerges from 
                                                 
122 HKRS 1101-2-13, From: Secretary, Panel of Censors To: Board of Review (Hon. S.C.A. [Secretary of Chinese 
Affairs], Hon. D.of E., Commissioner of Police, D. of S.W. [Director of Social Welfare], 24t September 1965. 
123 HKRS 1101-2-13, Item 11, From Secretary for Chinese Affairs, To Secretary, Panel of Censors, SCA 1 27 
September 1965. 
124 HKRS 934-5-34, Censorship of Films – Policy: Regs. 177-182 Ord. 22 of 1919, Item 130, Meeting On Film 
Censorship, 13 August 1965. 
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guns;” and the shot showing the slogan: “Be sure to liberate Taiwan.”125 Mr. McDouall wrote 
that since, “political emotional feelings are not running so high as during some of the 1950s, the 
whole of this film could have been passed for public release without any serious danger of a 
breach of the peace or of young people being incited to go back to school or home and start 
subversive cells.”126  
Following the September 1965 press incident, colonial Hong Kong’s censorship policies 
seemed to have become more lenient and less stringent toward mainland Chinese films. For 
instance, The Battle of Sha Chia Bund (1968),127 which was produced by Fenghuang Motion 
Picture Co. (Phoenix), a leading Hong Kong-based leftist film studio, was passed by the 
Censorship Board with only a few excisions. Without a doubt, before the 1965 press incident, 
this film would have been banned. This is an anti-Japanese film that recounts the success of the 
Communist troops, in particular, the Fourth Route Army in protecting the village called, Sha 
Chia Bund, a Japanese Occupied region during the Sino-Japanese War. Like many of the films 
coming from the mainland at the time, it glorifies the passion and action of Chairman Mao 
toward the building of progressive new China. However, instead of censoring the profuse 
inclusions of such slogans as “Long Live Chairman Mao,” we witness a new found leniency 
among the film censors. In the report of the Chief Film Censor, he wrote: “When compared with 
those of mainland production, this film is a mild one and makes no reference either to K.M.T. or 
to any of the Western countries. Only the word ‘Chiang’ has been heard twice in a low and 
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of Panel of Censors, Re. Film, “A Glorious Festival (National Day of 1964), 27 September 1965. 
126 HKRS 1101-2-13, Censorship of Films – Policy, Item 12, Letter from Secretary for Chinese Affairs to Secretary 
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negligible tone of voice, such as ‘Does it belong to Chiang or Wang?’ (Wang refers to Wang 
Ching-wei, chairman of the puppet regime in the Japanese Occupied Areas).”128  
This leniency of the Hong Kong Film Censorship Board could perhaps be explained by 
the fact that as the then Director of Information Services Department, Nigel Watt reported, 
mainland China since the mid-1960s had simply been putting out very few documentary films 
for overseas distribution.129 As such, films coming from China did not present as much of a 
threat as they did in the immediate postwar period. His report of the status of mainland Chinese 
film distribution activities was apt. The irreversible violence wrecked by the unleashing of the 
Cultural Revolution beginning in the 1966 and which became more and more intensified towards 
1968 led to the momentary suspension of documentary film production on the mainland.130 Yet 
one wonders why the Censorship Board would conclude that such films as the documentary, 
Chairman Mao Joins a Million People to Celebrate the Great Cultural Revolution (1966), 
featuring the inauguration of the Proletarian Cultural Revolution was considered “to deal with 
their own internal political uproars without any anti-British, anti-American or anti-Nationalist 
significance”131 and was permitted to be shown in leftwing theatres. 
In his report to the Political Adviser, the Director of Information Services, N.J.V. Watt, 
nonchalantly wrote how at the screening of the film at the Nanyang Theatre, only 40% of the 
seats were occupied and that “[t]here were about 10 people in the dress circle and that only some 
sporadic clapping was heard at the beginning of the show.”132 Little did the colonial government 
in Hong Kong realize or even suspect in 1965, the political, social and cultural repercussions of 
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the Proletarian Cultural Revolution would ravage the entire PRC for the next ten years to come. 
In Hong Kong, young people, students, labor unions, cultural workers, including film workers 
would take to the streets in support of leftist sentiments and call to end British imperialism. 
On the mainland, even prior to the opening salvoes of the Great Proletarian Cultural 
Revolution, many films including Early Spring in February (dir. Li Wenhua, 1963), which is an 
adaptation of a May Fourth novella by Ruo Shi (1929) about the dilemma of the hero’s struggles 
between tradition and modernity was heavily criticized for its bourgeois tone in 1964-1965.133 
This film was accused of countering the revolutionary ideals of the communist party. Just as the 
political situation and judgment of films in Hong Kong among the colonial officials shifted 
depending on the political situation of the time, in China, films and filmmakers were constantly 
under attacks for political different reasons. Towards the end of the 1960s, Li Wenhua, who was 
once attacked by the Communist party was ironically charged to adapt one of the “model 
performances”;134 the model ballet was The Red Detachment of Women.135  
To summarize, in the field of filmic representation, the Hong Kong government exercised 
its strangle hold on the people’s freedom to express through its censorship activities. Film 
censorship in all its forms was an integral part of the filmic event, beginning as early as the 
invention of film, either as a state apparatus of discipline and control, or as a form of self-
censorship to ensure a positive reception of the audiences. As noted by the Director of 
Information Studies of Hong Kong, N.J.V. Watt, in 1970, “the political situation at the time will 
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always be the governing factor.” 136 The first stage is marked by the use of draconian measures of 
censorship policies to clean up the “morality” of Hong Kong society and to erase any negative 
portrayals of the European expatriates in the films shown in the colony. The second involved the 
balancing act played by the Hong Kong government during the Cold War to quell the elements 
of both communism from Communist China and KMT militarism from the Nationalist 
government on Taiwan. The third phase is the relaxation of censorship rule following the heated 
and passionate battle between leftist newspapers and the Censorship Board of Hong Kong in 
September 1965. Indeed, Cold War politics were not unchanging and fixed. As Hong Kong’s 
role in the Cold War shifted from the 1950s through to the late 1960s, we also witnessed the 
changing phases of censorship control throughout the history of Hong Kong. 
 
The Ethnic Construction of Film Spectatorship: The Racial Exclusivity of Studio One 
While films that had both direct and indirect implications for colonial and Cold War 
politics and governance were heavily policed, in the realm of good taste and morality, the Hong 
Kong government had no intention of creating a bourgeois sensitivity amongst the majority of 
the Chinese population. Having good taste and possessing the ability to see films of artistic 
merits that were usually “banned” in the general public theatres of Hong Kong became a 
prerogative and privilege for the elite class in Hong Kong, both white, Eurasian and Chinese. 
When it came to the privilege of the minority class viewing public, that is, for instance, the 
members of the private film society, Studio One, the colonial government adopted a laissez-faire 
attitude. In discussing the issue of the classification of films in 1961, the Colonial Secretariat 
objected to the creation of film classification in the colony. He argues: 
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Are we then to legislate or negotiate in a Mrs. Grundy spirit by imposing upon the 
Chinese community a code of behaviour which they do not desire? I believe that there are 
great dangers in this sort of attitude. If that is not the aim then the whole scheme must be 
for the benefit of the relatively small European community. I simply do not believe than 
an Englishman who cares anything at all about his children cannot decide for himself 
what is and what is not suitable for them to see. If he himself does not care, then quite 
obviously no system of A-ing and U-ing is going to do anything to save the children.
137
 
 
It is clear from this statement that the colonial government had a set of differential opinions 
towards White and Chinese audiences. Racial exclusivity in the realm of colonial administration 
finds extension and expression in the “right” to watch films. 
As was evidenced by the heated debate between Wen Wei Pao and the Film Censorship 
Board of Hong Kong in regard to the distribution and projection of mainland Chinese films, a 
segment of Hong Kong audiences strongly felt that it was their “sacred right” to watch films 
produced by their mother country. The history and evolution of Studio One reminds us that 
censorship policies did not equally apply to all audiences in Hong Kong across the board. There 
was racial discrimination toward Chinese speaking audiences. If after the 1965 press incident, 
censorship decisions became more lenient, there were still films that many Hong Kong Chinese 
were excluded from enjoying. 
In Hong Kong, there were other stakeholders and types of audiences in Hong Kong who 
maintained yet a different type of interaction with the Hong Kong government. Hong Kong 
audiences belonged to different enclaves, not only defined by class and race, but by religious 
affiliation. For instance, the film industry did not always accept the decisions of the Board of 
Censors without a public battle and outcry. Religious groups,138 such as the Buddhist Monks 
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Association and other organizations, such as the Women Council of Hong Kong, separately and 
on different occasions, questioned and challenged the decisions of the Censorship Board and the 
Board of Review. On one occasion, the twenty ladies from the Hong Kong council of women 
complained to the Director of Information Services that the censorship policies in Hong Kong 
were not strict enough. They were concerned with the horror trailers attached to matinee films 
and Disney cartoons, because the children’s experience was ruined by such “lurid” and “vulgar” 
trailers.139 The above exposition of the reactions of two groups of audiences expose that each 
group of stakeholders had different intentions and motivations in their call for or against stricter 
censorship policies. 
Just as the politicized debate surrounding the banning of mainland Chinese films in 
September 1965 was veiled by the claim that this inquiry into the political motivations of the 
Censorship Board was instigated, from the outset, by the supposedly unified complaints from all 
Hong Kong audiences, members of Studio One demanded the right to see artistic films of merit 
that were shown elsewhere in other countries, a desire that may be interpreted as beyond and 
outside of the realm of political intentions. It therefore begs the question as to what extent and to 
what degree such discussions were not rooted in the highly politicized milieu of the Cold War 
era. By way of the perspective of Euro-elitist bourgeois taste and middle class sensitivity, a 
sensitivity that was adopted by both European expatriates and Chinese elite class, it is interesting 
to look at the intersection of governmental censorship policies and Studio One.  
 Before the establishment of Studio One, it was known as the Sino-British Club, the 
founding of which dates back to the immediate postwar period. Its objective was apparent from 
its title, which is to maintain the collegial and friendly relationship between the Chinese and 
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Anglo communities in Hong Kong. More specifically, it was formed in order to foster and 
promote Sino-British cultural relations in Hong Kong.140 Under the parent club of the Sino-
British Club, a film group was founded with the view that important films with “historical or 
technical value (old masterpieces, famous landmarks in film history [that] seldom have a long 
run in the local cinemas” should be shown to its members.141 As its mission made it extremely 
clear, it was not “established for profit, [but] to foster and promote Sino-British cultural 
relations.”142  
For a brief period, the Film Group was absorbed into its parent club, the Sino-British 
Club. But due to the demands of its members, the film group was reconstituted in 1961, and was 
later renamed, the Studio One the Film Society of Hong Kong Limited, which was incorporated 
as an independent film society on March 17, 1962. The name of this film club had another 
connection to British high society. The name “Studio One,” is in fact “the name of a cinema in 
London's Oxford Street, [which was] the first art cinema in Britain and almost the only place -- 
until the fifties -- where foreign films were shown.”143 Not only were the founding members of 
this Society Londoners, it also catered to the bourgeois sector, the minority few,144 in the 
modernizing and industrializing Hong Kong society. The membership to Studio One was 
exclusive and catered to the middle to upper middle class society. Its membership was from the 
outset exclusive to Euro-American expatriates and Eurasian elites, who belonged to the 
professions of businessmen, politicians, bureaucrats, doctors, professors, lawyers, etc. One look 
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at the membership rosters145 from the early years of Studio One reveals that many of its members 
held residences in the Peak area (a neighborhood, which before the end of World War II was 
legislatively exclusive to Europeans). Gradually, towards the late 1960s, and into the early 1970s, 
its membership began to grow and diversify, encompassing the educated and influential Chinese 
population at large.146  
Studio One audiences had exclusive privileges, for its members could see films of 
“artistic merit147 which would not otherwise be shown in Hong Kong or would not otherwise be 
adequately screened in the Colony owing to their lack of commercial appeal.”148 The subtext of 
this mission is that the rest of the Hong Kong public was different. The members of Studio One 
and their guests had special rights, and by extension good taste that had to be protected. Indeed, 
when some members brought more than two guests to the Danish Film Festival, the Society was 
concerned that these “voyeurs” and “strangers,” who did not appreciate films and viewed them 
as “blue films,” were taking up room in the theatres. 149 Studio One’s highbrow attitude toward 
the rest of Hong Kong audiences is best illustrated by the following excerpt from its April 1969 
newsletter: 
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It seems to be part of Hong Kong's cultural backwardness that many should think, and be 
excited by the thought, of sex and a separate distinct thing or commodity, to be stared at 
in shop windows, inspected, bought and sold: and presumably flushed away after use. 
Grown-up people know this attitude is a pitiful aberration, unlovely and loveless: but we 
happen to be living in the middle of it. Hard luck on us. Whether a small Film Society 
can really play any part in dragging Hong Kong a few feet forward into the twentieth 
century is perhaps debatable. Myth has it that the elephant can be frightened by an ant 
and Empires undermined by clowns. Maybe.150 
 
This sense of cultural privilege extended to its interaction with the Film Censorship Board of 
Hong Kong. Indeed, just as the decisions of the censorship board was challenged by leftwing 
newspapers, the panel of films censors also found their control over which films could be 
screened in the colony constantly contested by the committee board of Studio One.  
The attitude of Studio One toward Hong Kong government’s panel of film censors was 
proactive, vociferous and condescending. Up to this point, the verdicts of the Board of Review, 
which was consisted of the heads of various departments, were final. Furthermore, the board was 
not required to make its decision public. Studio One, however, sought to take part in the 
censorship process by offering the film censorship board its consulting advice when reaching 
verdicts.151 In October 1967, though to no avail, Studio One petitioned to the Governor-in-
Council that the society be exempted from censorship fees as it was a non-profit organization.152 
Most importantly, Studio One demanded that the panel of film censors should be less restrictive 
in its decisions for members of Studio One, a society that served cultural purposes.153 Indeed, 
Studio One membership was exclusive, and its members were not representative of larger Hong 
Kong public audiences as a whole. Film censorship policies that applied to the rest of Hong 
Kong should not be applied to Studio One members. Writing to the Secretary for Chinese Affairs, 
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the chairman of Studio One, P.V. Dodge argues: “In principle, however, we do feel that there 
should be some relaxation of restrictions in respect of purely adult audiences, especially under 
the controlled cultural auspices of our Society.”154 
The case of the censoring of  the French New Wave director Jean-Luc Godard’s, Une 
Femme mariée (1964) is telling in the differential treatments of the members of Studio One and 
the rest of the local grassroots Hong Kong audiences.155 While Une Femme mariée was censored 
and banned in Hong Kong, meaning that local audiences could not view this film, Studio One 
members could still see this French new wave film classic.156 These types of requests would 
mark the ongoing relationship between Studio One and Hong Kong’s censorship board well into 
the 1960s and onwards. If films of “internationally acclaimed work of art”157 could be seen in 
other Western countries, why could they not be shown to the elite audiences of Studio One? In 
fact, on more than one occasions, Studio One members were able to see films in private 
screenings that had been originally banned by the film censorship board. 
The historical trajectory of Studio One, more than any private organization or society in 
Hong Kong, exposes the complex relationship between the colonial government and Hong Kong 
society, by extension the colonial rulers and the colonized. Though Studio One claimed to 
“promote a better appreciation of films as a contribution to the artistic and cultural life of the 
community,”158 it often found itself to challenge the decisions of the film censorship board, 
which was an agent of the colonial government. This complex relationship is further complicated 
by the very identity of Studio One. Was Studio One a schizophrenic reincarnation of older 
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remnants of British colonial expatriate community, or did it represent a new bourgeois force in 
Hong Kong? Such variegated aspects characterizing the relationship between Studio One and the 
Film Censorship Board of Hong Kong further suggest how a private society like Studio One was 
inevitably imbricated within the colonial and Cold War politics of postwar Hong Kong cinema. 
 
Conclusion  
 In the postwar period, Hong Kong was the cultural cauldron where various forces sought 
to find new life in the Cold War. The clashes between Communist and Nationalist politics, 
interwoven in and by the imperial designs of British and American self-reinventions, found the 
optimal space of enactment and performance in British Hong Kong during the 1950s and 1960s. 
As such, the power over filmic representation in Hong Kong during the Cold War was 
paramount to the maintenance of a form of British imperial power, one way or another toward an 
increasingly decolonized world order. To do so, colonial Hong Kong had to secure a strangle 
hold over what local audiences saw through exercising the censorship law in the name of 
national security and the maintenance of friendly relations with neighbor countries. Such 
draconian censorship policies were upheld and justified as a means to ensure stability in the 
British Crown Colony of Hong Kong, as well as to maintain good moral standards among 
frivolous youths who needed to be disciplined.  
However, this power was tenuous and always risked to be toppled by other competing 
forces, including pro-Communist, pro-Nationalist and even the hegemonic power of Hollywood. 
In particular, the left-wing funded press in Hong Kong, Wen Wei Pao sought to influence public 
opinion by way of the printed word. To a certain extent, such left-wing newspapers as Wen Wei 
Pao and Tak Kung Pao were able to garner support from a particular segment of the general 
public and challenged the raison d’être of the colonial racial exclusivity and arrogance. For the 
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first time, a local based indigenous cultural producer was able to expose the hypocrisy of the 
British colonial rulers and debunk the myth and illusion of an apolitical Hong Kong in the Cold 
War.  
The next chapter examines the emergence of the left-leaning film cooperative, Zhonglian 
as an alternative producer in postwar Hong Kong cinema which would hail a new moral 
discourse that challenged the prestige of a declining British Empire.  Zhonglian forged a 
linguistic and politically subversive logic that struggled to be cosmopolitan when Hong Kong 
was still a colonial city.  As a local Cantonese film production company, Zhonglian successfully 
promoted an anti-colonial pan-Chinese discourse in and beyond Hong Kong. It achieved this feat 
by way of its film work as well as its fan magazine, the Union Pictorial and became the new 
cultural elites that resisted as well as ignored the prestige and arrogance of British colonialism. 
 74 
Chapter 2: Zhonglian and Its Pan-Chinese Patriotism in Cantonese Style 
Introduction      
The 1950s was a threshold moment when Cold War Hong Kong was struggling to 
become postcolonial in both the cinematic and cultural sense. The faltering power of the British 
Empire and its influence in colonial Hong Kong became evident in the cinematic field, whereby 
British hegemony had to compete against other alternative forces. Censorship regulations in 
postwar British Hong Kong seemed to have worked, but their implementation was not without a 
challenge from the pro-Communist and pro-Nationalist forces (chapter 1). This chapter centers 
on the historicity of the film work of one Hong Kong local film company, the Zhonglian Film 
Ltd, as an example and the site of anti-colonial resistance in the Cold War period. The work of 
Zhonglian not only dislodged the juggernaut of British colonialism in Hong Kong, the film 
company also proved that it was not dependent on British Hong Kong but coexisted with the 
colonial administration by forging a different orientation toward the Hong Kong postwar 
problem. I would argue that as an alternative producer of filmic representation in colonial Hong 
Kong, Zhonglian did not so much take heed of the old imperial model as forge a new Cantonese 
model which is both a linguistic and a politicized move. Most importantly, Zhonglian was able to 
reach to diasporic audiences in Southeast Asia or Nanyang (including British Malaya, Dutch and 
French colonies, Siam and the Philippines) and became as such, cosmopolitan neither bounded 
nor provincial. As an alternative voice Zhonglian filmmakers were indifferent to British Hong 
Kong and were not so much invested in the logic of British imperial prestige. 
As recounted in the last chapter, Hong Kong’s fate as a British colony was not 
ascertained following the Pacific War. The colonial government as chapter 1 suggested found 
itself inextricably embroiled in the struggles between pro-Communist and pro-Nationalist 
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politics. In order to maintain order and security in Hong Kong, the colonial government was 
keen on manipulating filmic representation in the colony to suppress the struggles between these 
two forces on the one hand, and on the other hand to elevate its prestige as the legitimate 
benevolent ruler of colonial Hong Kong par excellence in the eyes of the international 
community. The war of arms had ended, but the British colonial rulers continued to fight an 
ideological war through controlling film distribution and consumption in colonial Hong Kong. 
The Cold War in Hong Kong was precisely shaped by this ongoing ideological battle. At the 
heart of this Cold War were British Hong Kong’s attempts to create an apolitical society in the 
Crown Colony of Hong Kong. While films which contained overt content on leftist and pro-
Nationalist politics were banned, content that touched upon issues of morality was not 
necessarily censored or controlled as long as the sovereignty and governance of British Hong 
Kong were not threatened. 
It is precisely this very precarious existence of colonial Hong Kong that gave rise to 
competing ideological contests amongst proponents of different political persuasions and 
between different groups of cultural workers in the colony. Just as the fate of British colonial 
leadership in Hong Kong, to a certain extent, rested on the reproduction of its benevolent image 
and mediatized prestige in the new Cold War bipolar world order, the rise and fall of Cantonese 
films in Hong Kong were also intricately tied to the postwar reality of not only the migration of 
people, the movement of capital and talent, but also the traverse of political ideologies and 
sentiments from the mainland to Hong Kong. This Hong Kong postwar context gave rise to an 
environment where many forms of local and indigenous entertainment could exist and compete 
side by side. It is alongside the proliferation of various cultural expressions in the 1950s that the 
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film workers from the Zhonglian film cooperative took on new roles as Hong Kong’s new 
postwar cultural elites, whose films were Cantonese in expression, and patriotic in dignity. 
The influence of Zhonglian as the alternative producer of postwar cinematic imaginary in 
Hong Kong had both cultural and political repercussions that contribute to a new understanding 
of Cold War politics in Hong Kong. Whereas the colonial government desperately attempted to 
erase the Cold War tensions in Hong Kong by waging an ideological war in and through film 
censorship, Cantonese film workers staked their claim on the construction of postwar Hong 
Kong’s moral fabric and the sentiment of pan-Chinese patriotism amongst the Chinese people in 
Hong Kong and beyond its geopolitical borders. 
Due to the exhibition of Cantonese cinema in places beyond the colony, it acquired a 
transnational influence in many Chinese diasporic communities. In turn, the loyalty of the 
audiences to Cantonese cinema contributed to and elevated Hong Kong’s postwar status from a 
colony to a cinematic site where a pan-Chinese patriotism was contested, negotiated, as well as 
manufactured and disseminated. Hong Kong, through its cinematic productions, became 
therefore not only a transit point, but a nodal site, that joined many overseas Chinese together in 
a web of sentiments and affects that refused to submit to the imperial culture of racial arrogance. 
As such, Zhonglian is an example where Hong Kong was becoming cosmopolitan in the midst of 
colonialism in the Cold War period. In film historian Poshek Fu’s study of Chinese cinemas in 
the 1930s through to 1950, Hong Kong cinema was characterized as marginal in the “hegemonic 
discourse of China-centered nationalism and modernity.”159 To recenter Hong Kong cinema, Fu 
argued that an “incipient sense of local identity” of Hong Kong can be gleamed from the few 
                                                 
159 Poshek Fu, Between Shanghai and Hong Kong: The Politics of Chinese Cinemas (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2003), 53. 
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surviving films made in wartime Hong Kong.160 Indeed, the films of Zhonglian give us yet 
another opportunity to recenter the importance of Hong Kong’s Cantonese cinematic tradition 
not only within the history of Chinese cinemas, but also within the context of Cold War politics 
and the rise of  Chinese patriotism in Hong Kong and amongst the Chinese overseas.  
 
Zhonglian’s Mission: Transforming Film Business into the Moral Aesthetics of National 
Politics 
 
A close historical analysis from political, industrial and aesthetic perspectives of the work 
and mission of Zhonglian provides us with a privileged vantage to delve into important issues 
such as the effects of postwar migration, and anti-colonial politics in colonial Hong Kong and 
Chinese diasporic communities. The 1950s marked not only the birth of Zhonglian, but also the 
Golden Age of Cantonese cinema in becoming an expression of anti-colonial Chinese patriotism. 
The migration of mainland filmmakers to Hong Kong along with their cultural and political 
ideologies in the postwar era shaped the colonial and Cold War milieus in Hong Kong. Gradually, 
with the increasing popularity of Cantonese cinema in Hong Kong, South China, and the rest of 
the world, the Cantonese dialect would acquire an anti-colonial and political meaning which 
would in turn help shape the construction and dissemination of a pro-left-wing sentiment of 
being Chinese in the Cold War. Zhonglian facilitated this development in transforming celluloid 
fantasies and business enterprise into film art and an expression of political and patriotic purport. 
By tracing the historical development of Zhonglian’s film work, we will be able to expose 
Cantonese cinema’s long struggles against republican China’s “National Language Movement” 
and the Nationalist government’s ban on dialect film, as well as its triumph over the degeneracy 
of “wonton noodle” directors and the arrogance of opera stars. At the end of these struggles, 
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Cantonese cinema would find a new, albeit precarious home in Hong Kong, which in turn would 
provide a gateway to audiences in other diasporic Chinese communities outside of the colony.  
The Cantonese dialect161 did not yet possess an overt politicized expression in filmic 
production and projection during the era of silent cinema. However, once Cantonese talkies were 
produced beginning in 1933 in three separate production locations in Shanghai,162 San 
Francisco163 and Guangzhou,164 Cantonese cinema began to acquire not only a mass appeal but 
also a potentially threatening political force that could derail the Chinese Nationalist 
government’s projects of national salvation and unification. By entering into the contested realm 
of identity formation, Cantonese cinema would become the language and medium of the 
development of a sense of nationalistic patriotism in China and Hong Kong as well as the 
Chinese diasporic communities. 
The politicization of Cantonese and Cantonese cinema was due to the “National 
Language Movement” of Mandarin or guanhua165 (official language) following the 1911 
revolution. In the aftermath of the 1911 Revolution (when the Qing imperial government was 
overthrown and replaced by the republican government led by the Kuomintang), the Nationalist 
government sought to unify the country by promulgating that Mandarin be the official language 
                                                 
161 It was only in 1974 when the Hong Kong government enacted an Official Languages Ordinance which made 
Chinese an official language alongside English. See Wing On Lee, “Social Class, Language and Achievement,” in 
Schooling in Hong Kong: Organization, Teaching and Social Context, ed. Gerard A. Postiglione and Wing On Lee 
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162 The first Cantonese film was, Platinum Dragon/White Gold Dragon (Bai Jinlong), which starred the Cantonese 
opera star, Sit Kok-sin. The film was produced by Tianyi (Unique), which was the predecessor of the Shaw Brothers 
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Kong. Other film production companies in Shanghai also moved to Hong Kong and hence began the growth of 
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163  The first Cantonese film produced by Grandview in San Francisco was called, Romance of the Songsters/Singing 
Lovers (Gelu Qingchao), which starred Kwan Tak-hing and Wu Dip-ying. 
164 The first Cantonese film produced in Guangzhou is Iron Mounted Guard (Tie Ma Zhen Qi).  
165 Mandarin was spoken by the mandarin officials in the Beijing court. 
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or the national language (guoyu) of the newly founded Republic of China, while all other dialects 
would later be banned. While Mandarin, or guoyu was promoted by the Nationalist government 
as a language for all of China, other dialects, such as Cantonese were labeled as tools to promote 
“regional separatism” which fragmented the solidarity and unity of the Chinese people.166 In the 
midst of Japan’s imperial encroachment on China, the republican government targeted Cantonese 
dialect films as countering the goals of the Nationalist government in promoting Chinese 
nationalism. 
However, despite the “National Language Movement,” different dialects continued to be 
used in other provinces. This is due to the fact that China was only nominally unified under 
Chiang Kai-shek after his Northern Expedition military campaign (1926-1928). Although Chiang 
set up his new capital in Nanjing, many provinces, especially those in South China, did not 
recognize the sovereignty of the Nanjing government and were continued to be ruled by 
autonomous warlords. Under such political circumstances, the dialect of Cantonese took on a 
new meaning of regional loyalty and identification at a time of great internal turmoil, civil strife 
and ongoing foreign encroachment. 
Within China, film censorship policies regulated the production and distribution of films 
in China beginning in the early 1930s for nationalist reasons. During the republican period, the 
production and screening of Cantonese film was banned beginning in 1936167 under the Central 
Film168/National Film Censorship Committees, which were first established in1931.169 The 
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reason for the ban was that the Nationalist government wanted to suppress the regional identity 
of South China. Not only was Cantonese a part of South China’s regional culture, it was also a 
political tool to ensure the autonomy of Canton (present day Guangzhou in Guangdong).  
The imminent enforcement of the dialect film ban by the Central Film Censorship 
Committee on July 1, 1937, led Cantonese producers, distributors, filmmakers to found the South 
China Film Association, which sent representatives to Nanjing to petition against this ban, 
calling for the need of Cantonese cinema to promote the pride of Chinese patriotism among 
overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia. At the time of the dialect film ban in 1937, there were 
already between six to seven million overseas Chinese living in Southeast Asia, whose mother 
tongue was primarily Cantonese. Perhaps more important than the political arguments for 
overturning this policy was that the livelihoods of many Cantonese film producers and actors 
desperately depended on the survival of Cantonese cinema. Therefore, the dialect film ban was 
not only about the unification of China, as presented by the Nanjing government, as was also 
about the control over existing film production markets.170 However, the implementation of the 
government dialect film ban was disrupted on July 7, 1937 when the War of Resistance against 
the Japanese officially began.  
As soon as the Nationalist government declared war against Japan, numerous people 
from the mainland, in particular from Shanghai, sought refuge in Hong Kong. By late 1937, film 
companies and cultural workers, including writers, directors and actors, moved to Hong Kong to 
escape from the brutality of the Japanese forces. This was one of the first of several waves of 
                                                                                                                                                             
169 For an in-depth discussion of the Cantonese dialect ban, see Zhiwei Xiao, “Constructing a New National Culture: 
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nanlai (from the South) cultural workers and writers coming to Hong Kong, bringing with them 
a mainland Chinese patriotic consciousness as well as a May Fourth171 intellectual and aesthetic 
purpose and mission to the Crown Colony of Hong Kong. Some of those who came to colonial 
Hong Kong also brought with them their brand of pro-leftist infused ideology to the colony. The 
exodus from the mainland to Hong Kong included “intellectuals, filmmakers, studio bosses, and 
prominent business people.”172 Among them were Shanghai writers such as Guo Moruo, Mao 
Dun, Xia Yan, Sima Wensen, who perceived Hong Kong as a “cultural desert.”173 Some of the 
cultural workers from Shanghai had the biased impression that Hong Kong was a “cultural 
desert” for they believed that it had been contaminated by British colonialism on the one hand, 
and on the other hand, Hong Kong did not experience the new culture movement effected by the 
May Fourth cultural elites on the mainland in the 1920s. 
According to film historian, Poshek Fu, their “central plains syndrome” mentality led 
these cultural workers to stigmatize Hong Kong as “contaminated” and “polluted” because of its 
history as a British colony and its lack of nationalistic and patriotic sensitivity.174 These 
Shanghai exiles upheld the discourse on Hong Kong Cantonese cinema as “frivolous, vulgar, 
racy, superstitious, sloppy in craftsmanship.”175 If they thought Hong Kong lagged behind in 
May Fourth sensitivity, they were determined to bring cultural enlightenment to this colony. In 
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fact, some of these progressive cultural workers and intellectuals infiltrated into the cultural life 
of Hong Kong and attempted to promote the goals of Shanghai’s leftwing cinema tradition 
through such means as taking part in film productions and writing film criticisms. In such 
Communist-supported newspapers as Wen Wei Pao, Ta Kung Pao and Kung Sheung Yat Pao, 
film reviewers could be found under the penname of the “magnificent seven film critics.”176 
When Hong Kong fell on Christmas day 1941 after 18 days of resistance, many cultural workers 
and intellectuals returned to China’s interior or escaped to other Southeast Asian countries yet to 
be bombed by Japanese forces. But following the end of the War of Resistance and amidst the 
tumultuous showdown of the Nationalist party and the Communist party in the Chinese Civil 
War on the mainland, the second wave of important progressive cultural workers who held leftist 
ideology either came to Hong Kong for the first time or returned to the colony. Among them 
were artists who formed part of the leftwing tradition in China, such as Xia Yan, Situ Huimin, 
and Cai Chusheng. Their ideas in turn would shape the professionalism and influenced the 
aesthetic and moral vision of future Zhonglian members.  
When the war began, the implementation of the banning of all dialect films seemed to 
have been halted altogether. However, after the war ended, dialect films continued to be banned. 
Due to the guoyu policy of the Chinese Central government, all dialect films were forbidden to 
be shown in mainland China. The loss of the China market and the rise in production costs led 
many film producers in Hong Kong to turn away from producing Cantonese dialect films for fear 
that they would not make any profits. In fact, the first film made in Hong Kong following the 
war was a Mandarin film with an all-Cantonese cast. Under these economic circumstances, it 
was Ng Cho-fan (a Cantonese actor in Hong Kong and future president of Zhonglian) who first 
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suggested that companies could reduce production costs by shortening the shoot to ten days from 
the prewar production schedule of thirty days.177 Finally, in 1947, the first postwar Cantonese 
film starring Ng Cho-fan and the rising star, Pak Yin, a native of Guangzhou, My Love Comes 
Too Late, was produced. The film was a surprise box-office winner.  
Audiences in both Hong Kong and Southeast Asia went to see this film. The success of 
Hong Kong’s first postwar Cantonese film proved that exhibition circuits in Southeast Asia or 
Nanyang could garner huge profits for Cantonese movies. Subsequently, Cantonese film 
producers in Hong Kong decided that they could, after all, give up the South China market. 
Cantonese films found a new life in the postwar era thanks to the loyalty of Chinese diasporic 
audiences in Southeast Asia. To meet the high demands of Cantonese films in the Southeast 
Asian exhibition markets, film distributors would come to Hong Kong for presale (mai hua or 
mai pianhua) of films yet to be made in order to secure distribution rights. Often times, the 
production company was only required to provide the “menu” (cai dan)178 of the film, that is, the 
proposed story line and the names of the main actors and actresses of the film in order to secure a 
partial payment from the distributor, which would help with the production costs of one or even 
two or more films simultaneously.179 The profitability of making Cantonese films led many 
entering into the film industry to become “film snakes,”180 or negotiators between film producers 
and buyers. There were also many directors known as “wonton noodle directors,”181 who 
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churned out film after film, which, according to left-leaning cultural critics in Hong Kong, 
contained nothing but superstitious, feudal, obscene and violent content, polluting the minds of 
audiences in Hong Kong, China and abroad.182 
The postwar revival of Cantonese films and their high demands in Singapore and 
Malaysia also led many independent film companies to maximize profits by producing large 
quantities at the lowest costs to the detriment of the quality of their films.183 Many Cantonese 
films were produced in seven or fewer days. As such, they were called “seven day freshers” or 
“seven day quickies” (qiri xian).184 Furthermore, to facilitate the higher speed of the production 
process and to ensure that the film had a guaranteed box-office appeal, famous and well-known 
Cantonese opera plays were often adapted and a large number of opera artists185 were recruited 
as movie stars. Such production practices led to two industrial phenomena. Firstly, the decrease 
in the quality of late 1940s Cantonese films also decreased their reputation, which led to their 
notorious reputation of having poor and shoddy quality (cuzhi lanzao) amongst left-wing artists 
and cultural critics. Secondly, due to the rising prestige of Cantonese opera who increasingly 
entered the film industry,  many Cantonese actors became second-class performers ranking 
below the fame and wealth of their counterparts from the Cantonese opera world. Indeed, the 
professional and artistic dignity of Cantonese actors would often be compromised and relegated 
to the background.  
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It was within these historical and industrial circumstances that the clean up movement of 
the quality of Cantonese films was advocated by some Cantonese film workers in 1949.186 Led 
by such leftist film workers as Cai Chusheng from the mainland and local Cantonese actors, such 
as Ng Cho-fan, they formed the “South China Film Culture Movement” and the “Committee for 
the Improvement of Cantonese Cinema.”187 On April 8, 1949, the “Cantonese Film Clean-Up 
Campaign Manifesto” was promulgated by 164 professional Cantonese film workers led by Xia 
Yan, Situ Huimin and Cai Chusheng. This movement aimed to improve the quality of Cantonese 
films, which they claimed were full of “shoddy production values, feudal, superstitious and 
fantastical content.”188 On July 1, 1949, these eminent leftist filmmakers established the South 
China Film Industry Workers Union (or “South China Film Union.”)189  
In addition to transforming and improving the aesthetic and moral landscapes of the 
Cantonese film scene, members of the Cantonese cinema clean-up movement also were 
concerned with the arrogance of some of the opera stars. The split between Cantonese movie 
stars and Cantonese opera stars on the silver screen which followed the 1949 Clean Up 
movement is best understood by the account of the conflicts encountered by Cantonese film 
actors in their collaboration with opera stars. According to an account by the Guangdong native 
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film writer/director/actor, Lo Dun (He was the founder of Xinlian (leftist) Cantonese film 
company in Hong Kong):190 
In the early days, films featuring opera stars were box office winners. Once, Ng Cho-fan 
was asked to play alongside Sun Ma Si-tsang in a shoot scheduled at 10 am. Sun Ma, 
who was double-booked turned up at 10 pm and requested his own scenes to be shot 
before anyone else.  Ng Cho-fan, who was kept waiting all day, was mortified. He was 
after all revered as the “King of Movie Stars”! 
 
At that time, Cheung Ying used to live on Nga Tsin Long Road, and whenever we were 
working on a script, our whole gang would gather at his place to brainstorm. On that very 
day, Ng Kei-man, Sima Wensen (a critic for Hwa Shiang Pao) among others were all 
present when Ng Cho-fan stormed in. After he related the outrageous incident, we 
suggested that opera and movie stars should go their separate ways. At first, we didn’t 
want to be partisan, but we felt walked over, so that was how the “Clean-Up Campaign” 
came about. Actually, we did not intend to do any ‘cleaning-up’, we just wished to regain 
our dignity.191 
 
According to an interview with Lo Dun, the Clean-up movement was not merely about 
improving the quality of Hong Kong’s Cantonese film. The movement was in fact instigated by 
the desire of the Hong Kong movie actors to regain their own dignity as bona fide artists and 
professionals.192 This split between Hong Kong movie stars and Cantonese opera stars marked 
not only the beginning of the professionalization of Cantonese movie stars but also the 
politicization of art and politics, which increasingly deemed the moral aesthetics of film as a 
means to educate and disseminate Chinese patriotism to audiences in Chinese communities in 
Hong Kong and overseas.  
In both his autobiography and oral interview, Lo Dun exposed his thoughts on the 
intimate relationships between art and politics.193 As part of a small group of Cantonese film 
workers in the postwar period who were influenced by the leftist ideology of progressive cultural 
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workers from the mainland, Lo Dun believed that film should become a tool for educating the 
people. Many of the leftist film and cultural workers who came to Hong Kong brought with them 
the mission of May Fourth enlightenment but also a sentiment of Chinese patriotism that was 
impacted and shaped at once by party-based politics and their idealism in the moral purport of 
artistic works. Their presence and passion provided an ambience and training ground for the first 
generation of Cantonese film workers to raise the production quality and professionalism in 
Cantonese cinema.  
The cleanup movement initiated by Cai Chusheng finally came to fruition in 1952 when 
Xinlian was founded by Lo Dun (a Guangdong native and a student of Ouyang Yuqian from the 
Drama Research and Study Centre of Guangdong), followed by the establishment of the 
Zhonglian film cooperative in the same year (both of which produced Cantonese films). To 
change the poor reputation of Cantonese films, a number of filmmakers joined forces and 
established Zhonglian. The Zhonglian Film Ltd. was officially founded on November 15, 1952. 
There were twenty-one founding members in total, which include Ng Cho-fan,194 Pak Yin, Mui 
Yee, Cheung Wood-yau, Cheung Ying, Chun Kim, Wong Man-lei, Tsi Lo-lin, Lee Sun-fung, 
etc.195 
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At the heart of the mission of Zhonglian’s film opus is the phrase: “renren weiwo, wowei 
renren” (All for one, one for all). This slogan infused the creation and operation processes of the 
Zhonglian film cooperative company. Zhonglian was funded independently, whose members 
owned shares of the Zhonglian Ltd. The role of each member did not override or supersede that 
of another member. The purpose of this operational strategy was to collapse the hierarchical 
structure of the film company, which not only downplayed the star status of the Zhonglian actors 
but reinforced their group solidarity. Zhonglian film artists were not selfish nor did they seek 
fame and power for personal gains. Their very daily operations and the expression of their 
creative energy exemplified their motto of “all for one, one for all.” For instance, their works 
were often created collectively, with no hierarchical differentials, and their performances 
complemented each other’s. In fact, many of their films are driven not by any one main character, 
but rather by the performances of an ensemble cast. In terms of salary, regardless of the position 
or role of the Zhonglian member in the film, he/she earned 4500 HKD per film (which was only 
half or one third of their usual salary from other film companies).196 Indeed, their goal was not to 
advance individual recognition. Rather, they fought to produce high quality films to combat the 
corrupt and decadent Hong Kong film industry at the time, which was full of low quality 
quickies. In order to produce high quality Cantonese films, they spent much time as a collective 
team from scriptwriting to postproduction stages. Furthermore, as a small group of dedicated 
Cantonese actors, directors, producers and scriptwriters, they sought to produce films that 
challenged the feudal ideas and superstitious beliefs of traditional Chinese family economies 
displayed in the majority of Cantonese films predominant in the Hong Kong film industry in the 
late 1940s and early 1950s. 
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In order to distinguish themselves from the “wonton noodle” directors of the quickie 
films at the time, Zhonglian film workers advocated film not so much as a business venture, but 
as an art form and as an educational tool to teach the audience how to be a good and morally 
upright person – someone who serves the society, and who loves culture.197 Through their films, 
they also attempted to instill in their audiences in Hong Kong and overseas a sense of Chinese 
patriotism. Driven by their vision to improve the morality of the Chinese living in Hong Kong 
and abroad, they became the new cultural elites in their own right in postwar Hong Kong. As 
professionals, the Cantonese film actors and directors and producers felt an obligation to conjoin 
art and politics to serve their audiences. Not only were they professional entertainers, they were 
also educators. According to Lo Dun, a frequent contributor to the production of Zhonglian films, 
his experiences in the 1927 revolution in Guangzhou shaped his convictions that art should serve 
politics and that cultural workers could not be divorced from politics.198 For the other founding 
members of Zhonglian, their experiences escaping from the ravages wrought by the War of 
Resistance against the Japanese and their eventual move to British Hong Kong would continue to 
shape their worldview and aesthetics in filmmaking. 
 
Zhonglian’s Political Identity: Becoming an Alternative Elite in British Hong Kong 
May Fourth tradition199 played a huge role in the identity, cultural and political work of 
the Zhonglian filmmakers. For instance, Xia Yan and Situ Huimin, who came to Hong Kong 
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were part of the progressive left-wing cinema and cultural movement on the mainland in the 
1930s.200 The issue of nationalism is a floating term depending on the political and spatial matrix 
of the film production contexts themselves. That is, Chinese nationalism was made more 
complex by politics and the movement of people and shifting political allegiances. The legacy of 
the May Fourth film tradition continued in Hong Kong in the work of Zhonglian. If Jubin Hu is 
correct to say that Chinese filmmakers in the mainland during the postwar period (1946-1949) in 
their concern for the salvation of the Chinese nation in the face of foreign aggression “began 
rethinking the relationship between tradition and modernity in terms of ethics and culture”201 and 
to ask whether China could “take the road toward modernization,”202  then this same mentality 
and preoccupation would coincidentally be part of the project of the postwar filmmakers in Hong 
Kong. Indeed, just as the Chinese filmmakers in the 1940s sought to build a national cinema 
through negotiating between the themes of tradition and modernity in their films, the Zhonglian 
filmmakers would also deal with the seemingly contradiction between the realities of tradition 
and modernity. 
There were many other filmmakers, actors and screenwriters in 1950s Hong Kong. But 
Zhonglian’s directors, actors/actresses, and screen writers would become Hong Kong’s new 
cultural elites in postwar Hong Kong. Zhonglian’s film artists derived their status from their 
wartime experiences during the War of Resistance against the Japanese. Following WWII, they 
would struggle for their own brand of Chinese nationalism through film. In Zhonglian’s film 
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narratives, the absence of an overt representation of British colonial politics suggests that 
Zhonglian was attempting to forge an alternative presence that competed against the imperialist 
logic of British colonialism. Nonetheless, Zhonglian would target the Japanese imperialist now 
long bygone as their archenemy. In addition to their preoccupation with anti-colonial 
indifference and resistance, Zhonglian was also embroiled in the uncertainties dictated by Cold 
War left-right politics. Yet, in their struggle over the bipolar political restrictions in local and 
transnational film markets, they would become truly cosmopolitan cultural elites not only 
through the creative process of self-censorship but also through their film magazine, the Union 
Pictorial.  
As Hong Kong’s postwar new enlightened cultural elites, the Zhonglian members 
inherited the service and morally righteous attitudes of the May Fourth tradition. This service 
mentality and the desire to reconstitute the solidarity of the family and home was due in part to 
the wartime experiences of many Cantonese film workers, including the members of Zhonglian. 
Most of the members of Zhonglian lived through war-ravaged Hong Kong, China and/or 
Southeast Asia. Some saw their homes bombed down, and some, like Mui Yee, suffered the 
assaults of the Japanese soldiers.203 In postwar Hong Kong, these cultural workers gained the 
credentials to retell their stories through their sufferings. Before the War of Resistance, many 
took part in anti-Japanese efforts. For instance, Ng Cho-fan and Wong Man-lei204 starred in the 
anti-Japanese film, Return from the Battleground (Zhandi Guilai, 1934). This film was followed 
by the first sound national defense film, also starring Ng Cho-fan, Lifeline (Shengming Xian, 
1935). Even before Shanghai fell in August 1937 to the Japanese, Hong Kong film community 
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took part in various fundraising campaigns to help with the war efforts. Hong Kong female stars, 
including Wong Man-lei, Wu Dip-ying and Wong Shiu-hing (Ng Cho-fan’s first wife), served as 
dance escorts at the See Ho Hotel in an effort to raise funds for the War of Resistance.205 In the 
postwar era, they assisted the refugees who flooded into Hong Kong, and subsequently crowded 
in squatter areas. For instance, following the 1953 Christmas fire at the Shek Kep Mei squatter 
neighborhoods, movie stars and cinemas took part in January 1954 in the relief campaign by 
sponsoring a charity show to raise funds for the fire.206 
After Hong Kong fell on Christmas day 1941, many Hong Kong Cantonese stars fled to 
Guangzhou Bay to escape from the invitation from Wakuda Kosuke, the Japanese head of the 
film section of the information department in occupied Hong Kong to collaborate in Japanese 
produced propaganda films. For three years and eight months, the only film produced in Hong 
Kong was the propaganda film praising Japan’s Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere in Hong 
Kong called, Attack on Hong Kong (1941). The only Hong Kong actor playing in this film was 
the seventeen year old Tsi Lo-lin (a Guangdong native, who joined the Tai ping opera troupe of 
master Ma Si-tsang at the age of 13; both of whom would become the founding members of the 
Zhonglian film cooperative). It was rumored that she was duped by a false advertisement in the 
newspapers.207 
Despite the hardships and the unknown future of these Cantonese film workers, they did 
not succumb to the lies of the Japanese government. Along with a number of other Hong Kong 
actors, Lo Dun formed the Hong Kong Stars Troupe and acted in many anti-Japanese resistance 
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plays in Guangzhou Bay. After opening for a few months, Lo Dun, along with Cheung Ying and 
his wife at the time, Mui Yee, and Lee Tsing and his wife, Yung Siu-yee, decided to return to 
China and made their escape to Guilin. Ng Cho-fan, on the other hand, after escaping from Hong 
Kong to Guangzhou Bay via Macau, decided to forge a living in Saigon, Vietnam. In order to 
support themselves and their families, these Hong Kong actors worked in different jobs. Many of 
the first generation Cantonese film actors and film artists in Hong Kong were not from Hong 
Kong originally, but were themselves immigrants/refugees from the mainland, especially from 
the South China region (Guangdong and Guangxi provinces). After the war, they finally made 
their way back to Hong Kong and began calling Hong Kong their home. 
Since the conclusion of the Pacific War, the survival of Cantonese cinema was 
circumscribed as much by British colonial control over censorship as by the markets of Southeast 
Asian countries. In order for Zhonglian to flourish, their films had to be able to secure markets 
beyond Hong Kong, whose population in the 1950s was only around two million people.208 
Cantonese cinema might have triumphed over the Nanjing government’s ban on dialect films. 
But in the 1950s, Zhonglian, just as other film companies in Hong Kong, had to contend with the 
unstable political circumstances of the Cold War where the Civil War between the Communists 
and the Nationalists continued to be waged in the realm of filmic representation in colonial Hong 
Kong on the one hand, and where the draconian censorship regulations continued to be exercised 
by British Hong Kong, mainland China, and Taiwan on the other.  
British Hong Kong was often characterized as following a laissez-faire approach in its 
colonial rule. But as the discussion of censorship policies in Cold War Hong Kong in chapter 1 
illustrates, the colonial government took a heavy-handed approach to controlling the contours of 
film distribution and consumption to create the illusion of an apolitical milieu in Hong Kong. In 
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the mid-1950s following the Korean War, the tension between leftwing and rightwing ideologies 
and the struggles between the Communist-bloc and the democratic movement represented by the 
United States emerged in the cultural realm of experiences in Hong Kong. British Hong Kong 
was, as a result, extremely stringent in its treatment of any potential threats to its colonial rule. 
On January 10, 1952, the British Hong Kong government deported eight Chinese film 
workers, including Sima Wensen, who were accused of stirring pro-PRC sentiments in the 
Crown Colony. In the same month, a second deportation was effected, which also included 
filmmakers.209 In total, Hong Kong expelled more than twenty left-wing film workers to the 
mainland (among them were Bai Chen, Liu Qiong, Shen Ji, Shu Shi and Sima Wensen).210 
British Hong Kong’s stringent policy on stamping out leftist ideology is also evident in its 
censorship decision in the 1952 film, The Show Must Go On (Jianghu Ernu), by Zhu Shilin, a 
Mandarin film director working in Hong Kong. Although it was a story about a circus,211 a 
seemingly apolitical film, it was nonetheless warned by the Hong Kong’s film censors that the 
last scene, where one of the characters said, “let’s go back to our motherland” (hui zuguo qu) had 
to be re-shot.212 Filmmakers in Hong Kong, therefore, were very self-conscious of what scenes to 
avoid so that their films would not be banned. For instance, such dialogues and commentaries as 
“love thy country,” (ai guo) which implicitly referred to the China as led by the CCP could  
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never be mentioned.213 Under these censorship restraints, film producers in Hong Kong had to be 
vigilant about not alarming the colonial government, who had legislated censorship control over 
the contents of all films to be exhibited in Hong Kong. Hong Kong based film companies, 
regardless of their political persuasions had to exercise a form of self-censorship. If any image, 
dialogue or voice-over commentary contained overt references to the banditry of the Chiang 
clique or the triumph of Communist China over American or Japanese imperialisms, they would 
be censored and shelved. If they were deemed too “political,” the films would be banned from 
screening in Hong Kong. 
Censorship regulations in British Hong Kong had control over the contents of Hong 
Kong-produced films. Yet censorship policies in other Chinese speaking markets, including the 
PRC and Taiwan also politicized distribution markets and had a direct impact on whether Hong 
Kong produced films could be distributed outside of the colony. Cold war politics stipulated that 
the PRC implemented strict censorship over all films, especially those that contained anti-
Communist messages. As such, the China market was closed off for many Hong Kong films. 
Taiwan, which was controlled by the Nationalist government of Chiang Kai-shek also enforced 
strict rules over the import and distribution of films. As the Cold War in Hong Kong was fought 
between pro-Communist and pro-Nationalist forces, their struggles dictated what films could be 
distributed in mainland China, Taiwan, and other East Asian nations. When Hong Kong’s limited 
market was not large enough to sustain any one film company, the external markets became all 
the more vital to the livelihood of the Hong Kong film enterprise. As a result of the left-right 
struggle, film companies in Hong Kong had to pledge allegiance to either the Communists or the 
Nationalists. Indeed, straddling a neutral ground of impartiality was not feasible. 
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Four important film companies in mid-1950s Hong Kong included the Shaw Brothers, 
the Fenghuang (Phoenix; leftist; Mandarin film productions), the Cathay (MP & GI, Motion 
Picture and General Investment; pro-right; Mandarin film productions), and the Great Wall 
(Changcheng; pro-left; Mandarin film productions). These four companies were politicized as 
either right or left, depending on the source of their funding, which also entailed the distribution 
markets that were available for their films. At that time, only films that were made by film 
companies in Hong Kong subsidized by the Communist government had a chance to be shown in 
censorship-controlled China. According to Hong Kong film scholar, Sek Kei,214 Hong Kong’s 
leftwing film companies were those with leftist government financial backing. For instance, 
Great Wall, which produced Mandarin films, was characterized as having “leanings towards 
mainland China,”215 because the film company was supported by the Bank of China, whose films 
could be more easily distributed on the mainland.216  
When the China market closed down after the Communist takeover, Taiwan became a 
coveted market for the distribution and exhibition of both Cantonese and Mandarin films. 
However, in order for films to be exhibited in Taiwan’s theaters, they had to be made by 
filmmakers and starred by actors who had already joined the Hong Kong-Kowloon Free Cinema 
Association (Free Cinema Association).217 The primary objective of this association was to 
politicize and legitimize Taiwan’s support of Mandarin filmmakers, or “Freedom filmmakers” 
(ziyou yingren), who had no connections with leftist film studios.218 This association which was 
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founded and controlled by the Nationalist government in Taiwan in February 1952 announced 
that any film that was not affiliated with this association was not allowed to be shown in 
Taiwan.219 Furthermore, films which starred Hong Kong actors who had not joined this 
association could not be shown in Taiwan or in any of the Nationalist controlled exhibition 
venues in Southeast Asia. These actors could neither perform in Taiwan nor could they apply for 
a visiting visa to the United States. In fact, all actors in Hong Kong had to identify themselves as 
either pro-Nationalist government or pro-Communist. Under such Cold War restraints, actors 
who identified themselves as belonging to one political faction had to avoid at all costs 
associating with those from the other wing.220 The Cold War created a politicized market 
situation for film distribution for left and right wing production companies. 
Within this Cold War context, Cantonese film companies had an extremely difficult task 
at hand to stay in business. For many Cantonese films, Taiwan’s market was virtually closed off. 
After the establishment of the Free Cinema Association, Zhonglian was suspected of being a pro-
leftwing film company. Although Zhonglian was never officially labeled as leftwing, its films 
could not be shown in exhibition circuits controlled by or in favor of the Free Cinema 
Association corpus, which included the United States, Vietnam, Cambodia and the 
Philippines.221  The situation in the PRC was extremely strict even for films made by the so-
called “leftist” film companies. Some Hong Kong films were exported to the mainland between 
1949 and 1963, and most were produced by Chang-Feng-Xin (Changcheng (Great Wall), 
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Fenghuang and Xinlian), the three companies subsidized by PRC funding.222 For instance, only 
four to five Zhonglian films (including the Ba Jin trilogy adaptations, Family (1953), Spring 
(1953), and Autumn (1954)) were exported to China.223 Zhonglian and other film companies in 
Hong Kong had to explore other film markets in other countries. Southeast Asian markets,224 in 
particular, Singapore and Malaysia, proved to be the lifeline for Hong Kong Cantonese films in 
the 1950s.225 
Thanks to the assistance of Albert Odell (British Jewish), the Hong Kong based manager 
of the branch company of Loke Wan-tho’s Cathay film company, Zhonglian’s films were shown 
in Singapore and Malaysia’s cinema circuits which later opened up new opportunities for presale 
and in turn provided funding for Zhonglian’s film productions.226 The demand for Cantonese 
films in Nanyang was in part due to the substantial number of overseas Chinese living there. 
Since the 19th century, migrant workers from South China began to immigrate to Southeast Asia 
in search of other means of livelihood. The majority of overseas Chinese living in Singapore and 
Malaysia were Cantonese speaking Chinese. In the postwar period, the three largest Chinese 
exhibition circuits in Southeast Asia were owned by three families: the Shaw family (Shaws), 
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Loke Wan-tho (International Theatres under Cathay Organization) and Ho Khee-wong’s family 
(Kong Ngee/Guangyi). In the 1950s, these companies also moved to Hong Kong to establish 
production companies to produce Cantonese dialect films to supply their own exhibition locales 
in the Southeast Asian markets. Although the films of the Shaw Brothers and Cathay competed 
against those produced by the so-called leftwing film companies in Hong Kong, the fact that the 
demands for both Cantonese and Mandarin movies in the Southeast Asian markets were so high 
also meant that the business imperatives overcame the constraints prescribed by Cold War 
politics. 
Despite the politicization of film markets in Southeast Asia, film producers were caught 
up in the political economy of the art and business of movie making. Making a profit continued 
to dictate to a certain extent where films would be distributed. Officially speaking, the Shaw 
Brothers were a member of the Free Cinema Association. As a film production company, the 
films by the Shaw Brothers might be constrained by the Free Cinema Association guidelines, but 
as a film distributor in Southeast Asia, the Shaws crossed the restraints set out by the Cold War 
logic of bipolar loyalties. While Fenghuang’s films (Fenghuang was a Hong Kong based pro-left 
wing film company which produced Mandarin films) were distributed by the Shaw Brothers, and 
Great Wall’s films were distributed by Cathay (Great Wall was also a leftist film company which 
produced Mandarin films in Hong Kong). And Xinlian films’ distribution rights were sold to not 
only the Shaw Brothers, but also to Cathay and the theatre chains of the Ho family (Kong Ngee) 
(Xinlian was a leftist film company that produced Cantonese films).227  
 
Towards an Anti-Colonial and Cosmopolitan Identity and the Rhetoric of Being Chinese 
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Like other film companies in British Hong Kong, Zhonglian had to pay heed to the 
censorship situation in postwar Hong Kong, which in the early 1950s was heavy-handed and to a 
certain extent draconian (chapter 1). As such, Zhonglian exercised self-censorship over the 
contents of its own films.228 While imperial politics of the postwar reality were avoided and 
neglected, experiences during the War of Resistance were repeatedly showcased in Zhonglian’s 
films. In such films, the experiences endured in the War of Resistance are forever suspended in 
time. More than ten to fifteen years after the defeat of the Japanese forces, Zhonglian and 
audiences alike revisited the experiences of the War, and the courage of those who would not 
give in to betraying one’s own nation. 
If these anti-Japanese films did not reflect the contemporary realities of Hong Kong as a 
British colony or the struggles between pro-Communist and pro-Nationalist sympathizers, they 
created a myth of Chinese patriotism that is timeless. In the trilogy of anti-Japanese war, the 
ideology of patriotism is hidden safely in the logic of the war against the Japanese. The good 
always triumphs over the evil (Blood-Stained Gold Xueran Huangjin, 1957), (The Road Lu, 
1959), (Sea Hai ,1963); and those who betray their own nation for money and personal gains will 
meet their punishment in the end, and must pay for their past deeds with their own life. In many 
ways, these three films captured the experiences of the Zhonglian film actors during the Second 
                                                 
228 As Sek Kei argues, films produced by leftwing film companies did not necessarily set out to advocate a particular 
political ideology. These films did not overtly promote leftist or Communist teachings. They operated as other film 
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Chinese Mainland (1949-1979)’” trans. Stephen Teo, in (The 24th Hong Kong International Film Festival) Hong 
Kong Cinema Retrospective: Border Crossings in Hong Kong Cinema (Hong Kong: Leisure and Cultural Services 
Department, 2000), 25. 
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World War and the Japanese occupation of Hong Kong between 1941 and 1945. In each of these 
films, the actions of the ensemble cast not only reflect the solidarity of the Chinese patriotic 
spirit but also the many faces of human weaknesses and courage in times of war and revolution. 
Each of the three war films can be read as an allegory of the struggles of the identity 
politics among the Chinese living in Cold War Hong Kong under British colonial rule. I identify 
several questions that these three films address. Who is the enemy? What are the risks and lures 
of living and working in collaboration with the enemy government? And what does it mean to be 
a Chinese living under occupation/colonial government? More specifically, can one avoid being 
political in times of war? Must being Chinese be infused with political implications? The three 
films answered all of the above questions in dichotomous fashion. For instance, the enemy is 
always represented by the Japanese troops (or “daikon/radish heads” as a pejorative name called 
by the Chinese Hong Kong in the films), while the friends are the resistant fighters. This “us” vs. 
“them” representations parallel the bipolar logic of Cold War politics. The Japanese 
officials/soldiers are characterized by their brutality in their treatment of innocent Chinese 
civilians, especially against women (the pregnant woman played by Pak Yin is kicked by a 
Japanese soldier and the character played by Mui Yee is an escaped comfort woman who is again 
raped by a Japanese soldier; The Road). 
Under Japanese occupation, the Chinese characters in these films find themselves lured 
by the temptations of working with the Japanese imperialist government. In Blood-Stained Gold, 
the character played by Ng Cho-fan is a prison guard who lures the Chinese prisoners to stage an 
attack against the Japanese captors for the gold pillaged by the Japanese imperialists from 
Southeast Asia. And in The Road, one of the characters hired a truck driver to take him and his 
family to the city to work as an official under the occupation government. Such political 
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collaborationist actions are represented as human weaknesses and the corruption of the human 
soul. These actions are punished by death in the films’ narrative economy. In fact, both 
characters described above are the first ones to be punished by death. 
Can one avoid politics amidst war, revolution and colonial rule? Everyone, regardless of 
gender, age and class, finds her/himself struggling to survive under Japanese occupation. As 
demonstrated in The Road and Sea, passengers from all walks of life travel on the same truck or 
ship. In times of war, all class barriers dissolved. What distinguishes the different characters is 
not class or gender or age, but one’s spirit of integrity and righteousness as a Chinese amidst 
occupation. In particular, this spirit is expressed by the belief of the nobility in working hard, and 
not being lured by the riches of being a collaborator. Tsi Lo-lin’s character would rather leave 
occupied Hong Kong then to work as a nurse for the Japanese (Sea). In The Road, Tsi also plays 
a nurse. This time as the daughter of a man who seeks employment under the Japanese 
occupation government. She warns her father: “those with conscience will not work for 
radish/daikon heads.” 
Being Chinese in these three films, therefore, implies that one be loyal to one’s 
national/ethnic identity. To prove one’s allegiance as a Chinese patriot, one must resist at all 
costs to work for the imperialists on the one hand, or need to become a resistant fighter as Ng 
does in The Road after his sister dies from her mission. No matter whether one is part of the 
resistant movement or not, all Chinese patriots are expected to aid in the cause. Indeed, all 
members of the Chinese community should join forces as one (such action is announced by Ng’s 
character in The Road (tongxin heli)). If they cannot survive together, they must die together 
(sheng yiqi shengsi yiqi si). Not only do class differences dissolve, gender inequities no longer 
exist in the act of being patriotic. For instance, in Sea, after the Chinese characters killed all the 
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Japanese soldiers, they find a life boat. However, only four people can fit on this boat. Instead of 
leaving the men behind, the women stay on to fight off other Japanese who may be coming to 
capture them. Audiences of these three films should leave the theater with one moral lesson. That 
is, being Chinese means being patriotic under a foreign government. In order to reassure its 
audiences, Zhonglian celebrated the noble cause of being patriotic by narrating the survival of 
characters who sacrificed as martyrs in contrast to the deaths of those who became colonial 
collaborators.   
Within this allegorical imaginary of the Zhonglian anti-Japanese war films, where the 
violence of British imperial reality is whitewashed and where the War of Resistance continues to 
be the central site of disruption and reconstruction, Chinese patriotism is defined as an anti-
imperialist sentiment that is ironically directed at the already defeated Japanese power and not at 
Hong Kong’s then British colonial ruler. In these three films, Japan was labeled as the enemy of 
the Chinese people. Yet by avoiding the representation of British presence, Zhonglian 
filmmakers’ cinematic indifference could also be interpreted as another form of anti-colonial 
resistance. 
Although Zhonglian was not officially labeled as a leftwing film company, they had 
connections with the Xinlian film company which was overtly pro-Communist and left-leaning 
in ideology. Nonetheless, their films were able to secure limited exhibition pockets in the 
Southeast Asian markets. Through its fan magazine, Union Pictorial, Zhonglian was able to 
reach a much larger audience base outside of Hong Kong. Through this magazine, Zhonglian 
gradually became a cosmopolitan and transnational film company.  I would argue that Union 
Pictorial offered an opportunity for overseas Chinese in such places as Malaya and Indonesia to 
construct a pan-Chinese nationalism, albeit one that was party-based and leftist, in times of 
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indigenous anti-colonial insurgencies and counterinsurgency propaganda work by the British 
colonialist in the postwar period.229 Amongst the Chinese diaspora in Southeast Asia, 
Zhonglian’s films were esteemed for their high caliber of artistic quality. In addition to providing 
the overseas audience a form of familiar entertainment, Zhonglian’s Cantonese films gave the 
Chinese diasporic population an object of nostalgic identification that provided them strength in 
times of identity and nationalistic crises amidst decolonization and anti-imperialist processes.  
While the distribution of Cantonese films by such left-leaning film companies as 
Zhonglian and Xinlian to countries in Southeast Asia was circumscribed strictly by Cold War 
realities and political control of the film industry in Hong Kong, the overseas circulation of film 
magazines put out by left-leaning film companies such as Great Wall and Zhonglian were able to 
break the distribution barriers and censorship restrictions engendered by the ongoing 
Communist-vs.-Nationalist struggles to become one of the media through which Zhonglian’s 
moral values and patriotic imaginary were disseminated to their audiences/readers. Through the 
pages of the monthly Chinese language the Union Pictorial (Zhonglian Huabao), the values of a 
newly defined set of postwar Confucian ethics were instilled amongst their readers. As Hong 
Kong’s postwar cultural elites, they advocated the importance of film as education, and as a tool 
to awaken the moral duties of every Chinese. Furthermore, they sought to mobilize the affects 
and sentiments of overseas Chinese for a nostalgic return to their homeland on the mainland. In 
places where Zhonglian’s films were not distributed, the Union Pictorial came to replace the 
celluloid form to advocate a sense of duty among the Chinese compatriots all around the world. 
Was Zhonglian successful in disseminating their ideological tenets through its fan magazines? 
What were the views of their readers toward Zhonglian’s films and actors? When we examine 
                                                 
229 See Susan L. Carruthers, Winning Hearts and Minds: British Governments, the Media and Colonial Counter-
insurgency 1944-1960 (London and New York: Leicester University Press, 1995). 
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closely the contents and tone of the fan letters to Zhonglian and responses by the Zhonglian film 
actors, Hong Kong’s role in the politics of Chinese identity formation was as much constructed 
by the Pan-Chinese audiences as by the various governmental bodies during the Cold War.  
The first issue of the Union Pictorial was published on September 1, 1955.230 Its 
publication ran until the early 1960s.  In its inaugural issue, the president of Zhonglian, Ng Cho-
fan, outlined the mission and goals of Zhonglian and its fan magazine. According to Ng, since 
the founding of Zhonglian, it sought to raise the artistic standards and quality of Cantonese 
cinema. But more importantly, it aimed to serve the needs of its audiences.231 Since this first 
issue, the Union Pictorial solicited the views and opinions of its readers and audiences in regard 
to their films. Indeed, the Union Pictorial acted as an intermediary to bridge Zhonglian and its 
readers in Hong Kong, Macau, Singapore, Indonesia, Vietnam, Cambodia, and the Chinatowns 
in North American and South America.232 More importantly, as noted by Ng Cho-fan, the Union 
Pictorial belonged to its readers and the audiences of Zhonglian film productions.233 
The first Zhonglian film was not shown in Indonesia until 1958, five years after the 
founding of Zhonglian and three years after the arrival of the Union Pictorial in Jakarta.234 Their 
                                                 
230 Union Pictorial was one of many film trade journals in Hong Kong at the time. Even in the 1930s, the 
nationalist/patriotic was advocated by Lianhua’s film magazine. Linda Lai suggests that “In 1934, Lianhua founded 
the colony's second film magazine, Lianhua monthly, its mission being the dissemination of patriotic sentiments as 
much as the promotion of film literacy and of Lianhua's distinct identity as a company.” This magazine promoted a 
“nationalist rhetoric.” See Linda Lai, “Hong Kong cinema in the 1930s: docility, social hygiene, pleasure-seeking & 
the consolidation of the film industry,” Screening the Past Issue 11 (2000). Accessed on the WWW: 
http://www.latrobe.edu.au/screeningthepast/firstrelease/fr1100/llfr11h.htm 
231 All my translations from Chinese unless otherwise indicated. Union Pictorial, No. 1 (September 1955), front 
matter. 
232 The viewers of Zhonglian films and readers of the Union Pictorial were not limited to those who resided in Hong 
Kong, Kowloon and Macau. The Chinese diasporic readers extended as far away as Singapore, Jakarta (Indonesia), 
Saigon (Vietnam), Burma, Phnom Penh (Cambodia), San Francisco (USA), and Chinatowns in South America. 
From issue number 13, the Union Pictorial began to be distributed to Havana, Cuba. From the fan letters published 
in the magazines, there were even readers from Canada, New Zealand (Union Pictorial, no. 17, 32), and even 
Madagascar (Union Pictorial, no. 33 (July 1958), 22.) Zhonglian’s films were distributed to these places, but fan 
letters were mostly from Hong Kong, Macau, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore. 
233 Union Pictorial, no. 1 (September 1955), front matter. 
234 Union Pictorial, no. 33 (July 1958), 23. 
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films were still not distributed in Cambodia in 1959.235 Despite the absence of Zhonglian’s films 
in these two countries, the Union Pictorial garnered a group of fans that had never seen their 
films. The affective ties between Zhonglian and its reading fans were perhaps just as strong as 
those between the film company and its film viewing audiences. This intimate connection 
between the actors and their fans was achieved via such sections as the Readers’ Corner, where 
fans could offer suggestions on how to improve the magazine or Zhonglian’s films as well as ask 
questions about the private lives of their favorite actors, which were often answered by the 
female actors from Zhonglian. On some occasions, readers’ letters and film reviews were 
published by the Union Pictorial. 
Such fan letters from readers of the Union Pictorial were able to project the voice of the 
Chinese diaspora. Yet, the sentiments of the readership should not be generalized. We should 
continue to be wary of the degree to which such fan letters represented the voice of all the 
overseas Chinese communities, where they could access other Hong Kong made films such as 
those produced by the Shaw brothers and Cathay. Nonetheless, through their letters, we hear the 
visceral and tangible likes and dislikes of Zhonglian’s fans. One complaint by overseas Chinese 
audiences was that the monthly magazine would sometimes be published at different times of the 
month. This seemingly trivial grievance is by far the most frequent, which only proves the 
eagerness of Zhonglian’s overseas fans in hearing news about their favorite role models and their 
films.  Other criticisms relate to the differential treatments between Hong Kong and Macau 
residents and those who lived overseas. In particular, a fan from Burma complained how free 
sneak previews or studio visits were only limited to fans residing in Hong Kong and Macau, but 
not for fans abroad.236 Overseas Chinese communities, especially those in Indonesia, often 
                                                 
235 Union Pictorial, no. 43 (May 1959), 34. 
236 Union Pictorial, no. 31 (May 1958), 24. 
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complained how they could not view Zhonglian’s films.237 In fact, Zhonglian’s Spring, dubbed 
into Mandarin, was finally screened in Indonesia five years after its initial screening in Hong 
Kong; it was very well received by many fans there.238 According to a witness report of one 
reader in Jakarta, even as early as two to three hours prior to the opening of the screen, there was 
already a long queue in front of the movie theater.239 One reader who witnessed this sight 
claimed that those who had waited for more than four hours did not necessarily secure a seat in 
the theatre.240 Reading such excitement from fan reports and correspondences with Zhonglian 
actors in the Union Pictorial allowed fans living in Chinese diasporic communities in countries 
that did not import Zhonglian films to establish connections to the cultural realm of their 
“motherland.”  Not only did the Union Pictorial provide the “spiritual food” for many readers, 
the physical magazine itself was also a “precious” object that they cherished.241 This precious 
object, that is the Union Pictorial, became a conduit connecting the Chinese diaspora to a 
country, a home that they never knew. For these fans, the film magazine became a pathway of 
nostalgic return, albeit an imaginary one, to the China motherland. 
The brand of Chinese patriotism disseminated and reinforced by Zhonglian through its 
monthly pictorial may seem at first glance to be couched in apolitical terms. Yet the sense of 
Chinese patriotism promoted by Zhonglian was subtly defined by pro-Communist party politics. 
For instance, left-wing pro-PRC politics were subtly promoted by their very focus on the needs 
of the little urbanites and working class of Hong Kong and overseas Chinese.242 Zhonglian’s pro-
left-leaning rhetoric and sentiments is most evident in the readership demographics of the 
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magazine. More often then not, Union Pictorial’s readers were high school students or factory 
workers.243 In a letter from the workers of the Wing Fa Factory, the fans wrote to express their 
appreciation for the tour they had at the Zhonglian film studios.244 In their letter of appreciation, 
they wrote: “Although we work in different industries, we are the same “people” (renmin, 
citizens) who love our motherland (zuguo).”245  
Such patriotic sentiments felt by the Chinese diaspora were revealed through the letters 
written by the fans of Zhonglian in such countries as Indonesia. In a moving letter by a young 
school girl from Jakarta, Indonesia, she wrote about her discovery of Zhonglian’s films in the 
pages of the Union Pictorial. For three generations, her grandmother, her mother and herself had 
enjoyed the news about Zhonglian film workers. Although the conditions of the Chinese diaspora 
were dismal, through reading about Zhonglian’s films they no longer felt as if they were 
“overseas orphans” (haiwai guer).246 It is news about the achievements of their motherland on 
the mainland that made them proud. She, along with her mother and grandmother, identified with 
the cultural heritage of the mainland as led by the Communist Party. Here, identification with 
“China” was highly but subtly politicized within the context of Cold War struggles between the 
PRC and the KMT. On the other hand, there were those among the overseas Chinese who held a 
different view of their diasporic experience. One reader, who was an overseas Chinese student 
who grew up in Jakarta proudly recognized Indonesia as his second home: “We love our 
motherland and we also love Indonesia” (Women reai zuguo ye reai yinni).247 
The brand of this new found patriotism among the Chinese diasporic audiences in places 
such as Indonesia was as much culturally as historically contingent and politically circumscribed. 
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Subtle pro-PRC sentiments and positionality are sprinkled throughout the Union Pictorial. For 
instance, reviews of films by such left-wing film companies as Fenghuang and Great Wall were 
often reported in the Union Pictorial. Most prevalent was the recognition of the value of the 
working class audiences in the pages of this magazine, which fostered the importance of 
proletarian taste and sensitivity. Second, leftist politics were often presented in moral terms. 
Readers learned about Zhonglian’s films through the Union Pictorial and embraced the 
“educational value” (jiaoyu yiyi) of their films.248 What is important to note here is that such 
descriptions are the same words used to describe the films produced by the mainland by the 
unhappy readers of Wen Wei Po in the heated press battle between the Hong Kong Film 
Censorship Board and the leftist press in Hong Kong in the mid-1960s (chapter 1). Viewers in 
Indonesia also recognized the PRC as the motherland.249 For young readers in Cambodia, 
Zhonglian’s films were able to counter the poisonous and corrupt influences of certain films 
made in Hong Kong.250 To support Zonglian’s magazine became synonymous with supporting 
Zhonglian’s films. And to support Zhonglian’s films symbolized one’s support of Cantonese 
films and the healthy message of Chinese patriotism which promoted the PRC as the 
motherland.251 
The ideology advocated by Zhonglian, in raising the opinions about Cantonese cinema,252 
reached not only beyond the colonial setting of Hong Kong and Macau, but beyond dialect. 
Through the pictorial, even those living overseas who did not know Cantonese came to 
appreciate Cantonese cinema. For instance, in Cambodia, where most overseas Chinese spoke 
                                                 
248 Union Pictorial, no. 37 (November 1958), 22. 
249 Union Pictorial, no. 33 (July 1958), 23. 
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the Chaozhou dialect,253 Zhonglian’s fans were still able to appreciate the high quality films by 
Zhonglian. Not all Zhonglian’s films were able to reach the overseas Chinese audiences around 
the world due to Cold War politics. But through the Union Pictorial, Zhonglian successfully 
touched the hearts and minds of fans as far away as Havana and San Francisco, and delivered its 
message of humility, dignity and patriotism across the porous boundaries of the celluloid image, 
the regional differences between Chinese dialects, as well as the geopolitical boundaries of 
colonial Hong Kong.  
 
Zhonglian’s Film Work: Representing the Rhetoric of Confucian Ethics in Cantonese Style 
According to Laiwan Pang, the left-wing cinema movement (1932-1937) in China 
encompasses films showing the directors’ “strong sense of social mission and ethical 
commitment to the nation and its people”, and those “that contain elements of class 
consciousness or revolution, and concerns about the poor and the disenfranchised.”254 In addition 
to adopting the aesthetic and moral legacy of left-wing cinema, Zhonglian, similar to the left-
wing cinema filmmakers of the 1930s, had to succumb to the market imperative of the film 
industry of the time. Indeed, the “Chinese left-wing cinema was by and large a commercial one, 
a successful one indeed, as many of these films set box office records. Its success in ideological 
terms was necessarily conditioned to the films’ popularity among the mass.”255 Zhonglian’s films 
were also box-office winners that appealed to many Hong Kong and overseas Chinese audiences. 
According to Pang, the Chinese left-wing film movement “was neither a top-down ideological 
didacticism in which the filmmakers retained the sole power to control this movement nor a pure 
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money-making industry determined merely by the tastes or desires of the spectators.”256 Indeed, I 
believe that the Zhonglian’s relationship with its audiences was in many ways similar to that 
between the left-wing filmmakers in 1930s and 1940s China and their audiences described by 
Pang. 
Lights of Ten Thousand Homes/Myriad of Lights (Wanjia Denghuo, 1948) is a leftist film 
written by Yang Hansheng and Shen Fu, and directed by Shen Fu. Yang Hansheng was a 
Communist member and was one of the leftist activists during the Left Wing Film movement in 
the 1930s.257 In this Mandarin language melodrama about the vicissitudes of a young couple and 
their children in Shanghai during the immediate postwar period, we witness the clash between 
the urban and the rural way of life when the family of the young man, which includes his mother, 
his younger brother’s family, decides to move to the city to live with him. However, the 
apartment is too tiny to accommodate all of them. The interpersonal tensions which arise from 
the small living space would reappear again in the Zhonglian’s film classic, In the Face of 
Demolition (Weilou Chunxiao, 1953). According to film historian Paul Pickowicz, melodrama 
“was a genre especially well suited to the task of popularizing and dramatizing basic Marxist 
ideas” of the May Fourth or left-wing filmmakers.258 Similarly, Zhonglian often turned to the 
melodramatic modality in their film narratives to explore the contradictions of the Confucian 
moral ethics in colonial Hong Kong. 
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This film genre presents political turmoil and national crises experienced by the Chinese 
people in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War as familial problems.259 The cause 
of this family tension is attributed to the evil of the capitalist boss in times of rampant inflation 
problems during the immediate aftermath of WWII in China and the imminent outbreak of the 
Civil War between the CCP and the KMT on the mainland. The conflicts experienced with the 
family in Lights of Ten Thousand Homes are in the end resolved when the son and his wife 
realize that the solidarity of the family is needed to overcome the financial instability of their 
sociopolitical reality. This family union and the revival or reinterpretation of Confucian morality 
in turn is required for the salvation of the Chinese nation in the face of foreign aggression. 
However, the May Fourth melodramas of the 1930s and 1940s, which provided a critical 
commentaries on society and hence on the state authority through family centered narratives 
disappeared in the 1950s and 1960s on the mainland.260 
Although the May Fourth melodramatic film tradition ended on the mainland, the 
Zhonglian cooperative would continue this legacy in 1950s Hong Kong. An examination of the 
Zhonglian films exposes not only the historicity of this cooperative’s films, but also how the 
progressive film tradition on the mainland in the 1930s and 1940s and its preoccupation with the 
stories of the underprivileged continued in the Zhonglian’s film work. Through my textual 
analyses of such films as In the Face of Demolition and Sworn Sisters (1954), we will learn that 
the overarching themes which structure most of Zhonglian’s films are the twin pillars of tradition 
and modernity. Such a dichotomous perspective is in fact Zhonglian’s method to make sense of 
the contradictions of being Chinese in colonial Hong Kong in the Cold War period. On the one 
hand, their worldview, as revealed in their films, was at once heavily rooted in Chinese traditions; 
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yet, on the other hand, they also reassessed the feudal aspects of familial values found in the 
Confucian moral fabric. At the same time, just as Zhonglian film artists were the alternative 
cultural elites in 1950s Hong Kong, their films also critiqued the problems and even moral evils 
prevalent in British Hong Kong that sought for colonial industrial modernity. Zhonglian’s films 
also dealt with such issues in their filmic moral universe as the role of women in the Chinese 
patriarchal familial economy plagued by the postwar problems of overcrowding, housing 
shortage and unemployment, which were social ills made doubly by the class divides on the one 
hand, and political uncertainties in Cold War Hong Kong on the other. 
Zhonglian film workers were more then film workers. In fact, they were also educators 
and  torch bearers of a renewed Chinese Confucian morality in Hong Kong when the PRC 
government was politically cut off from the Hong Kong Chinese. Indeed, Zhonglian’s film artists 
not only became the alternative cultural elites in Hong Kong, their ideology also challenged the 
authority of British colonial rulers and replaced the latter’s colonial patriarchy with the logic of a 
renewed leftist patriarchy. The films of Zhonglian can also be assessed as the sub-story of our 
historical narrative on the impact of Cantonese cinema in Cold War Hong Kong, which reveals 
the structure of feeling of the underprivileged and the grassroots in British Hong Kong. In 
particular, I look at film genres such as melodrama and social realist ethics film (lunli pian). 
Most importantly, by way of my textual analyzes of the films of Zhonglian, I seek to answer 
such questions as how the genres of melodrama and social realist lunli films can be pivoted 
against the main political and historical structure of Cold War Hong Kong; and how the stories in 
the film can be mapped onto the structure of the turn away from the British Empire and outward 
to the Chinese diaspora. 
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During the Golden Age of 1950s Hong Kong cinema, when the Hong Kong film industry 
witnessed annual productions of  around two hundred films,261 Zhonglian competed against other 
local film companies in how Hong Kong social life and diasporic Chineseness were 
cinematically represented.262 For instance, Zhonglian’s Soviet and Italian neo-realist influenced 
social realist melodramas celebrating the dignity of the underprivileged, contested against the 
ideals of modernity and cosmopolitanism, proffered by the pro-Taiwan Cathay-MP & GI’s 
Hollywood styled Mandarin musicals and urban romances in the mid-1950s through to the 1960s. 
From the early 1950s to mid-1960s, Zhonglian, as the alternative producer of Hong Kong’s 
filmic imaginary did make a significant contribution to elevating the quality of Cantonese 
cinema and to redefining the role of Cantonese film artists. As Hong Kong’s postwar cultural 
elites, Zhonglian film artists proved that Cantonese cinema could become the legitimate torch 
bearers and purveyors of the values of Confucian ethics, and a pan-Chinese vision of patriotism 
amidst both cutthroat competition and the ongoing political distress experienced in the Crown 
Colony of Hong Kong.  
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Zhonglian had to take heed of the censorship situation in postwar Hong Kong, which in 
the early 1950s was heavy-handed and to a certain extent draconian. In order to avoid Hong 
Kong government’s censorship regulations, Zhonglian exercised self-censorship over the 
contents of its own films.263 The company chose save genres to advocate its message, which 
included melodramas and republican era dramas based on adaptations from literary works by 
PRC-approved writers such as the May Fourth writer Lu Xun. In the early 1950s, in a world of 
heated struggles between right and left, between pro-Communist blocs and the U.S. backed 
ideological forces on the colonial ground of Hong Kong, not a single Zhonglian film directly 
mentioned the realities of the waning British colonial prestige in the new global world order. 
Although the message conveyed in Zhonglian’s films was not overtly political, Zhonglian films 
became the new guidance for righteous moral actions in times of postwar crises. Within a mere 
decade, Zhonglian created in the imaginary of their audiences, a subaltern moral universe of 
working class dignity and familial solidarity which included fellow neighbors living in dire 
poverty. This moral universe reinterpreted the precepts of outdated Confucian morality and 
challenged the patriarchal and gender inequities in Chinese family and society. 
While shunning genres such as martial arts and opera films, which were considered by 
many left-leaning cultural workers and critics in Hong Kong as aesthetically and morally inferior, 
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Zhonglian privileged the production of wenyi (literary genre films) and lunli pian (social realist 
films which deal with social ethics and morality), as the main genres par excellence to construct 
and convey the moral universe of righteous Chinese patriotism. In particular, Zhonglian film 
workers drew on the traditions of the service mentality of May Fourth literati and progressive 
reformers on the mainland. Not only did Zhonglian based many of its films on adaptations of 
Chinese classics, such as works by Ba Jin (Family, Spring, Autumn), the company readily 
absorbed influences and based some of its films on classics from the Western canon, such as 
Theodore Dreiser’s Sister Carrie (1900) (Everlasting Love Tianchang Dijiu, 1955), Nikolai 
Ostrovsky’s Born of the Storm (Big Thunderstorm Da Leiyu, 1954), Leo Tolstoy’s Anna 
Karenina (1878) (Broken Spring Dreams Chuncan Mengduan, 1955),and Charles Dickson’s The 
Great Expectations/Oliver Twist (An Orphan’s Tragedy Guxing Xuelei, 1955). In and through 
wenyi pian and lunli pian, Zhonglian’s moral universe was both constructed and disseminated. 
The aesthetics of Zhonglian’s social realist melodramas, which had been attributed to both Italian 
neo-realist and Soviet social realist traditions, became in the postwar Hong Kong context the 
quintessential purveyors of the precepts of Confucian ethics and morality. 
During the rise of Cantonese lunli pian in the 1950s and 1960s, the British Crown Colony, 
became the successor of China in transmitting values of moral good and a sense of patriotism to 
the overseas Chinese. This moral universe was based on a “contradiction” between “tradition and 
modernity.”264 To a certain extent, I agree with the Hong Kong film scholar, Liao Zhiqiang that 
this inherent contradiction can be found in the themes of Zhonglian’s film trajectory. On the one 
hand, Zhonglian’s films expose the dangers of feudalism and superstitions in the daily realities of 
the underprivileged in postwar Hong Kong. On the other hand, these films attempt to revive the 
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positive aspects of Confucian morality by purging the deep seated superstition of traditional 
Chinese society. Indeed, the “contradiction” between tradition and modernity is not only integral 
but also constitutive of the very creation of an imperial and anti-colonial patriotism in Hong 
Kong’s cinematic universe and by extension daily realities. This very dialogue or contest gave 
rise to a unique moral universe of Zhonglian. 
Between 1953 and 1964, Zhonglian produced forty-four Cantonese dialect films. The 
first Zhonglian produced film was an adaptation of a work by Ba Jin entitled Family.265 Being a 
faithful adaptation of Ba Jin’s work, Zhonglian’s Family provides a critical denunciation of the 
stagnation of the Chinese traditional familial values in the age of modern change, and against 
meaningless feudal rituals, customs and practices (lijiao) amidst the continuous onslaught of 
foreign aggression on the minds of the Chinese. Films such as Vampire Woman (Xixue Fu 1962), 
and The House of Murders (Guiwu Yiyun, 1963) condemn the suffocation of human freedom that 
was the result of the feudalist and superstitious ideas in traditional Chinese society. All of the 
following Zhonglian produced films, including, Family (Jia, 1953), Spring (Chun, 1953), 
Autumn (Qiu, 1954), Big Thunderstorm (Da Leiyu, 1954), Autumn Comes To Purple Rose 
Garden (Ziweiyuan De Qiutian, 1958), and A Sketch of Humanity (Renlun, 1959) celebrate 
strong characters who fought for the freedom of marriage and romantic love. These films further 
warn against the danger of archaic Confucian notions of gender roles in disrupting family love 
(The Wall Qiang, 1956). 
Although these lunli social ethics films critique the abuse of Confucian ideals, they 
continue to celebrate the importance of the Confucian virtue of filial devotion, and the 
responsibilities and duties towards one’s parents and children (Parents’ Hearts Fumu Xin, 1955). 
                                                 
265 The reception of Family was a great success both in Hong Kong and on the Mainland. It garnered 250, 0000 
HKD in local box office returns. 
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This filiality is markedly different from the one critiqued within Ba Jin’s trilogy. Rather then the 
blind duty that is expected from children to uphold the image of propriety and to sustain the 
prestige of the patriarchal family, the filial devotion expressed by children in such films as In the 
Face of Demolition, is an expression of love and appreciation for the genuine care from their 
parents. The son in this film, played by the young Bruce Lee, goes to work in the morning and 
studies at night to support the family, bringing hope for his parents. To reward his son, the father 
sells his blood in order to bring home a good meal to his ailing wife and their three young 
children. 
For Lo Dun and his fellow progressive film workers, the contents of films should be akin 
to “clear water” (bai kaishui). Such “healthy” films as In the Face of Demotion and The Prodigal 
Son (produced by Xinlian in 1952) delivered clear and straightforward moral lessons, which 
guided people to a life of compassion and kindness.266 What Zhonglian sought to achieve was to 
raise the quality of Cantonese cinema on the one hand, and on the other, to expose the ugliness of 
poverty in postwar Hong Kong, as well as the stifling effects of traditional feudal ways which 
could only be vanquished by one’s dignity and humility. Zhonglian never pretended to resolve 
the problems of human drama and daily experiences during wartime China and postwar 
China/Hong Kong by the end of the narrative economy of any one film. In fact, by the end of In 
the Face of Demolition, even though all the characters survive the collapse of their tenement 
building following a huge catastrophic rainstorm, they remain unemployed. Rather, what is 
advocated is that all the characters must unite together in times of life-changing crises: death, 
childbirth, typhoon disasters, etc. – in order to survive. 
The most influential Zhonglian films were those that drew their archival materials from 
the daily realities of the new arrivals in Hong Kong in the postwar period. To a certain extent, 
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Zhonglian film workers developed an intimate rapport with the reconstruction process of postwar 
Hong Kong society in their historical and social documentation of the lived experiences of the 
class divide between the rich and the poor. Unlike other Hong Kong movie stars, Zhonglian’s 
film artists did not promote themselves as merely stars. On the silver screen, the most popular 
Zhonglian stars, Ng Cho-fan and Pak Yin, often portrayed characters who struggled in the 
stifling conditions of traditional Chinese feudal society, or lower class heroes who remained 
dignified amidst the impoverished conditions of postwar Hong Kong. Their onscreen personae 
were recaptured in photographs and film reviews that appeared in the Union Pictorial. Yet such 
recapitulation did not merely summarize the films’ contents. They also promoted the silent 
nobility of such human vicissitudes and aimed to effect a change to improve the postwar society 
and the plight of the underprivileged. In addition to being film actors/artists, they adopted 
additional roles as spokespersons for the poor, and educators of their fans, which allowed the 
actors to reassess, critique and redefine their social identities as Cantonese film stars in Cold War 
Hong Kong. These various roles are made most evident not only in their work on the silver 
screen, but also in their interviews in the Union Pictorial.  
In particular, Zhonglian’s film workers redefined their professionalism in terms of their 
character as benevolent modest actors. As film actors, they had the obligation to improve their 
character through cultivation and modesty. For instance, Zhonglian film workers promoted such 
virtue through their own responses to the praise from their fans of their fine acting. Zhonglian 
actors always responded by remaining humble about their acting capabilities.267 Modesty as the 
primary virtue of Zhonglian film workers also meant that they worked to educate the public 
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rather than to gain monetary benefits for themselves, for “Money cannot purchase art.”268 Actors 
should not seek fame and money. In his speech to the newly selected young potential stars of 
Zhonglian, the President, Ng Cho-fan269 reminded the new comers that they had to at once give 
up the fantasy of becoming superstars and of attaining the wealth in the forms of a house, a car, 
etc. Rather, they had to commit themselves to the long arduous road ahead of them, of hardships 
and tribulations.270 Indeed, actors had the social responsibilities to worn audiences of the 
potential degeneration and danger of succumbing to materialistic decadence and vanity. In one of 
her responses to a fan from Malaya regarding the role of a film worker, Yung Siu-yee wrote that 
those involved in film work had to possess a certain level of cultural knowledge and social 
awareness. Furthermore, the responsibility of a film worker was to guide the public toward a 
correct moral path, to assist the public in understanding society and life.271 Throughout the pages 
of the Union Pictorial, the Zhonglian film workers promoted the ideology of hard work, 
education, and most importantly of Chinese patriotism, albeit in a very subtle way, amongst the 
Chinese diasporic communities.  
The major themes covered in the majority of Zhonglian’s films are social commentaries 
on postwar realities, such as housing shortage, unemployment, and the inequities of the 
tremendous divide between the rich and the poor. The praise and celebration of both familial and 
neighborly love and solidarity in such lunli films would construct a new conception and a new 
constitution of family and home that replace the displaced and corrupted family of the Ba Jin 
trilogy. A new Confucian social ethics replaced those of the stagnant Confucian lijiao of the 
bygone past. In the place of the hypocrisy of lijiao is the sincerity and righteousness of group 
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solidarity among fellow little urbanites. Hailed by many film critics as Zhonglian’s masterpiece, 
In the Face of Demolition is the film most representative in exposing the problems experienced 
by the impoverished population in postwar Hong Kong. In this Zhonglian masterpiece, we 
witness the struggles and vicissitudes of the tenants who share a small shabby rundown tenement 
apartment unit in postwar Hong Kong. Despite the various tribulations that these little urbanites 
face, they never once give up hope, for they have faith in the power of group solidarity. 
Throughout the film, we hear the taxi driver, played by one of the founding members of 
Zhonglian, Ng Cho-fan, iterates the following slogan, “One for all, all for one” (renren weiwo, 
wowei renren) many times encouraging his fellow neighbors to stay positive and remain 
dignified in both sickness and poverty. This phrase would become the slogan of Zhonglian’s film 
workers’ didactic ideals.  
Amidst problems such as overcrowding, housing shortage, as well as unemployment, this 
film reflects the historical moment of 1950s Hong Kong. Just as many new immigrants and 
refugees had to deal with such problems, In the Face of Demolition exposes the struggles and 
predicaments that the individual tenants face living under one roof. This film exposes the 
postwar hardships experienced by the newly arrived immigrants and refugees in Hong Kong, but 
also the rift between the rich and the poor. The moral lesson conveyed in this film is that class 
status and education level should not be the determining factors in judging or defining a person’s 
true character. Rather, a true gentleman should have benevolence and kindness for all his friends 
and neighbors. This characteristic is exemplified by the taxi driver played by Ng Cho-fan. He is 
neither rich nor well educated, but he is a compassionate person who helps his neighbors through 
hardships without reservations. The teacher played by Cheung Ying is an aspiring writer who 
gives up easily and succumbs to the lures of an easy life as a rent collector. He indirectly causes 
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the death of one of the tenants by forcing him to pay rent, which leads the unemployed father to 
sell his own blood to make ends meet.  
Indeed, one’s education and money are merely social trappings. This new found 
Confucian morality flourishes and is celebrated in times of war.  The selfish desire for 
accumulating wealth and saving face has no place in the moral universe of this Zhonglian film. 
Just as in times of war (The Road and Sea), when many Chinese from all walks of life 
experienced the same brutality under Japanese occupation, here in the political uncertain times of 
1950s Hong Kong, social classes dissolve as all neighbors must join together to overcome all 
challenges. The true judge of the social life of the various little urbanites in the film is at the 
dénouement, mother nature itself. In this film, when the storm threatens to demolish the entire 
tenement building, everyone becomes victims of this imminent danger. They can only overcome 
poverty and the storm by helping each other.  
In addition to celebrating the importance of loving one’s neighbors, some Zhonglian 
films focus on the moral dilemmas and plight of the underprivileged (for instance, the female 
domestic workers in Sworn Sisters Jinlan Jiemei, 1954). Often times, the plight is not so much 
brought upon by the material poverty of the underprivileged, but by human weakness in the face 
of the lures of modern life, such as vanity and greed. For instance, one of the female domestic 
workers in Sworn Sisters is cheated by her lover for she seeks for vanity and an easy life. Desire 
for money is deemed as an evil force which only brings upon its culprit a punishment by either 
death or law (Money Qian, 1959; The Cruel Husband Duzhangfu 1959). The lures of modern life 
and vanity can often stray an upright individual toward the poisonous habit of drug addiction 
(Humanity Ren, 1960), (The Cruel Hand Dushou, 1960). Such human weaknesses often lead to 
the disruption of family life (We Want to Live Woyao Huoxiaqu, 1960; Money is Forever Yinzhi 
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Wansui, 1961). The problems that were confronted by the Hong Kong grassroots in the postwar 
period, as presented by Zhonglian’s films, are not so much brought upon by material poverty but 
by moral degradation, the corruption of authority of the traditional literati class, and the 
disruption of family love. 
The representation of the contrast between the glamour of modern life and the 
vicissitudes of the underprivileged in effect reflects the contradiction and constitutive 
interrelation between modernity and tradition, or between the logic of colonial benevolence and 
the values of Confucian moral ethics. In Sworn Sisters the contest between tradition and 
modernity are played out in the gender relations and the reconstruction of traditional forms of 
patriarchy found in the experiences of the five female characters in this Zhonglian film.  
The five female characters are all “amah” or domestic workers in postwar Hong Kong. 
Each of the four women possesses a desire or a vice, the fifth woman, played by Tsi Lo-lin 
represents the voice of wisdom who would eventually guide her four friends back onto the path 
of honesty and righteousness. Ah Choi wants to live an easy life and marry a rich man. But 
instead, she is duped by a married man who steals all her savings and their unborn child. Ah 
Chun wishes to ensure the continuation of the patrilineal lineage of her family. Instead of curing 
her young nephew’s illness, she forces him to get married at a young age. However, soon after 
his wedding, he becomes ill and dies. Ah Sam entrusts all her fortune to an oracle teller who 
almost dupes all of her money with a lie to grow money for her. Finally, Ah Ho is a middle aged 
woman who has worked for her master’s family for many years. She is so loyal to her boss and 
his family that sometimes she uses her own savings to buy rice for the entire family. However, in 
times of crises, not only does the master’s son not compensates Ah Ho for her work, he also fires 
her. 
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What motivates these four women is a deep seated superstition and the perceived truth of 
all by-gone practices of Chinese customs. Yet this film is also a challenge against the corrupted 
Chinese patriarchy as represented by all the weak male characters in this film: the lover of Ah 
Choi, the nephew of Ah Chun, the fortune teller and the son of Ah Ho’s master. Although the 
women all fall victims to their own supervision, in the final analysis, they learn their lessons and 
accept their fates as underprivileged amahs and celebrate their hardworking ethics and positive 
spirit. The triumphs of the five women not only expose the weakness of the Chinese patriarchal 
system, but also the ugly side of the greed for wealth made possible by the flourishing industrial 
economy of Hong Kong’s colonial modernity. 
The narrative structure of the film contrasts with the film’s focus on women’s lives. The 
voice over which introduces the characters and ends the film is an all knowing male who has the 
final say on the moral lesson of the film. He asks the audience: “Afterwards, what can the 
audience learn? What do we think of the characters’ actions?” Nonetheless, the power of 
sisterhood triumphs towards the end of the film when all five characters walk hand in hand with 
confidence down the road toward the camera. Indeed, those who overcome daily social 
challenges rose to become heroines of postwar Hong Kong.  
The moral lessons conveyed in Jinlan jiemei are not only the importance of sisterhood 
but also of some aspects of Chinese patriarchy and the solidarity and strength furnished by the 
Chinese family. To reconstitute the foundation of family life in Hong Kong’s Cold War society, 
Zhonglian re-conceptualized a select vocabulary of Confucian virtues. The credentials to be a 
gentleman of benevolence and kindness are no longer predicated on a high education standing 
like that of the pre-Republican China’s gentry class literati. In Zhonglian’s filmic universe, no 
orphans are left behind, for the family now encompasses the society at large (Following the 
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Gentle Light Kuhai Mingdeng, 1953). Furthermore, being poor does not necessarily mean a life 
of misery. In fact, what money cannot buy is precisely happiness (Under Hong Kong’s Roof 
Xianggang Wuyanxia, 1964). Rather, a life of happiness is conditioned by one’s positive, honest 
and humble attitude (A Myriad Home Qianwan Renjia, 1953; Father and Son Fu yu zi, 1954). 
Family is not so much based on blood and descent, but by the common experience of suffering 
(In the Face of Demolition). As such, the means to reconstitute stronger ties of familial 
connections is via the embrace of group solidarity in overcoming the vicissitudes and tribulations 
brought upon by natural disasters, war and poverty and the social dislocation of postwar 
economies together (Love, parts 1 and 2 Ai 1 and 2, 1955). And those who are selfish and greedy 
are in the final dénouement of a Zhonglian film diegesis punished by the natural world or by law 
and order. 
On another level, this patriarchy was reinforced in the very work of Zhonglian’s actors. 
To a certain extent, the Zhonglian’s female actors were subordinated within the ideological 
confines of the familial duties of a woman. For instance, the stories of the daily and family lives 
of the stars were often featured in the Union Pictorial. In an interview, Wong Man-lei revealed 
that when she was not filming, she enjoyed cooking and knitting sweaters for her husband; she 
also wished that she could have more time to lead the family life of a housewife.272 In an exposé 
on Tsi Lo-Lin, readers learned that Tsi loved to play with children, and as hobbies, she enjoyed 
gardening and flower arrangement and playing with her dogs.273 The husband and wife team, Lee 
Tsing and Yung Siu-yee often reported on their routine life as father and mother to their three 
children.274 Pak Yin, the most illustrious star of Zhonglian revealed that her life outside the silver 
screen was normal and without glamour. In her spare time, she enjoyed doing house chores and 
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making clothes for herself and her children.275 What was emphasized was the importance of 
family life. Furthermore, all the fan letters to the Union Pictorial were answered by Zhonglian’s 
female stars. Indeed, the very act of communicating with their audiences was gendered which 
reinforced the authority of the Zhonglian’s male stars. Perhaps the contradiction of Zhonglian’s 
work is not so much within its cinematic moral universe, but in its very identity as the new 
cultural elites in Cold War Hong Kong, whose mission in forging an alternative vision which 
paralleled that of the British colonial ruler nonetheless reinforced their own brand of Confucian 
patriarchal order. 
 
Conclusion 
In postwar Hong Kong, the precarious nature of British colonial rule in addition to the 
Cold War struggles between pro-Communist and pro-Nationalist forces led to a politically 
charged film arena, where both Mandarin and Cantonese films became more than a form of mass 
entertainment, but a business enterprise that inevitably became entangled within Cold War 
politics on the one hand and at times mobilized by proponents of different political persuasions 
to promote various ideological visions. On the other hand, our examination of Zhonglian’s role 
in postwar Hong Kong sheds light on its significance in the dissemination of leftist infused 
Chinese patriotism amongst diasporic Chinese communities in Southeast Asia. Indeed, although 
its fate as a British colony remained uncertain, Hong Kong and its film industry nonetheless 
became the central site for the production and dismantlement of a contested patriotic nationalism 
that was shaped by both party politics and market considerations.  
By 1964, Zhonglian ceased to produce new films. And in 1967, Zhonglian finally folded 
its operations. That same year, Hong Kong witnessed one of the most calamitous workers-led 
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riots ever in the streets of the colony. According to Hong Kong film critics, such as Yu Mo-wan, 
the decline of Zhonglian and of Cantonese cinema towards the late 1960s could be attributed to 
various factors. The primary factor was the waning of Zhonglian’s creative force due to its 
dwindling talent. Zhonglian was founded on the collective dedication of its members. However, 
only after three years, the main core artists divided their energy by developing their own film 
companies or working on films produced by other companies.276 Others had either returned to 
the mainland (Hung Sin-nui and Ma Si-tsang), or retired from the film industry (Mui Yee in 
1959, Pak Yin and Tsi Lo-lin in 1964).  
On the politicized distribution market front, as a result of the increasingly stringent 
censorship and “extreme leftist policies” and the subsequent Cultural Revolution on the mainland, 
not one single Hong Kong film, Mandarin or Cantonese produced by pro-Beijing or pro-Taiwan 
film companies was imported into the PRC between 1964 and 1977.277 As for the overseas 
market situation, Hong Kong film scholar Stephanie Chung Po-yin argued that the distribution 
market was eventually closed to Hong Kong’s Cantonese cinema due to the “Speak Mandarin 
Campaign,” introduced by the Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Kuan-yew in 1965 to “diffuse 
ethnic and cultural tension” in the newly independent nation.278 As a result, Cantonese cinema’s 
lifeline in the Southeast Asian market was greatly threatened. The rise of film culture in Taiwan 
also led to its fierce competition with Cantonese cinema for market shares in Southeast Asia.279  
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A study of the work of Zhonglian shows that the juggernaut of British Colonial rule in the 
cinematic realm of Hong Kong was tenuous and never complete. In the next chapter, the Hong 
Kong government would try its hands on creating films. Was the government able to manipulate 
and shape local reception? How did the government secure the positive reception of the official 
interpretation of “actualities” in transforming the social realities of postwar Hong Kong? While 
this chapter focused on the political and cultural work of Zhonglian and their films in forging an 
alternative worldview in colonial Hong Kong, the next chapter traces the same historical 
trajectory from the perspective of the government’s strategies to touch the hearts of the 
grassroots. In the next chapter, I examine the experiences of the audiences of these newsreels and 
their realities not only on the screen but also on the colonial ground. By way of delving into the 
locality of consumption, chapter 3 exposes the spatial politics in the industrializing and 
modernizing colonial city that is Hong Kong, starting from the mid 1950s through to the late 
1960s. More importantly, chapter 3 focuses on the local politics of both grassroots space and the 
indigenous body, bodies that were often trapped within the suffocating confines of the so-called 
comfortable living and modern style of the government subsidized housing estates on Hong 
Kong Island and in new Kowloon. Indeed, the next chapter reveals how the British Hong Kong 
government could no longer ignore the bio-power of the large number of refugees flooding into 
Hong Kong. 
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Chapter 3: Representations of Colonial Hong Kong for Local and Global Consumption 
 
Introduction   
 
Following the end of the Second World War, the image of the British Empire as 
invincible was called into question due to its humiliating failure to protect its colonies vis-à-vis 
Japanese aggression. The ongoing prestige of British colonialism and in particular British 
colonial rule in Hong Kong was tested in the early 1950s by Cold War politics inside and outside 
of the colony. Indeed, its very survival and identity as the legitimate ruler of Hong Kong par 
excellence had to depend as much on the financial aid of such new global power as the United 
States as the perception of the international community toward Great Britain and British Hong 
Kong. As the Cold War bipolar order intensified after the conclusion of the Korean War, British 
Hong Kong had to contend with the potential power of the Chinese people in Hong Kong, who 
flooded into the colony to escape from the political crises and turmoil on the mainland wrought 
by the Civil War and the Great Leap Forward campaign under Chairman Mao. It should be noted 
that the British colonial rulers in Hong Kong had always been in the minority vis-à-vis the 
Chinese Hong Kong majority which constituted their colonial subjects. 
As chapter 1 demonstrated, censoring which films the Hong Kong public could and could 
not see was an important cultural and political work of the colonial government in Hong Kong. 
This chapter examines a different aspect of the work of British Hong Kong as an image producer, 
through the publicity productions of its own film unit under the Information Services Department 
(GIS). In order to salvage its prestige, British Hong Kong reproduced its colonial paternalistic 
benevolence through locally produced publicity short films that were meant to be projected to 
both local and global audiences. The Hong Kong government’s film unit, the Hong Kong Film 
Unit (HKFU), which was first established in 1959, primarily had two goals. Firstly, through the 
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HKFU produced short films, the colonial government sought to improve and boost its trade 
relations with other neighborly nations. Secondly, by transforming the postwar problem of rapid 
population growth and the social reality of overcrowding into a filmic trope, the colonial 
administration attempted to contain the effects of the large influx of refugees and immigrants 
entering into the colony in successive waves in the 1950s and 1960s. 
In particular, this chapter examines and assesses the degree to which such representations 
were successful in establishing and maintaining good public relations in and beyond Hong Kong 
on the one hand, and whether such filmic productions were able to garner popular support 
amongst the colonial audiences in Hong Kong on the other. The historical narrative which 
follows traces the transformative role of the British colonial government in different guises. 
From containing the problem of overcrowding as a trope to addressing Hong Kong’s grassroots 
as audiences, and from securing its global presence through attracting Western audiences to 
seeking the collaboration of the colonized, it is my contention that British Hong Kong simply 
could not deny the sheer power of colonial bodies, not only as trope, but as audiences and local 
collaborators. I would argue that British colonial governance in Hong Kong and imperial 
presence on the world stage were effectively co-produced by three fields of power: the state (as 
film producer), the mobile film team (established in 1964 as circulator), and the colonial 
audiences, as represented by the resistant power of the huddled masses at the resettlement estates. 
By recounting the ways whereby British Hong Kong’s success story was realized and reproduced 
for the maintenance and legitimacy of British colonial rule in Hong Kong, this chapter also 
assesses the extent to which this narrative of success was realized by the ability of the Housing 
Authority of Hong Kong to relocate the huge numbers of people living in the squatter areas 
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scattered across Hong Kong island and Kowloon. But this narrative of success was as much a 
construction reinforced in cinematic representation as it was in actuality.  
While chapter 2 examined the films of Zhonglian, this chapter examines the history and 
implications of British Hong Kong becoming a producing organ which controlled how 
information was presented to the public as well as the dissemination of such information in order 
to influence favorable public opinion amongst local and overseas audiences. In order to control 
the representation of its own imperial myths, the Hong Kong government had to deal with the 
postwar problem of housing through both concrete housing development and cinematic ventures. 
Furthermore, British Hong Kong had to control the space of consumption in order for the 
colonial government to perpetuate the reproduction of its own imperializing paternal 
benevolence in the eyes of the local people and the global audiences. Despite the minimal role of 
local Chinese within the colonial elitist regime, British Hong Kong needed collaboration of local 
Chinese people to administer its rule. 
 
The Emergence of British Hong Kong as an Image Producer 
The history of the emergence of the Hong Kong Film Unit (HKFU) in the late 1950s 
exposes multiple layers of conflicts and contradictions between the Crown Colony of Hong 
Kong and the metropole in London, as well as amongst the different stakeholders within the 
colony itself. When British Hong Kong became a film producer in 1959-1960, it had to struggle 
with extricating itself from the deep seated influence of the imperial metropolitan center in 
London over representation in the colonies. But once colonial Hong Kong established its own 
film unit, it could not ignore the demands of the colonial masses. The HKFU was in many ways 
the successor of the Colonial Film Unit (CFU) of the British Empire, which was first established 
at the beginning of WWII. As part of the colonial periphery, British Hong Kong gradually gained 
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independence; nonetheless, it continued the imperialist assumption and legacy of racial 
exclusivity which was predicated on the continuing myth of its own prestige. In fact, the 
production of images in Cold War Hong Kong remained the exclusive preserve of European 
expatriates working for the colonial government. Chinese people working for the government 
could at best be the cameramen of the colonial production process. Although HKFU continued 
the legacy of the operations of CFU during wartime propaganda work, it had to adapt to the 
various crises and realities on the colonial ground. As a colonial apparatus, filmmaking had to 
depend as much on the colonial designs of British Hong Kong as on the relationships with local 
actors in the very processes of representation, production, and projection. 
The primary goal of the newly established Hong Kong’s Public Relations Office (PRO) 
(1946 –1959) (later renamed, Information Services Government, GIS) was to publicize the 
affairs within the colony and in Great Britain to people living in Hong Kong as well as those in 
the UK and United States. Led by J. L. Murray, the PRO in the early 1950s struggled to establish 
its own film unit that could produce independently visual representations of the colony. It would 
take more then a decade following the end of WWII before the Hong Kong government could 
successfully formed its own film unit in the GIS department. As a British colony, the Hong Kong 
government continued to rely on the many services in film production and distribution that the 
Colonial Office in London offered. Yet, this reliance did not always mean that the colonial 
government in Hong Kong always agreed with the policies emanating from the British 
parliament or the Colonial Office. The transition from the British colonial film unit to the Hong 
Kong film unit as well as their interactions provide a telling drama of the problems involved with 
the colonial administration of a territory with a Chinese majority and the desire of the British 
government to project imperial prestige in and beyond Hong Kong.  
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During the war, Great Britain waged an ideological warfare through moving images.280 
The CFU was first established by the Film Division of the Ministry of Information (MOI) at the 
start of WWII in 1939 as a means to boost the morale of the allies and audiences at home and 
abroad in the colonies (on the battlefield among the troops and in civilian theaters) as part of a 
concerted war effort. According to British policy makers, documentary film was the best means 
to not only inform, but also educate and entertain the populace. This was mainly achieved by 
sending mobile cinema vans and supplying films to colonial governments. 
Following WWII, while Great Britain lost much of its imperial prestige in the Far East, 
the United States emerged as a new global force. It begs the question as to how film could 
continue to be of value to the British Empire and provide a means of control over its diminishing 
colonial possessions. As the war ended, the original rationale for the existence of the CFU, which 
was to boost the war efforts was supplanted and justified by the educational mission of the 
Empire, that is to instruct and educate the “unsophisticated” and “unlettered”281 peoples of the 
colonial territories and commonwealth countries.282 In the name of colonial development, the 
British Empire promoted the continuing importance of the CFU. In Hong Kong, as in other 
former British colonies, the CFU provided various services, such as the distribution of films 
produced by the Central Office of Information, London (COI), to educate the colonial subjects 
about the Empire.  
                                                 
280 During World War II, both the Allies (Great Britain, Russia and the United States) and the Axis (Germany, Italy, 
and Japan) discovered the provocative uses of filming war and documentary footage to wage a war on the 
ideological front in the forms of propaganda and counterpropaganda. Just as combatants entered into the battlefields 
in full armor, films of ideological and emotional persuasion entered into the depths, both literal and figurative, of the 
killing fields by way of “Mobile units [which] could show films anywhere – in the field, in military hospitals, in 
jungle outposts, in industrial plants, and in civilian theatres.” See Barsam, Nonfiction Film: A Critical History, 173. 
281 HKRS 41-1-7190, Report of the Colonial Film Unit, Item 1(1), “Colonial Film Unit Annual Report,” W. Sellers, 
February 1952.  
282 HKRS 41-1-7190, Report of the Colonial Film Unit, Item 1(1), “Colonial Film Unit Annual Report,” W. Sellers, 
February 1952.  
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As early as 1948, the Hong Kong government ran a film library that lent films, which 
were related mostly to postwar Great Britain and supplied by the Colonial Office, to schools, 
clubs and individuals for exhibition.283 As reported in the 1950 annual report of the PRO, the 
office relied heavily on visual materials produced by the COI, which in turn were supplied to the 
Colony through the Information Department of the Colonial Office. As the PRO in the early 
1950s did not produce its own publicity materials for local use, publicity and public relations 
work conducted by the PRO involved in assisting private film companies, which often came to 
Hong Kong to make documentary films about the Colony.284 Through such films and film 
activities, the imperial center, though fading gradually into the vanishing point, held on to the 
lifeline that gave it hope to rise again to a new found power on the world stage. 
The maintenance and sustenance of imperial rule were not obtained without a struggle, 
which was nakedly exposed by the financial difficulties encountered by the CFU.285 On the one 
hand, the CFU desperately tried to salvage its central importance among the British colonies in 
the postwar era; on the other hand, it attempted to project the image of benevolence through its 
aid to various colonies in establishing their own film units in line with the democratic mission to 
facilitate the transition from colonialism to decolonization. When the CFU was first established 
at the start of WWII, it was funded entirely by the British Imperial funds. In 1946, the Colonial 
Film Unit came under the direction of the Films Division of the COI, which replaced the 
Ministry of Information. As already mentioned above, the original raison d’être of the CFU was 
to serve as the machinery in the production of wartime propaganda. However, when the war 
                                                 
283 Annual Report of the Public Relations Officer, 1948-1949. Subsequent references to this report will be 
abbreviated as PRO Report, year. 
284 PRO Report, 1950, 5. For instance, the Taurus Film Company, who took film footage of Hong Kong on behalf of 
the Central Office of Information as well as on behalf of the Methodist Mission. The department also provided 
assistance to another private film company, ‘This Modern Age’, branch of the Arthur Rank Organization also had 
representatives in the Colony. 
285 HKRS 41-1-5788, Colonial Film Unit – Film Supplied by the …., Item 1, Circular Despatch From the Colonial 
Office to the Office Administering the Government of Hong Kong, 19 September 1950. 
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ended, it had to reinvent itself to justify its ongoing existence. Its new guise after the war became 
the producer of educational films for colonial territories in the name of development and 
progress. In 1950, the administration of the CFU was transferred from the COI to the Colonial 
Office, which supervised various developmental initiatives in the colonies. The budget to cover 
the cost of making educational films would be provided by the central reserve under the Colonial 
Development and Welfare Act, a fund designated to the assistance of “colonial governments in 
the improvement of social conditions in colonial territories.”286 However, such funds would 
depreciate by the end of the financial year of 1952-53. 
Due to the postwar change in the funding situation, the COI advocated to the colonial 
governments to form their own film units on the one hand, but at the same time make 
contributions to the CFU in order to ensure the continuing livelihood of this “central agency” on 
the other. Mr. Griffiths from the Colonial Office suggested in his circular, dated September 19 
1950, that the upkeep of the CFU should be financed by regular annual contributions from 
colonial governments and by payments of agency services.287 Based on a projected estimate of 
the amount and types of services that had been requested from and/or would be required by each 
of the colonies, the CFU asked Hong Kong to pay £400 each year for two years.288 
This financial obligation was met with the immediate protest from the director of Hong 
Kong’s Public Relations Office, J.L. Murray: “I know it’s not exactly encouraging to the CFU 
(which I think ought to survive if humanly possible), but, looking at the future from a strictly 
Hong Kong point of view, I don’t see how I can recommend a £400 a year contribution for rather 
                                                 
286 HKRS 41-1-5788, Colonial Film Unit – Film Supplied by the …., Item 1(1), The Past Work and Future Plans of 
the Colonial Film Unit, 1954? 
287 HKRS 41-1-5788, Colonial Film Unit – Film Supplied by the …., Item 1, Circular Despatch From the Colonial 
Office to the Office Administering the Government of Hong Kong, 19 September 1950. 
288 HKRS 41-1-5788, Colonial Film Unit – Film Supplied by the …., Item 1, Circular Despatch From the Colonial 
Office to the Office Administering the Government of Hong Kong, 19 September, 1950. 
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nebulous services.”289 Furthermore, the Public Relations Office was convinced that, one of the 
only main advantages derived by this Colony from the CFU was the regular free supply of 
propaganda films, such as the British News Reel.290 These news reels, which projected the news 
events in Great Britain as well as the lifestyle of the British people, were mostly exported for 
consumption by its colonial territories. From Murray’s statement above, it is clear that the Hong 
Kong government did not at first find these proposals just and necessary and did not find that the 
free supply of British News Reel was beneficial to the colony of Hong Kong. However, given 
that the plans of the Public Relations Office to eventually develop its own film unit was still in 
the initial planning stage, the PRO was well aware of the potential benefits of consulting with 
experts at the CFU in London. Murray recommended that “we [the Hong Kong government] 
volunteer our contribution. If we are going to tackle films at all we shall certainly need a lot of 
help from London.”291 Finally, it was agreed upon that the fees would be reduced from £400 to 
£250 a year, beginning in 1953 for two years for the upkeep of the CFU.292 This incident can be 
interpreted as Hong Kong’s attempts to exert its own power and independence from metropolitan 
London in the immediate postwar period, and to address its own objectives to serve local needs. 
Indeed, it is precisely around this time, in 1953, when Murray and his staff began discussions of 
creating a film unit within the PRO. Coincidentally, 1953 also marked the year when the film 
censorship regulations were promulgated. 
In the early 1950s, training schools were formed in various colonies. Such initiatives 
were carried out in the West Indies in 1950 and subsequently a training school was formed in 
                                                 
289 HKRS 41-1-5788 , Colonial Film Unit – Film Supplied by the …., Item 11, Letter Written by Director of Public 
Relations Office, J.L. Murray to C.Y. Carstairs at the Colonial Office, 19 March 1952. 
290 HKRS 41-1-7190, Colonial Film Unit – Report of the, Memo, 20 July 1953. 
291 HKRS 41-1-7190, Colonial Film Unit – Report of the, Memo From J.L. Murray to the Hon. Colonial Secretariat, 
23 February 1953. 
292 HKRS 41-1-5788 , Colonial Film Unit – Film Supplied by the …., Item ?, Letter from the Governor of Hong 
Kong to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 24 July 1953  
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Cyprus in 1951 by the CFU. Representatives from the colonial governments in such former 
colonies as Cyprus, Mauritius, the Sudan and Hong Kong attended the training school in Cyprus. 
One such government officer from Hong Kong was sent to Cyprus. On March 19, 1951, the 
Public Relations Office recommended that Mr. Li Shiu Leung, a cameraman for the Medical 
Department’s health films, be sent to the film training school in Cyprus under the auspices of the 
CFU. This training course was designed to train students in basic photographic knowledge, 
which would equip them with the skills needed to produce simple educational films and film 
strips. After much discussion within the ranks of the Colonial Office and PRO, Mr. Li was sent 
to Cyprus in June 1951. However, following the training of Mr. Li, the question as to whether 
the Hong Kong government’s future film unit could quickly become self-sufficient arose. After 
much discussion, it was agreed upon that Hong Kong would in fact continue to need the 
assistance of the film personnel from the CFU from London. In a letter dated March 19, 1952293 
from the director of the PRO to the Colonial Office in London, J. L. Murray expressed his 
reservations in regard to the ability of Mr. Li once the latter returned from his training course in 
Cyprus. 
In this early stage of film production activities within the Hong Kong government, the 
PRO continued to see the need to secure the expertise of officers from the Central Information 
Office in London. Murray argued that “although I expected Mr. Li’s course to be of very great 
value both to him and to us, we could hardly expect him to be able to carry the whole weight of 
initiating a Film Unit and embarking upon a film-making programme unaided immediately upon 
his return to Hong Kong.”294 The public relations officer saw the need to obtain the services of a 
                                                 
293 HKRS 41-1-5788 , Colonial Film Unit – Film Supplied by the …., Item 11, Letter written by Director of Public 
Relations Office, J.L. Murray to C.Y. Carstairs at the Colonial Office, 19 March 1952. 
294 HKRS 41-1-5788, Item 11. 
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“European Officer” from the CFU, at least “in the initial stages.”295 With the expertise of such an 
officer and “with the assistance of Mr. Li as his cameraman,” the film unit of the Hong Kong 
government would  be led on “the right road to successful production in a reasonably short space 
of time.” 296 
There was a disjuncture between the desire of the Hong Kong government to develop its 
own independent film unit and its need to remain connected to the CFU. These opposing desires 
of Hong Kong’s PRO was due to its financial situation, which stipulated that Mr. Li’s training be 
justified within the fiscal allowances within Hong Kong’s administration; that is, his potential 
contribution had to be guaranteed to yield a net gain in the fiscal coffer. Prior to sending Mr. Li 
to Cyprus, there was much discussion within the ranks of the colonial government of Hong Kong 
in regard to the budget situation of the government. In this discussion, the age of Mr. Li was also 
taken into consideration and calculated into the long term fiscal benefits of this venture from the 
perspective of the PRO: “Li is 40 years of age – not too old to take this course, assuming that we 
will have some years of service out of him after it. I agree with P.R.O. that it would be cheaper to 
train Li than to recruit an expatriate officer.”297 The start up of a film production unit in Hong 
Kong, just as the upkeep of the CFU, was as much a hegemonic venture as an economic one, 
dictated as much by ideological motivations as by financial and budgetary constraints.  
In the early stages of the film production activities of the Hong Kong government, it was 
a practical decision to send Mr. Li, who was a low ranking general service civil servant of grade 
II rank. As a local Chinese, Mr. Li was expected to serve as a middleman or translator to assist 
film production companies from abroad. After his eleven month course in Cyprus, Mr. Li 
                                                 
295 HKRS 41-1-5788, Item 11. 
296 HKRS 41-1-5788, Item 11. 
297 HKRS 41-1-5788, Colonial Film Unit…Film Supplied by the, Item ?, Memo from E.O. to D.C.S., 21 March 
1951.  
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returned to Hong Kong in May 1952, and began working as an assistant to “visiting [still and 
film] cameramen.”298 Since his return, he also worked with such private media organizations as, 
Life Magazine, National Geographic Society, and Dudley Films Corporation, U.S.A..299 
However, being a low ranking clerk, Mr. Li was not expected or groomed to become the future 
head of the Hong Kong government film unit. Rather, he was to remain as a technical assistant, 
and a cameraman. The letter from the director of the PRO, J.L. Murray to Charles Carstairs at the 
Colonial Office reveals not only the glass ceiling in colonial leadership for an ethnic Hong Kong 
Chinese but the hierarchical structure of the colonial administration:  
[A]lthough I expected Mr. Li’s course to be of very great value both to him and to us, we 
could hardly expect him to be able to carry the whole weight of initiating a Film Unit and 
embarking upon a film-making programme unaided immediately upon his return to Hong 
Kong. He just wouldn’t have either the weight or the experience. (No General Service 
Clerk Grade II, turned film “expert” more or less overnight, would, for one thing, ever be 
able to advise, let alone stand up to, Heads of Departments on how their films should be 
produced. After 20 years of saying “Yes, Sir” no matter how much he knew he ought to 
say “No” and would have to turn to someone else for reinforcement and the big guns to 
shoot down amateur theories and stiff-necked opposition. I could see my over-worked 
self being starred in that role!).300 
 
The sending of Mr. Li in 1951 was part of the efforts of the PRO to develop expertise that 
would facilitate the establishment of its own film unit. At the time, only the Medical Department 
produced films on health issues. It was not until the late 1950s when a full-fledged film unit, that 
would consolidate all the filmic publicity efforts across all departments was established in Hong 
Kong. In the 1950s, films about the British way of life produced by the COI in London, such as 
“British News,” continued to be lent out by the PRO film library free of charge to the Hong 
Kong Education Department, which in turn distributed such publicity films to schools, private 
                                                 
298 PRO Report, 1952-53, 13. 
299 PRO Report, 1952-53, 13. 
300 HKRS 41-1-5788, Item 11. 
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clubs, and individuals for exhibition.301 As these films were in the English language, the 
audiences who could understand them were part of the elite class.302 In fact, the schools which 
received such films included such private schools as La Salle. Despite these initial efforts on the 
part of the Hong Kong film unit, it was not until the early to mid-1960s when film productions 
that addressed the political and social concerns of the local populace began to germinate and 
develop. Important “prestige” films such as Made in Hong Kong and Report to the Gods were 
also made in the mid-1960s when the need to improve trade relations provided the impetus for 
the Hong Kong government to produce publicity films about the progress of Hong Kong to the 
global audiences, especially those in the United States. 
 
Defining the Problem of the People 
In addition to containing the left-right struggles following the Chinese Civil War through 
film censorship, the British colonial administration had to deal with the Cold War Hong Kong 
reality of an increasing number of refugees entering into the colony from the mainland, which 
created the problems of overcrowding, the growth of squatter neighborhoods on hilltops and 
rooftops and subsequently, squatter fires that the Hong Kong government could no longer ignore. 
This large influx of refugees created  a problem described as a “rash” by the HKFU produced 
short film A Race Against People, but also an anxiety among the colonial officials as to what 
measures to take in order to contain this influx of colonial bodies. We should not forget an 
important fact that the colonial subjects in Hong Kong had always been in a staggering majority 
vis-à-vis their colonial administrators. From the mid-1950s onward, it became a colonial 
imperative for the ruling elite to control the colonial subjects through such government policies 
as the resettlement housing initiatives.  
                                                 
301 PRO Report, 1946. 
302 PRO Report, 1951-52. 
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Following such government housing initiatives, the reality of the influx of Chinese 
refugees would become a recurrent trope for the colonial government to fashion a narrative of 
colonial success and paternalistic benevolence in celluloid myths. On the one hand, British 
colonial benevolence was as much magnified in the very act of producing such representations of 
magnanimity as projecting them to local and global audiences. On the other hand, the continuing 
production about the narrative of “rags to riches,” “from squatter to home” exposes the potential 
subversive threat of the bio-power of colonial bodies as well as the extent to which the authority 
of the colonial government was both tenuous and vulnerable. The recurrent representations of the 
overcrowding problem by the government would testify precisely to the reality that the 
government was never fully in control over the people in Hong Kong.  
The Hong Kong government publicity publication, The Problem of the People (1957),303 
noted that the most pressing concern encountered by Hong Kong society in the 1950s was the 
large influx of people from the mainland, both former residents and new arrivals: “It is the 
problem of a vast immigration population.”304 This pamphlet praised the governmental initiatives 
undertaken to solve Hong Kong’s housing problem following the 1953 fire at Shek Kip Mei, 
which was one of the largest shanty towns in new Kowloon in the 1950s.305 Not only was the 
overcrowding of immigrants, both legal and illegal flooding into Hong Kong deemed a problem 
by the Hong Kong government in the years that followed, “overcrowding” became a recurrent 
representational image that would dominate the colonial discourse on Hong Kong, its people and 
society. 
                                                 
303 PRO Report, 1957.  
304 The Problem of the People. Hong Kong. Public Relations Office. 1957, 2. 
305 Edvard Hambro, The Problem of Chinese Refugees in Hong Kong: Report Submitted to the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (Leyden, Holland: A.W. Sijthoff, 1955), 116. 
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Overcrowding was recognized by the Hong Kong government as a problem since the 
beginning of colonial rule. Regardless of the different ways that this problem was described by 
colonial officials depending on the political circumstances of the time, the subtext had always 
been accented by the racial arrogance and prerogatives of both the expatriate community and the 
colonial officials of Hong Kong. After the British added the Kowloon Peninsula and 
subsequently the New Territories to its colonial possession in 1860 and 1898 respectively, the 
colonial administrators found themselves having to deal with a much larger Chinese population 
then before. Colonial rulers in Hong Kong expressed their colonial prestige and pride in terms of 
where they lived and where they vacationed, that is in terms of spatial segregation from the 
majority of the Hong Kong Chinese population. This exclusivity and privilege were exemplified 
by the Peak District (Residence) Ordinance and the Cheung Chau Ordinance. For instance, the 
Peak or “Hill District,” where it is cooler, was reserved for European residents only.306 Chinese 
people were forbidden by law to reside there. This spatial division created a divide between the 
minority European ruling class and the majority Chinese: legal/illegal, sanitary/unsanitary, which 
in turn created “housing” and “residence” as markers of social status and political authority. 
Though these racially exclusive legislations were repealed after WWII, the power to occupy 
urban and metropolitan space remained a prerogative reserved for European expatriates, rich 
Eurasians and Chinese elites who worked for Euro-American multinational corporations or 
within the colonial administration. 
The problem of overcrowding was aggravated in the aftermath of the Second World War 
as successive waves of refugees flooded into Hong Kong from the mainland (table 2).307 Before 
the Pacific War, the Chinese populations freely traversed between the mainland and Hong Kong. 
                                                 
306 A European residential district was established by law in 1888. See Alan Smart, The Shek Kip Mei Myth, 30. 
307 For additional data, see Census & Statistics Department. Hong Kong. Hong Kong Statistics, 1947-1967 (Hong 
Kong, 1969). 
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Up until the Communist takeover of China in 1949, Hong Kong was intricately tied to the South 
China’s economic and social networks and therefore, the boundaries between the mainland and 
Hong Kong were fluid and Chinese migrants came and went freely. When Hong Kong fell on 
December 8, 1941 to Japan, the population which was recorded at 1,640,000 in 1941, fell to 
600,000 inhabitants, when British forces reclaimed Hong Kong following the defeat of the 
Japanese in 1945 (during the Japanese occupation, many either left Hong Kong voluntarily to 
escape from persecution, or were forced by the Japanese to return to China, due to the lack of 
resources). Following the Japanese defeat, the population in Hong Kong reached 1.8 million by 
the end of 1947. In the 1950s and 1960s, in order to escape from the persecution of the 
Communist Party on the one hand, and famine on the mainland wrought by the Great Leap 
Forward on the other, the Chinese people continued to find refuge in Hong Kong. By the end of 
1954, the population in Hong Kong reached a total of 2,250,000.308 These migrants were 
described by the colonial government in Hong Kong as “refugees” as they were fleeing from 
political persecutions and upheavals that were taking place on the mainland. As such, the 
colonial government did not provide social relief for these refugees nor did it, at first, resolve the 
housing shortage problem.  
Hong Kong’s area was a mere 1045 square km, and most of its land was of rugged terrain. 
Available land for urban development was limited. Due to the scarcity of desirable land, and the 
limited resources for the current residents and the ruling elite, the colonial government enforced 
different types of immigration policies to curtail and limit the large influx of refugees from the 
mainland into Hong Kong. For instance, new arrivals in Hong Kong in the early 1950s were 
                                                 
308 Edvard Hambro, The Problem of Chinese Refugees in Hong Kong, 148. 
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denied access to ration coupons and subsidized rice.309 Beginning in 1952, individuals were also 
required to have “valid exit permits that had been issued to them by the mainland Chinese 
government.”310 By the mid-1950s, the Hong Kong Government had imposed a quota system on 
the entrance of mainland Chinese residents into Hong Kong, limiting their numbers to fifty per 
day. This quota system was briefly ceased by the colonial government in February 1956 for six 
months due to pressure from the PRC government. During this interim, 56, 000 people flooded 
into the colony. As the colony was not able to deal with this influx of migrants, the quota system 
was once again reinstituted.311 In the aftermath of the great famine of the Great Leap Forward in 
1962, Hong Kong was once again overwhelmed by the large numbers of mainland Chinese 
entering into the colony. This large influx could also be attributed in part by the relaxing of 
Guangdong officials’ border control practices during 1962.312 The colonial government in Hong 
Kong also practiced the “touch base” policy, which “granted amnesty to illegal entrants to the 
colony who could reach urban areas.”313 Once these “would-be” immigrants reached urban 
points in the colony, they would “achieve legal residency status in Hong Kong.”314 This touch 
base policy was only abolished in 1980. 
Gradually, it became evident for the colonial government that the growing number of 
Chinese refugees entering Hong Kong would not immediately return to the mainland as the 
government had hoped. The gravity of this issue was further demonstrated by the report, which 
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was compiled in 1954, following the Hong Kong Refugee Survey Mission in 1952. 315 Despite 
this housing shortage, the government held on to its laissez-faire policy toward housing provision. 
Firstly, the Hong Kong government had hoped that the newly arrived refugees from the mainland 
would return to China once the political turbulence subsided there, that is when the political 
milieu there “returned to normal.”316 Secondly, it had hoped that the international community 
would lend a helping hand, which did not happen. And the last thing that the colonial 
government desired was to become, as argued by anthropologist, Nuala Rooney, “landlords, 
[which] would amount to acceptance of these people as citizens, with all the pressure on social 
welfare that this would entail, such as schooling and medical care.”317 
But this situation would all change and soon, the colonial government would be 
transformed from an indifferent, racially hostile and laissez-faire ruler to a “financier, contractor, 
and landlord,”318 and I would add, an image producer, when on Christmas Eve, 1953, a fire 
broke out at the squatter area in Shek Kip Mei.319 As the conventional narrative repeatedly 
emphasizes, more than 50,000 victims lost their makeshift homes overnight. The government 
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took prompt action by establishing the Housing Authority by a special ordinance in 1954,320 and 
began building resettlement housing blocks. In less then a year, all the homeless were 
relocated.321 In order to provide immediate housing relief for these fire victims, the Public Works 
Department constructed two-storey bungalow houses on site. By the end of 1955, eight six-
storey buildings (the first generation of such resettlement housing blocks were called Mark I (fig. 
1)322 and subsequent complexes were called Mark II, Mark III, Mark IV, etc.)323 were completed 
to resettle the Shek Kip Mei fire victims. It is not surprising that the Shek Kip Mei fire was 
hailed as the beginning of Hong Kong’s public housing programme, which was often referred to 
as a watershed in Hong Kong’s path toward successful urbanization and industrialization.  
These large-scale housing projects beginning in the mid-1950s were followed, in 
subsequent years, by publications by the Housing Authority to reinforce the colonial 
government’s benevolence.324 In these publications and the celluloid representations which 
                                                 
320 Hambro, The Problem of Chinese Refugees in Hong Kong, 118. 
321 Around the same time, following the Shek Kip Mei squatter area fires, “The government also undertook colossal 
public projects during this same period. In 1953 the Causeway Bay Reclamation project was completed; 1954 saw 
the completion of the Central Reclamation; and in 1955 the Hung Hom reclamation began. Reservoirs were built, 
and the Kai Tak runway was extended.” See John D. Young, “The Building Years: Maintaining a China-Hong 
Kong-Britain Equilibrium, 1950-71,” in Precarious Balance: Hong Kong Between China and Britain, 1842-1992, 
ed. Ming K. Chan (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1994), 132. 
322 David Drakakis-Smith, High Society: Housing Provision in Metropolitan Hong Kong, 1954 to 1979, A Jubilee 
Critique (Hong Kong: Centre of Asian Studies, University of Hong Kong, 1979), 46. 
323 These resettlement blocks were in the shape of the letter ‘H’. Each room was 120 square feet (for five adults; 
children below ten were counted as half an adult). As such, the average living space for each adult was 2.2 sq m, 
which was below the space standard for housing set by the United Nations. In such first generation resettlement 
blocks, tenants had to endure such abysmal conditions as overcrowding, poor hygiene and no amenities. Cooking 
was often done in the public hallway. And toilet facilities were communal. Indeed, these blocks were described as 
“substandard” in the Resettlement Department annual reports, for they were built only as a temporary measure at 
very low cost in order to meet emergency needs. Although they were meant to be upgraded and converted into self-
contained flats with more modern amenities, very few were in fact converted. Only a few were transformed in the 
early 1970s. Many of these older resettlement blocks were eventually demolished. See Leung Mei-yee, From Shelter 
to Home: 45 Years of Public Housing Development in Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Housing Authority, 
1999), 50-51.  
324 Housing Authority, Hong Kong, Annual Report (Housing Authority, Hong Kong, various years); Information 
Services Department, “Homes for a Million” (July 13, 1968). Copies were available free of charge in English and 
Chinese at Public Enquiry Centres, the Government Publications Centre at the Star Ferry Concourse, Hong Kong, 
and at the Government Information Services, Beaconsfield House, HKRS70-4-63 ,“Information Services 
Department”; Housing Authority, Hong Kong, The First Two Million (Housing Authority, Hong Kong, 1979); 
Leung Mei-yee, From Shelter to Hong: 45 Years of Public Housing Development in Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Hong 
 147 
followed, the prevailing discourse was the story of Hong Kong’s success and triumph, progress 
and modernity. This success story would find reenactment in a 1963 publicity film produced by 
the Hong Kong Film Unit, A Race Against People. The spread of Hong Kong’s squatter areas 
was akin to a “rash,” according to the film’s English commentary. This publicity film further 
reported that, thanks to Hong Kong’s “industrial revolution” along with the efforts of the 
government’s efficient re-housing programme in the past ten years, the overcrowding problem in 
Hong Kong was resolved with great success. Such Hong Kong government publications and 
publicity shorts underscored the benevolence and success of British colonial governance in 
postwar Hong Kong. 
The GIS put out a pamphlet in 1968 entitled, Homes for a Million.325 This publication 
celebrates the success of the government’s resettlement program by tracing the history of the 
public housing project, and anticipating future housing projects of the government beyond 1972. 
In the golden jubilee publication on Hong Kong’s public housing initiatives, we find the 
following quotations, which present the public housing project as the harbinger to the triumphant 
narrative of modern Hong Kong: 
Beyond any doubt, the development of public housing in Hong Kong is a success story. 
By whatever international standards, the Hong Kong story is one that makes us 
proud...The success of public housing in Hong Kong is by no means an accident, 
although its beginning was somewhat accidental. The disastrous fire in the Shek Skip Mei 
squatter area made 53,000 squatters homeless overnight. As an emergency measure, the 
government built resettlement blocks nearby to rehouse those affected by the fire. This 
was the beginning of a public housing programme that would grow greatly in scale in the 
following decades.326 
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By the time of the handover in 1997, the public housing programme was widely 
acknowledged as a success story, and considered a model of how a government skillfully 
and effectively marshals the domestic resources, energy and political will to transform a 
place into a modern and thriving world city.327 
 
These jubilee publications were a classic example of the rhetoric of colonial benevolence 
and success in rectifying the housing problem and the problem of the people. The colonial 
rhetoric of benevolence predicated on how well the government can hide the actual reality of the 
persistence of Hong Kong’s housing crisis. In fact, in the mid-1960s, the housing problem 
continued. Squatter settlements persisted and even increased. The number of squatters was 
300,000 in 1953, and it increased to 550,000 in 1964, which was 20% of the Hong Kong 
population.328 Up to the 1990s, some Hong Kong people continued to live as squatters, cage 
dwellers329 or even street sleepers, and remained homeless or lived in destitute and substandard 
conditions.330 Indeed, these publications along with the filmic productions produced by the 
government shied away from addressing the daily problems encountered by those who continued 
to live in squatter areas and those who were relocated to resettlement estates.   
 
Representing the Problem of Overcrowding for Global Audiences 
Similar to the local Hong Kong Cantonese film company, Zhonglian discussed in the 
previous chapter which structured its filmic narratives of anti-colonial and anti-feudal 
melodramas by different notions of the traditional and the modern, the strategy employed by the 
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HKFU was to mobilize the dichotomous representations of tradition and modernity. Balancing 
the representations and narratives of tradition and modernity was one way that the colonial 
administration presented itself as benevolent rulers that could not only resolve the postwar 
problem of overcrowding, but would not, in the process of modernizing the colonial city of Hong 
Kong, ignore the local customs and way of life of the grassroots population. 
One of the effects of the Korean War was that Hong Kong was gradually cut off from the 
mainland economy and familial networks. Coupled with the waning prestige of the British 
Empire, the colonial rulers faced the Cold War reality of a colonial Hong Kong that had to 
develop itself into an industrial economy that could elevate itself to a world class trading partner. 
The HKFU found itself with two missions in the Cold War period, that is, to improve trade and 
implement population control. Furthermore, this period was marked by an international 
atmosphere of anti-colonial sentiments and the reality of decolonization processes. For Hong 
Kong to remain a British colony in this Cold War milieu, British Hong Kong had to revive its 
prestige through projecting in filmic narratives its benevolent work of transforming Hong Kong 
into a modern and urbanized metropolis. 
In the government produced publicity shorts, narratives of success present both progress 
and development as the inevitable fate of Hong Kong under British colonial rule. Film became 
an important weapon, as well as a publicity tool that projected Hong Kong as a worthy trading 
partner, and justified and legitimized the continuing presence of the British in Hong Kong in the 
age of decolonization. However, in this process, the people of Hong Kong including their way of 
life were used as tropes; for the most part, the Chinese residents of Hong Kong were ignored as 
audiences. Gradually, the Hong Kong government realized that it needed the cooperation of local 
actors as well as their support to sustain the lessons of its imperial myths. Not only could the 
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colonial government no longer ignore the people of Hong Kong, British Hong Kong simply 
could not so much represent the Chinese people living in Hong Kong as colonial tropes of its 
imperial narratives, as co-opt the grassroots as loyal audiences of their myths of benevolence. 
In the early 1950s, film productions were outsourced to or co-produced with commercial 
or private film companies from other countries, such as the United States. The lack of Chinese 
Hong Kong’s participation led to the perpetuation of the colonial myth and exultation of the 
benevolent image of British colonialism which the colonial government in Hong Kong wished to 
project itself to the global audiences. 
JE and JHE ….  Julius: All over the world, there are unsolved 
refugee problems resulting in appalling living conditions … 
    Joan: We saw them in many countries of the Far 
East and the Middle East…  
    Julius: But here in Hong Kong, they are managing 
to do something about it. You often hear disparaging things said about 
Colonialism. Many of them may be right… 
    Joan: …or wrong!... 
    Julius: This is something we’ve seen and 
photographed ourselves… and we hope you’ll agree with us, … that this 
particular achievement merits a bouquet to that oft-maligned subject, …British 
Colonialism!331 
 
The above dialogue is an excerpt from a script, entitled the Miracle of Hong Kong,332 a 
documentary film shot by the America freelance film producer Julius Evans in the early 1950s. 
The film is about the squatter areas in Hong Kong, praising the Hong Kong government’s public 
housing program initiatives. Interestingly, the representation of the problem of overcrowding in 
postwar Hong Kong was not only mobilized by the colonial government to boast its benevolence 
to the local population, it also became a tourist attraction and a tool for developing international 
relations. The colonial government would take advantage of the motif of the housing and 
overcrowding problem to promote the efficiency of its colonial rule and its trading ventures in 
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Great Britain, the Commonwealth and the United States.  This color film was later made 
available via the COI for the Foreign Office in London for television and documentary 
distribution in the United States.333 
In his letter to G.C. Simpson at the Information Policy Department, Foreign Office on 
March 6, 1957, C.H. Dand at the British Information Services in New York writes: “I think the 
material offers a very good opportunity to produce a film for use in South-East Asia, the Middle 
East, and the U.S.A. to show how well we have gone about this problem in Hong Kong. Here are 
Chinese, who have fled from the mainland and Communism, crowding into Hong Kong prepared 
to live in squalor, but we are giving them really modern accommodation.”334 Furthermore, the 
British Information Services in New York suggested that this documentary include footage on 
the interview between the filmmaker, Evans and the Hong Kong Governor at the time, Alexander 
Grantham to provide political context for US audiences.335 Such discussions on the distribution 
of this documentary demonstrates Hong Kong Government’s wish to propagandize its 
benevolence and progress to the American audiences. Indeed, the colonial government wanted 
not only to discipline its subjects on the ground, but also to prove to the international community 
that it was the legitimate ruler amidst anti-imperial sentiments and decolonization efforts around 
the world. As the above discussion of Julius Evans’ film illustrates the film distribution network 
for such publicity films extended beyond the Crown Colony of Hong Kong.  
One of the strategies employed by the Hong Kong government to justify its ongoing 
colonial rule in Hong Kong was to project its image of benevolence through its documentary 
film productions. The Hong Kong documentary film movement had its start within the British 
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documentary movement336 led by John Grierson.337 During the war, cinema became a “strategic 
tool” to solicit support for the ally forces.338 The Hong Kong government continued this legacy 
of psychological warfare in the postwar period publicity shorts produced by the HKFU which 
were propagandistic by nature.339 Two main messages were usually conveyed in Hong Kong 
government produced publicity films: firstly, the British could rule Hong Kong in an effective 
fashion; secondly, colonial Hong Kong and by extension the British Empire was worthy to be 
part of the postwar world powers. More concretely, the colonial government had to prove to its 
own colonial subjects and to the Western world at large that it was capable of resolving Hong 
Kong’s overcrowding problem and that it was bringing progress and modernity to its subjects. 
In order to appeal to the Western global audiences, as well as to promote and project its 
colonial benevolence to the outside world, the colonial government would dub these films into 
the languages of the countries to which these so-called films were distributed. The primary 
channel through which these films were circulated was governmental networks, as well as 
commercial and festival circuits. For instance, publicity films made in the 1960s, including This 
is Hong Kong (1961), Made in Hong Kong (1964), A Race Against People (1964),340 Sea 
Festivals of Hong Kong (1962), and Report to the Gods (1966)341 were made to be consumed 
beyond Hong Kong. All of these films had worldwide television and theatrical and non-theatrical 
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distribution in such cities as London, New York, Berlin, Vancouver, etc. When they were 
distributed abroad for global consumption, such films were similar to manufactured trade 
products displayed at imperial state sponsored world fairs. Similar to other industrial 
“manufactured trade products,” these films allowed the British Empire to flaunt its effective rule 
in Hong Kong to the rest of the world.342   
The status of Hong Kong as a manufacturing center of trade and commerce did not 
develop overnight. Up until the Communist takeover of China in 1949, Hong Kong maintained 
intimate relations with the mainland in economic and social familial ties. However, the Cold War 
would change all that. In particular, at the start of the Korean War in 1950, the US induced a 
United Nations embargo on trade on strategic goods to the mainland. As a result of this embargo, 
Hong Kong’s once intimate entrepôt trade relations with the mainland slowly diminished. This 
severance, paradoxically would indirectly catapult Hong Kong toward the path of a growing 
manufacturing industry which in turn would lead Hong Kong to transform into an international 
financial and manufacturing metropolis that is today. In the years following the Communist 
control over all of China in 1949 and 1950, many industrialists from such Chinese cities as 
Shanghai emigrated to Hong Kong to establish their businesses in the Crown Colony.343 
Together with the ingenuity and enterprising efforts of Shanghai entrepreneurs and the large 
labor force both from the Guangdong area and in Hong Kong, Hong Kong gradually became a 
competitive manufacturing center. 
The annual report of the Information Services Department of 1965-66 begins with the 
following introductory paragraph:  
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The work of the Information Services Dept mirrors the activities and the interests of 
Hong Kong: a busy modern city dependent through its trade upon its links with the rest of 
the world. So the department is concerned on the one hand with affairs inside Hong Kong 
and particularly with its large and vigorous press and its growing broadcasting industry 
and on the other hand must play its part in maintaining and promoting Hong Kong’s 
image abroad in support of its trading policy.344 
 
This introduction is extremely transparent in articulating the Hong Kong government’s trading 
ventures. Undoubtedly, publicity played a huge part in Hong Kong’s projection of its modern 
developments and success to the rest of the world, and film as part of the government’s publicity 
apparatus, is an integral part of this type of public relations work. By the mid-1960s, the Hong 
Kong government, through the information and publicity work of the GIS, proactively sold the 
prosperous image of Hong Kong’s progress and modernity to promote its trade and tourism 
interests overseas in “North America, Australia, Africa, the Middle East and Europe.”345 
The Hong Kong government’s film production activities matured in the 1960s. Yet, the 
distribution of Hong Kong government produced films continued to rely on the networks of the 
British imperialistic regime. Hong Kong’s economic trade activities and prospects continued to 
be intimately tied to the creation and distribution of imperial prestige and royal fanfare. In Hong 
Kong, the HKFU publicity films were distributed in local theatres. Internationally, these films’ 
primary outlet was in London. For instance, the world premier of Sea Festivals was at the 
Empire and Ritz Theatres in Leicester Square, London in 1963. The film was released in Great 
Britain by MGM.346 These films and related publicity print materials were also exhibited at Hong 
Kong’s prestige exhibits at the Frankfurt, Berlin and Milan Trade Fairs, as well as by the COI 
and distributed in Great Britain. For overseas distribution, the Hong Kong Film Unit would 
usually dispatch a newsreel item or publicity film footage to London, which in turn would be 
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screened by the COI at a trade screening attended by representatives from such major television 
and movie distributors as Pathé, Movietone, MGM, and the British Commonwealth International 
news film agency. At such screenings, these companies would decide in turn whether or not to 
purchase copies of the films screened and include them in their company’s reels. As these films 
were made with overseas audiences in mind, they were dubbed into different languages. For 
example, Sea Festivals were dubbed into Portuguese, French and Spanish, and distributed to 
Portugal, Belgium, Santiago and Chile for overseas distribution.347  
This is Hong Kong (1961) is one of the first prestige films made by the Hong Kong 
government, and was produced by European expatriates, Tom Hodge (producer) and associate 
producer Noni Wright, who wrote and directed this film production. According to one of the 
press statements by the GIS, This is Hong Kong, which is a 30-minute color documentary 
produced by Cathay Film Services (HK) Ltd. and commissioned by the GIS garnered the 
“’Golden Harvest’ trophy for best documentary screened at 8th Asian Film Festival held in 
Manila in March…[and] was primarily made in order to show audiences in every part of the 
world the manifold facets of this territory.”348 Chinese audiences in Hong Kong saw a version of 
this film with Chinese subtitles. In the GIS annual report, we learn that This is Hong Kong was 
the first “prestige” film “to promote knowledge of Hong Kong and its problems abroad.”349 
Through this “chocolate marshmallow coated public relations tablet,”350 which had a 
commentary spoken by the Canadian, Bernard Breden the Hong Kong government attempted to 
reach global audiences in England, the United States and Canada. 
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In this film, the word, “modernity” is often mentioned in the commentary. This film is 
about Hong Kong’s rise to the ranks of an industrialized urban center. As noted in the press 
statement of the GIS about this film: “Industrial sequences ranging from a textile mill to an 
electronics factory carry the message that not only can Hong Kong produce cheap goods but also 
quality products at competitive prices.”351 According to the 1964-65 report of the Information 
Services Department, another prestige film, Made in Hong Kong, a short film about the trade and 
industry of Hong Kong, “is expected to play a vital part in the Colony’s overseas trade drive.”352 
For instance, Made in Hong Kong with the voiceover commentary by Eamonn Andrews, was 
distributed in the United Kingdom through Hillcrest Productions. On September 23, 1965, it was 
shown at the 1700 sea Leicester Square Theatre in London as a second feature to Mirage starring 
Gregory Peck and Diane Baker. It was shown in conjunction with “a series of ‘Hong Kong 
Fortnights’ which are being held in major cities throughout the United Kingdom to promote the 
sale of Hong Kong products.”353 Furthermore, such films as This is Hong Kong and Hong 
Kong’s Sea Festivals also had a “25-day run at Carnegie Hall Cinema in New York last May. 
The latter film was shown during May and June in eight theatres in New York City, New 
Rochelle, White Plains, Spring Valley Trenton and Chicago, [and] screenings lasted from a week 
to ten days. [In] Brooklyn, Philadelphia and Worcester in Massachusetts, [the] film [was shown] 
from one week to 20 days.”354 As we can see from such a wide distribution network, which was 
both transnational and global, the purpose of the HKFU was to disseminate and represent 
modernity. In addition to flaunting its success in Hong Kong and promoting trade relations with 
other countries, the colonial government promoted ideas of progress and modernization and 
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transported them through filmic representations beyond Hong Kong’s borders into the new 
global world order, hence bridging the colony to the rest of the world.  
 
Between Tradition and Modernity: Struggling to Appeal to Local Audiences  
Despite winning international accolades, praising the “progress” of such prestige films as 
This is Hong Kong, the government simply could not ignore the local audiences, for their sheer 
force and their potential to erupt in protest and dissent against the colonial rulers. In the colonial 
discourse, in particular statements from the GIS officials to the Hong Kong press, the Hong 
Kong government posited itself as wanting to respect and work within the local culture and 
customs of colonial Hong Kong. In one of the GIS press statements, we learn that Bernard 
Braden, the Canadian who recorded the voice over commentary of This is Hong Kong (1961), 
first came to Hong Kong before recording for the film in order to “familiarize himself with the 
Colony.”355 Furthermore, the GIS promoted the film as appealing to the local Hong Kong public: 
Local audiences will, naturally, find in the film’s sequences much that is familiar – part 
of day-to-day existence. But the camera pokes into odd corners, and sees a variety of 
things that will be new or strange to many. Excellent camerawork and skillful editing 
combine to give on the screen a very faithful reproduction of the kaleidoscopic 
patchwork that is Hong Kong.356 
 
In the analyses of two HKFU produced films, Report to the Gods (1966) and The Magic Stone 
(1966), I will assess the extent to which HKFU was successful in coaxing the loyalty of local 
audiences in Hong Kong through representing tradition and modernity. 
In producing the prestige film, Report to the Gods, the HKFU attempted to appeal to the 
local audiences by various means. For instance, the Hong Kong Film Unit recruited the famous 
Cantonese cinema comedic star, Leung Sing-por. Furthermore, in addition to dubbing the film 
                                                 
355 HKRS 70-6-580-1, Film Unit, HK – NC + DIB (1961-1973), “Showing Hong Kong to American People: 
Promotional Films Draw Large Cinema Audiences”, 4 August 1965. 
356 HKRS 70-6-580-1, Film Unit, HK – NC + DIB (1961-1973), “Showing Hong Kong to American People: 
Promotional Films Draw Large Cinema Audiences”, 4 August 1965. 
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into Cantonese, the British Hong Kong also appealed to the public through the representation and 
resolution of such social realities as overcrowding and housing problems faced by the 
underprivileged. 
Report to the Gods,357 which was an updated version of Made in Hong Kong, was 
directed by Brian Salt and was a quintessential prestige film, in which the HKFU combined the 
motifs of tradition and modernity to sell Hong Kong’s progress to the local people as well as 
overseas audiences abroad. In this color film which runs a total of twenty-six minutes, the 
narrative of Hong Kong’s successful path toward industrialization and modernization is 
recounted. It presents Hong Kong’s history as a teleological narrative from fishing village to a 
manufacturing industry, which now produces traditional crafts, goods for daily needs and 
luxurious items and high technological products to be sold and consumed in various overseas 
markets in the U.S., Europe and Africa. Most importantly, it tells the story of the problem of 
overcrowding, the spread of squatter areas, and the Shek Kip Mei fire, which led to the 
subsequent success of the government’s public housing projects. This docudrama reminds the 
viewers that Hong Kong’s success was earned through overcoming the problem of overcrowding. 
And the solution that led to Hong Kong’s industrial success had its beginning in the 
government’s building initiatives of affordable modern housing complexes. As in other prestige 
films, the purpose of Report to the Gods is to promote this success story to the people of Hong 
Kong. But more importantly, it was made to project a story of British Hong Kong’s paternal 
benevolence and by extension the staying global power of British influence to the Western world. 
Report to the Gods was made in two versions, one in English and another one in 
Cantonese. In fact, the film was originally made in English as the lips of the narrator of the film, 
Tso Kwan, the kitchen god, played by the Cantonese comedian Leung Sing-por, was obviously 
                                                 
357 Report to the Gods, Film 0042-HK/40/G (Hong Kong Public Records Office, Hong Kong). 
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speaking in English. While the English version was aimed to attract potential trading partners for 
Hong Kong in the West, who would be impressed by the industrial wonders manufactured by 
Hong Kong’s growing industry, the Cantonese version appealed to the local audiences of Hong 
Kong, the majority of whom spoke Cantonese as their mother tongue. Whereas the Cantonese 
version was distributed in local theatres, the English version was distributed overseas through the 
COI in London that addressed audiences in English speaking countries.  
Report to the Gods used a narration style of “expository mode.” According to film 
scholar, Bill Nichols, “The expository text addresses the viewer directly, with titles or voices that 
advance an argument about the historical world.”358 In an expository mode documentary, the 
message is conveyed via “an unseen ‘voice of God’ or an on-camera voice of authority who 
speaks on behalf of the text.”359 The “voice of God” method is employed in this short publicity 
film. Report to the Gods is narrated through the character of the kitchen god, who is the only 
person speaking, or rather the only one who is allowed the power of speech. The kitchen god’s 
voice is hence transformed into the “voice of God,” as his voice is the only one audiences hear.  
In the English version, Leung has an English accented voice. As such, Leung Sing-por’s voice is 
analogous to the representative of the Gods (The British imperialist rulers in London? Or the 
colonial officials in Hong Kong?).   
Yet, it should be noted that this agent to the gods is a Chinese kitchen god from the local 
Chinese folk tradition. From the outset, we learn that the kitchen god has the duty of reporting to 
the gods the achievements of Hong Kong in the past year. Although the achievements of Hong 
Kong depicted in the film are related to Hong Kong’s manufacturing might and advances, the 
fact that the film is narrated by the kitchen god suggests that the government had to make the 
                                                 
358 Bill Nichols, Representing Reality: Issues and Concepts in Documentary (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana 
University Press, 1991), 34. 
359 Bill Nichols, Representing Reality, 37. 
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story more palatable to Chinese local tastes and customs. The kitchen god in the local Chinese 
folk traditions, takes care of his people, all four million of them. In return, the Hong Kong 
Chinese must pay respects to him by burning incense in front of his altar.  
This docudrama makes use of both local traditional folklore narrative strategies and 
motifs. With the clever insertion of the character of the kitchen god, which is a well-known 
legendary figure in Chinese folk religion, Report to the Gods localizes the story of 
industrialization, urbanization and imperialism. In the English version, the kitchen god, played 
by Leung has an English accent and in the Cantonese version, we hear Leung’s own voice. 
Leung Sing-por’s celebrity status may be lost on the English speaking audiences overseas. In 
Hong Kong, Leung Sing-por was a household name during the 1950s and 1960s (who 
interestingly appeared on the cover of the first installment of the Hong Kong television guide, 
called Hong Kong TV Week (Xianggang dianshi).360 One strategy employed by the Hong Kong 
Film Unit to attract local audiences was to invite local Cantonese actors as spokespeople in their 
publicity films. These films were mainly documentary in style, but they often included fictive 
elements by soliciting the help of Cantonese comedic movie stars to lend these often 
preponderant films a touch of humor. For instance, in the first installment of the Hong Kong 
Today publicity newsreels (monthly film magazines produced beginning in 1967), Josephine 
Shao and Connie Chan Po-Chu, who were famous Cantonese stars in the mid-1960s Hong Kong 
youth movies, had cameo appearances.361  By employing the help of Leung, the HKFU was 
poised to sell this success story to the grassroots public of Hong Kong. Dressed in the traditional 
garb and makeup of the kitchen god, Leung’s character offers a familiar and traditional face to 
the modernizing developments of Hong Kong.  
                                                 
360 Leung Sing-por is a famous Cantonese actor. He appeared on the cover of the first volume of the Hong Kong 
wireless television guide, Xianggang dianshi (Hong Kong Television), no. 1 (November 15, 1967).  
361 Hong Kong Today, No. 1, Film 0012-E001 (Hong Kong Public Records Office, Hong Kong). 
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At the outset, the story is introduced by Leung in the traditional garb of the kitchen god. 
Yet once he descends from his altar to begin his reporting of the achievements of Hong Kong, he 
is transformed from the agent to the gods, to a local Hong Kong “everyman.” Throughout this 
short film, Leung appears in different roles. For instance, Leung becomes one of the squatter 
dwellers who witnessed the squatter fire in Shek Kip Mei, as well as the rapid construction of the 
first generation of resettlement housing blocks; he is also the traffic regulator that ensures that all 
automobilists follow the rules; he is one of the many drivers that rushes to work each morning on 
the busy roads of Hong Kong’s expanding urban horizon; he is also the man who works to build 
the water dams and reservoirs in Hong Kong. As the film comes to a close, we are reminded that 
in Hong Kong the east and the west exist side by side. The progress did not leave behind the 
traditions of Hong Kong. Life in the village or on the open seas continues to this day, while 
Hong Kong has caught up with the rest of the Western world in its postwar modern and 
industrial drive. Hong Kong can now boast of its capacity to provide affordable modern housing, 
healthcare, and higher education to its people.  
By featuring the kitchen god in many faces, Report to the Gods is not only a report to the 
gods or colonial rulers this docudrama also suggests that the experiences of the “everyman” were 
in fact those of the Chinese people living on the “colonial ground.” In the final scene, the kitchen 
god ascends back to the altar. As he sits down, he salutes us with a glass of red wine in one hand 
and a Chinese rice cake in another. In this final gesture, we are reminded that just as the kitchen 
god is the Chinese traditional guardian of Hong Kong’s new generation, he is also an agent to the 
colonial rulers of Hong Kong. Report to the Gods is by far one of the most sophisticated 
publicity docudramas produced by the Information Services Department (GIS)’s film unit 
(HKFU). Such films were often praised in the reports of the GIS, while garnering awards in the 
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international festival circuits. But how many people in Hong Kong actually saw these films? 
When they did, what did they think of the publicity directed at them?  
In what would be the highest budget government film to that point, The Magic Stone 
exposes the extent to which publicity films were successful in using the trope of “tradition” as a 
promotional device. In this film, Chinese tradition is represented by the star power of Nancy 
Kwan, who, as the international emblem of Asian womanhood, domesticity and modernity, also 
blatantly became the spokesperson for the success story of Hong Kong under British colonial 
rule. The Magic Stone is one example whereby the colonial government failed to stir the 
affective responses amongst the local audiences through gendering tradition. In order to attract 
local audiences, HKFU publicity shorts were distributed in local theaters. However, as my 
discussion of The Magic Stone reveals, not even the star power of Nancy Kwan could attract the 
local audiences in Hong Kong.  
In 1966, the GIS recruited the service of Nancy Kwan, an internationally renowned Hong 
Kong actress, who had appeared in such Hollywood films as The World of Suzie Wong (1960)362 
and Flower Drum Song (1961),363 to star in The Magic Stone, which recounts the story of the 
legend of the amah rock and the birth of the Chinese mariner’s compass. This fictional film 
about a bygone time in Hong Kong was a complete departure from the film unit’s previous 
informational-oriented productions. Producing such a film on Hong Kong’s folk customs would 
seem to contradict the government’s promotion of the image of Hong Kong as a modern, 
industrializing international city. Yet, I would argue that representing and glorifying local Hong 
                                                 
362 For an in-depth analysis of The World of Suzie Wong, see Gina Marchetti, “White Knights in Hong Kong: Race, 
Gender, and the Exotic in Love Is a Many-Splendored Thing and The World of Suzie Wong,” Postscript 10, 2 
(Winter 1991): 36-49. 
363 This is the first all-Asian cast Hollywood film. In this film, Nancy Kwan plays a cabaret dancer at an Asian-
American night club, who found love and marriage at the end of the film with the night club owner. The 2008 
released DVD of this film includes a commentary track of Nancy Kwan. 
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Kong Chinese tradition is integral to the construction and making of colonial modernity in Hong 
Kong. What is of interest to me are the strategies employed by the film unit to prove to the rest 
of the world that it also respected traditional Chinese customs and values, perhaps even more so 
then the PRC government on the mainland which held an anti-tradition stance at the time. 
According to the head of the HKFU, Brian Salt,364 who also wrote and directed The 
Magic Stone, it is important to move away from previous informational films and “straight 
forward documentaries” and produce experimental works like The Magic Stone in order to reach 
“the widest possible audiences” in “the western world.”365 By the Western world, he meant the 
US market and Hollywood. It is interesting that Salt also mentioned: “Although Hong Kong has 
a tremendously successful film industry, its market is almost exclusively in Asia and mostly in 
Southeast Asia. The potential of Hong Kong to provide interesting stories, first-class performers 
and skilled technicians has yet to be properly realized in the western world.”366 In this respect, 
Salt was comparing the HKFU with the local film industry in Hong Kong and was suggesting 
that it could challenge the local film companies in garnering the same if not more support from 
both local and global audiences. Salt continued to pronounce that “In this respect we are 
particularly fortunate in having secured the services of Miss Nancy Kwan. Her name and her 
abilities will be a valuable asset and we are particularly grateful for the fact that, recognizing the 
nature of this enterprise, Miss Kwan has agreed to perform for a nominal fee.”367 
When we examine the themes and narrative strategy of The Magic Stone, we become 
aware of how the Hong Kong government made use of the myth-making process to posit the 
                                                 
364 Brian Salt was in the film industry business for almost 30 years at the time. He used to work on the British TV 
series, the Scotland Yard production feature, Gideon’s Way. 
365 HKRS 70-6-580-1, The Government Records Service Hong Kong, Film Unit, HK – NC + DIB, 1961-1973, 
“Nancy Kwan to Star in Unusual Film to Publicise Hong Kong: Production by Official Hong Kong Film Unit”, 7 
January 1966. 
366 Ibid. 
367 Ibid. 
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precolonial history of Hong Kong as a “legend.” The theme of Confucian morality, of female 
chastity, and wifely devotion, were put forth as idealized virtues and characteristics of the 
quintessential Oriental woman. The fisherman’s wife is called Mei Ching, meaning the beautiful 
and the faithful one. During important events, such as marriage, childbirth, Mei Ching would 
always pay tribute to the Queen of the Sea, Tin Hau, the Goddess of Hong Kong’s fisherfolk. 
Mei Ching also proves herself to be a devoted wife as she waits for her husband’s return on the 
hilltops until Tin Hau turns her and her son into rocks, which now still stand. At the end of the 
story, Hong Kong’s precolonial past, a legend, is authenticated by the British colonizers in the 
act of retelling this myth. The love story of the fisherman and his wife becomes part of Hong 
Kong’s mythology, history, and landscape.  
By the end of this tale, its audiences should come out of the theatre believing that the 
colonial authority of the British is one of benevolent paternalism. The colonial government 
effectively positioned itself as a non-violent and non-interventionist rule that not only respected 
the customs of its colonized subjects, but also preserved and promoted their traditions through 
the very production and distribution of this film. What was also achieved from the perspective of 
the colonial government is not only a livelihood and legitimacy of its imperial rule in the eyes of 
the Western world, but also the reiteration and reification of the dichotomy colonizer/colonized; 
tradition/modernity; legend/history; precolonial past/modernized present, the very existence of 
each symbiotic pair depends on the epistemic violence of this pairing. Indeed, the Hong Kong 
Film Unit has the final word. 
Throughout the entire film, both the fisherman and his wife remain silent; they are only 
given the luxury of pantomime but not of speech. As the film ends, we hear a man speaking over 
the images in a British accented English and concluding the story of this Hong Kong legend: 
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“And the goddess Tin Hau wept for Mei Ching and she sends a thunderbolt to bring Mei Ching 
and Wu Ying together once more. To this day, visitors to Hong Kong can still see the rock that 
the goddess Tin Hau left as her silent monument to her great devotion.” 
In The Magic Stone, Hong Kong history as a fishing village is mythologized and 
translated into an embodied visual pleasure. The documentary was further made more palatable 
and portable for a Western and transnational audience by the silencing of the fisherman and his 
wife, who are not given the power of speech in the film’s narrative economy. Through the bodies 
of the muted subjects, or rather, the objects of imperialist desire, the looming and omniscient 
presence and gaze of the colonial narrator are violently felt. Hong Kong’s tradition here is 
repackaged, rearticulated, and represented by the state’s heavy-handed power over language, and 
by extension, the symbolic sign of representing the colonial self and the colonized other in and 
through the transnational imperialist networks of fantasy and star consumption. 
Although this fantasy blends beautifully and harmoniously the East and the West, 
tradition and modernity in the very persona and characterization of the fisherman’s wife by 
Nancy Kwan, The Magic Stone did not appeal to the Hong Kong audiences at the time. The star 
power of Nancy Kwan did not improve the film’s gross earnings. In fact, it was a huge flop and a 
waste of taxpayers’ money, as claimed by one unsatisfied viewer in a local newspaper. The local 
reception of The Magic Stone was not entirely positive. Criticisms368 against the film complained 
how the film was a waste of taxpayer’s money as the government spent $400,000 to produce the 
film but only $5800 was made. From such criticisms, the colonial government was far from 
correct to say that audiences in the colonies are “unsophisticated” and “unlettered peoples.” It is 
interesting to note that the director of this production, Brian Salt admitted that the reason for the 
                                                 
368 Some of the criticisms found in the Hong Kong newspapers at the time include: Nene King, “Squeezing the $ out 
of the Magic Stone: Where Did Film Unit Go Wrong?” China Mail, 28 April 1969; “Film Chief – I Admit Error”, 
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miscalculation of the film budget was because: “he was inexperienced in local conditions when 
he had calculated costs.”369 To explain further difficulties in the filming of The Magic Stone, Salt 
noted that professional actors had to be brought in at “considerable expense” as “local villagers 
refused to wear period costume to act in crowd scenes.”370 This anecdote not only reveals the 
refusal of the local villagers of Hong Kong to be represented in the fashion as defined by the 
Hong Kong Film Unit, it also exposes the reality that the film unit did not have the power to co-
opt the local people, whose collaboration and assistance the film unit desperately needed.  
The Magic Stone was an example of the failure of the Colonial prestige film genre to 
effectively penetrate and speak to the desires and fears of the local audiences and thus failed to 
bridge the gap between the ruler and the ruled. What were the reasons? The biggest selling point 
was its star, Nancy Kwan. However, she was an international star. As such, the government was 
still trying to please the global or Western audiences. It may true that in producing The Magic 
Stone and other prestige films, the HKFU staff was trying to get familiarized with the colony. 
This film failed at the box office primarily because despite the attempts by the film unit to 
promote itself as a producer who represented faithfully the lived experiences and social crises of 
Hong Kong’s underprivileged, the colonial subjects of Hong Kong or the Chinese people being 
represented by the colonial film apparatus were never given a voice of their own. These films 
also failed to appeal to local audiences for they did not solicit the cooperation of the local 
community. More importantly, the government, in their conception and production of both The 
Report to the Gods and The Magic Stone continued to focus most of its energy in attracting 
Western audiences and improving international trade and its imperial prestige on the world stage.  
 
                                                 
369 “Director tells why government film flopped,” China Mail, 25 April 1969, 2   My italics. 
370 Ibid. 
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Disciplining the Audiences at the Resettlement Estates: the Mobile Film Team Comes to 
Town 
 
The purpose of the Hong Kong Film Unit was primarily to promote transparent 
communication flow between the public and the government. More importantly, its goal was to 
produce films that establish friendly relations between the ruler and the ruled. As Benedict 
Anderson371 argued, print capitalism allowed those who were located far apart to imagine that 
they belonged to the same community and nation. In the case of Hong Kong, the HKFU 
productions, which were usually shown in local theaters before the main feature films for local 
consumption in order to reach the Hong Kong Chinese population  
was one way whereby the colonial government incorporated their subjects living in Hong Kong 
into their sphere of influence. As not all Hong Kong people could meet face to face with their 
colonial rulers, these films introduced the leaders of the colonial government to the Hong Kong 
subjects so that they could meet their colonial and imperial rulers on the silver screen. The 
newsreels not only reported the events in the current year, they often documented the visits of the 
British royal family, such as Queen Elizabeth, Princess Alexandra of Kent in 1962, as well as the 
good service of Hong Kong’s governor Sir Robert Black at the Shek Pik Reservoir Water supply 
project in 1963, and the arrival of the new governor Sir David Trench in 1964. 
In the postwar era, the Hong Kong Film Unit took on a new mission, namely, to create 
modernized and urbanized subjects/citizens,372 endowed with civic virtues, equipped with 
healthy bodies, inhabiting clean and orderly colonial territories.  Some of the episodes of this 
publicity series include topics such as land reclamation, public safety, and hygiene. Other 
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publicity film titles include, Television on the Move (1962), which informed the public on how 
the government sent census takers to visit each household in the 1961 territory-wide census. In 
the docudrama newsreel film, Television News on the Move (1962),373 which, dubbed in both 
Cantonese and English versions captured the Hong Kong 1961 census taking process on 
celluloid. The Hong Kong 1961 census was an important event as it had been thirty years since 
the last territorial wide census was last taken. The publicity short informed its viewers that in 
order to report on “how many people do how many jobs,” the census takers went out to the sea, 
to the countryside and to the public housing blocks to reach the close to four million people in 
Hong Kong. The purpose of the 1961 census was, according to the narrator of the film, to help 
the government to forecast its education, healthcare and housing programs. Not only did this film 
seek to inform the Hong Kong public the importance of participating in the census taking process, 
it also attempted to establish a trust between the census takers, who represented the colonial 
government, and the people of Hong Kong.  
From the perspective of the colonial government, which audiences had to be tamed and 
educated? This was in part determined by the social and political unrests in the colony. The most 
important turning point in the history of Hong Kong was the anti-colonial riots that took place on 
May 1967 which lasted for eight months. Film was mobilized during the riots. In the words of 
the GIS, government produced films were used to “to fortify public confidence in the 
Government and to advise the people not to take part in Communist-inspired gatherings.”374  
In particular the colonial audiences living in the resettlement estates had to be impressed 
upon, civilized, domesticated and monitored. Riots often took place in the resettlement estates, 
which were far away from the central urban areas of Hong Kong. During the 1967 riots, the 
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resettlement estate neighborhoods witnessed many disturbances. These neighborhoods were 
inhabited by the poorest populations of Hong Kong society. From the perspective of the colonial 
government, the resettlement estates were breeding grounds for potential unrests in the colony. 
Following the “confrontation,” the government devised strategies to reincorporate these 
grassroots populace into the colonial logic of benevolent paternalism. Although the squatter 
resettlement development had, to a certain extent, resolved the overcrowding problem, the Hong 
Kong grassroots population became increasingly decentralized from the urban centers, not only 
spatially divided from the colonial seat of power encircling the Victoria Harbour area, but also 
separated in a great distance from the very means of their livelihood. At a time when 
transportation provision was unavailable and inconvenient, living in such resettlement areas was 
similar to being banished to the fringes of urban society. In the 1960s, there were very few job 
opportunities in the new towns. In fact, in the early 1960s, the concrete resettlement blocks were 
surrounded by “deserted land and hill slopes.”375 Hong Kong’s public housing projects, as such, 
led to a spatial divide between colonizers and colonized, the rich and the poor. This spatial and 
class divide is best illustrated by David Drakakis-Smith’s “concentric circle” (fig. 2)376 diagram 
which relates Hong Kong’s metropolitan land use zones to its social demographics in spatial 
terms.377 Close to the nucleus of the circle, that is, areas around the Victoria harbour and areas of 
commercial and government land uses, were resided by higher income groups, constituting the 
metropolitan core of Hong Kong. Further out are areas and lands in New Kowloon, which at the 
start of the government housing projects in the mid-1950s were still quite rural in character. And 
furthest away from the nucleus are new town areas in the New Territories, where most of Hong 
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Kong’s lowest-income families would find their residence as the resettlement programs 
developed in the mid to late-1960s.378 
From the perspective of the colonial government, though now resettled and relocated, the 
former refugee squatters, the people from the lower-income bracket group, were deemed to 
incubate seeds of potential political unrest in the colony. How to maintain the continuing myth of 
political stability and laissez-faire governance in Hong Kong and how to inculcate in the minds 
of the grassroots populace, now living within modern housing complexes a parallel logic of 
modern consciousness of citizenry and civic duty, became some of the concerns of the colonial 
government. The government had to figure out how to bridge and reconnect these grassroots 
elements back to the imperialist logic of benevolent paternalism. Designed as self-contained and 
self-sufficient, such new town communities as Shek Lei379, Tsing Yi, and Tsuen Wan (which 
was one of the first New Towns)380 created in the late 1950s381 were located in the New 
Territories and were faraway from the central urban metropolitan areas. The question as to how 
to incorporate the new town population back into the colonial mentality arose. Though located 
far from the seat of colonial rule along the Victoria Harbour, the new town communities within 
the urban-rural fringes were reconnected and bridged back to the colonial center through the 
active services of the Mobile Film Team. The apparatus of mobile film vans and film mobiles 
was not a new invention. For instance, in order to reach a larger audience, Grierson and his 
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colleagues at the General Post Office developed a system of “nontheatrical distribution” by 
bringing films to their viewers via traveling cinema vans.382 The government of India following 
its liberation from British rule also made use of film to educate and discipline its vast rural 
populations.383  
Plans for theater constructions in the new towns only began in the late 1960s and early 
1970s. Although such new towns did not have cinema or movie theatres, the GIS Mobile Film 
Team384 brought to the grassroots populace in such new towns the publicity films produced by 
the government. The department’s first mobile cinema began in 1964, which organized 68 film 
shows for audiences “numbering more than 470,000.”385 The early mobile film teams were sent 
out in tandem with the HKFU’s efforts to promote trade relations abroad. By the late 1960s, 
these mobile film teams became more and more involved in the entertainment and instruction of 
the youth in the public housing neighborhoods. In 1968, the mobile film team visited 13 
resettlement estates to “give film shows to entertain residents” in such new towns as the Wong 
Tai Sin Resettlement Estate, Tung Tau Resettlement Estate, Tsz Wan Shan Resettlement, and 
Shek Lei Estate.386 
The interiors of early public housing complexes were shabby and small. Recent studies 
have argued that Hong Kong people dealt with the claustrophobia of the confined space of their 
house by focusing on the exterior space outside of their homes.387 For the resettlement housing 
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spaces of their apartments by focusing on the ocean view from their unit. See Helen Hau-ling Cheng, “Consuming a 
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tenants, the open space outdoor became important arenas for them to find liberation. Watching 
movies in an outdoor space, therefore became an act of liberation. Moviegoing therefore allowed 
these tenants to shift their attention away from the abysmal conditions of the space within the 
housing blocks. I take this opportunity to problematize the politics of space in such housing 
complexes and argue how the grassroots populace appropriated an alternative use of colonial 
space through an active filmgoing experience. Through this liberatory and creative act of 
transforming housing space into film viewing space, the Hong Kong populace might have begun 
to debunk the imperialist discourse and disciplinary control over the meaning of space and hence 
over their social life. The perennial housing crisis which plagued postwar Hong Kong gave the 
colonial government in Hong Kong an opportunity to prove its benevolent paternalism in their 
efficient public housing projects. Interestingly, moviegoing as a social practice offered a 
potential site for the Hong Kong grassroots to talk back to their colonizers and reclaim their own 
story through the very act of spatial appropriation and film viewing. 
Shortly after the 1967 pro-Communist induced anti-colonial riots, the colonial 
government showed the following titles by way of its mobile film team to such resettlement 
estates neighborhood as Wong Tai Sin, Tung Tau, Shek Kip Mei and Shek Lei: Report to the 
Gods, The Magic Stone, Sea Festivals, This is Hong Kong, Race Against People, the Hong Kong 
Today series, and films produced by the Central office of Information, Britain.388 This line-up of 
film titles exposes how British Hong Kong continued to perpetuate the colonial logic of 
paternalistic benevolence to the grassroots audiences. It should be noted that these were the very 
prestige films that were not popular amongst local audiences when they first came out in local 
theaters. In addition to playing such “prestige” and publicity films, which dealt with such issues 
                                                                                                                                                             
Dream: Homes in Advertisements and Imagination in Contemporary Hong Kong,” in Gordon Mathews and Tai-lok 
Lui, eds., Consuming Hong Kong, 215. 
388 HKRS 70-6-580-1, “Free Film Shows for Resettlement Estate Resident,” 4 January 1968; January 8 to 25 1968. 
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as preventing bronchitis and water hygiene389 to the resettlement estates, the government 
continued to reinforce its presence through representing the audiences as malleable, which 
remained important for promoting its success to Hong Kong’s general public at large.  
In the January 9, 1968 issue of the Hong Kong English-language newspaper, Star, the 
title above the picture of the children at the Hong Kong government’s mobile film team’s public 
screening reads: “Colour movies thrill children” (fig. 3)390 The picture shows both boys and girls 
huddled together on the grounds outside of their resettlement housing blocks located in 
Tszwanshan in awe. Their wide opened eyes revealed their wonder and anticipation. They 
seemed to be utterly captivated by the magic of the moving pictures projected onto the white 
screen by the colonial government’s cinematic apparatus. For many, it was perhaps their first 
time seeing movies. The caption beneath this photograph reads: 
Thousands of children at the Tszwanshan Resettlement Estate had a thrill last night when 
a GIS film unit screened colour films for them. The films are being screened nightly at 
resettlement estates, schools and Kaifong associations.391 
 
It is interesting to note that this photograph is reminiscent of the cover which grazed the 
June 1951 issue of Colonial Cinema, a quarterly technical film magazine published by the now 
defunct Colonial Film Unit in London and distributed to film units of the British colonies (This 
quarterly film magazine ceased publication by the end of 1954) (fig. 4392).393 In this picture, the 
African audiences are framed by a rectangular screen. A stream of light projects this very image 
from the edge of the magazine cover, rendering them doubly as objects of the colonial gaze. 
Within this picture, the focus is the audiences and their reactions to the film screening beyond 
                                                 
389 HKRS 1025-1-1, Mobile Film Team schedule, 13 February 1969. 
390 “Colour movies thrill children”, Star, 9 January 1968. 
391 “Colour movies thrill children”, Star, 9 January 1968.  
392 Colonial Cinema Vol IX, no. 2, cover. 
393 Rosaleen Smyth, “The Post-War Career of the Colonial Film Unit in Africa: 1946-1955,” Historical Journal of 
Film, Radio and Television, 12, 2 (1992), 174. 
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the borders of this photograph. The similarity between the two pictures is that both focused on 
the expressions of awe and ecstasy of the audiences as well as the large number of the viewers at 
such colonial screenings. Yet, what is different is that in the Hong Kong case, the audiences 
represented in the press were all children, while the African audiences consisted of both adults 
and children, men and women. The emphasis on the children suggests Hong Kong government’s 
anxiety over the new generation of Hong Kongers, born and raised in the resettlement estates. 
Indeed, both pictures captured the filmic moment of both the cinematic projection and the 
audiences as “colonial subjects” who could be civilized through such public film screenings. In 
late 1960s Hong Kong, the colonial legacy of paternalistic benevolence continued. Within the 
discourse of the Colonial Film Unit in London, film played a central role in educating the 
“unsophisticated” audiences, for it “has proved a valuable instrument for education and 
information for the public in the Colonies, particularly for people living in rural areas who are 
inclined to be less in touch with current developments than people living in the towns, and for 
whom there is special need for education in improved methods of agriculture, better hygiene 
etc.”394 Similarly, in many of the films shown by the mobile team unit, they included such titles 
as Preventing Bronchitis and Preventing Measles, which were standard publicity films educating 
the public on health related issues. 
Despite such representation of the Hong Kong audiences as awe-struck audiences, the 
space of consumption and projection was a contested site, where the projector and the still 
camera were not always the all powerful colonial apparatus. I would like to argue that the 
huddled masses, the colonial bodies as audiences reappropriated the resettlement space. It may 
be true that during such outdoor screenings, the mobile film team took pictures of the film 
                                                 
394 HKRS 41-1-5788, Colonial Film Unit – Film Supplied by the .… 
 175 
projections and the estates’ children playing in front of the camera.395 These pictures depict 
images of the van of the mobile film team, the employees or volunteers of the film team as well 
as images of children at the Tsuen Wan housing estate watching the film screenings which are 
beyond the borders of these photographs. These pictures were not sent to the Hong Kong press as 
publicity materials.  As such, they revealed a moment of an alternative reality to the one 
represented by the press. One of the most striking revelation about these pictures is that the 
audiences at these public screenings were not always children; there were also adults. Secondly, 
the images of the children were not always like those in the Star newspaper, staring in awe at the 
screen. Instead, these images are of children standing in front of the camera with big smiles on 
their faces. In such photographs, it is clear that the children were excited about such outdoor 
screening events, not only for the contents of the publicity films shown, but also for the 
opportunity to be playing in the spacious outdoors of the public housing estates. In a few pictures, 
the young kids were conscious of the presence of the camera eye and posed in a playful pose in 
front of the still photographer. In one picture, one of the kids was in the middle of throwing a 
ball at the camera. 
It is my contention that these children found freedom in the new town environment 
beyond the confines of the suffocating interior living environments. Indeed, filmgoing, which 
was a modern activity of leisure became an opportunity for the young children to have fun, to 
appropriate the exterior space in the new town neighborhood, to break free from the boundaries 
and borders set by the concrete structures of the housing estate complexes.  It begs the question 
as to whether we can interpret such filmic experiences as resistance to the civilizing mission of 
the colonial government. In a schedule report of the mobile film team taken after the outdoor 
                                                 
395 HKRS 1025-1-1, “Mobile Film Team,” 1969-74, Hong Kong Public Records Office, Hong Kong. 
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screening at the Shek Lei housing estate in 1969,396 information such as the date and location of 
the screening, as well as the films shown and the response of the audience was noted.  
The Hong Kong audiences were not without their own demands. At a public screening 
held at the Shek Lei resettlement estate’s ball court, audiences, which numbered at about three 
hundred, expressed that they were quite pleased with the public screenings; however, they also 
suggested that in future screenings, the film team should show Cantonese melodramas or 
cartoons.397 At another screening at the Tsing Yi public school’s ball court, where titles included 
tourist films for Europe, Hawaii and Japan, audiences expressed that if the films had Cantonese 
dubbing, that would be most ideal.398 The colonial mobile film team did not always heed such 
demands. They continued to screen reruns of The Magic Stone399 or tourist films about Japan, 
Hawaii, Hong Kong, West Germany, New York and Brazil.400 Only once did they show a 
Cantonese film about the Monkey King (a character from the Chinese classic, Journey to the 
West) at the resettlement at Tsing Yi.401 One thing is certain. If such rare audience reception was 
not intentional resistance against the colonialist desire to civilize the grassroots populace, it 
shows an active response to, a rare audience reception of such publicity films shown in the 
resettlement estates, and their desire to be entertained rather than to be educated.  
Another interesting observation to note is that the staff of the mobile film team was all 
Chinese. Just as chapter 1 suggests that the colonial government needed the local people of Hong 
Kong to carry out the censorship work of films from the mainland, Taiwan and locally produced 
Hong Kong films, the GIS solicited Chinese employees and volunteers to bring films to the 
                                                 
396 HKRS 1025-1-1, “Mobile Film Team,” 1969-74, Hong Kong Public Records Office, Hong Kong. 
397 HKRS 1025-1-1, Mobile Film Team schedule, 17 May 1969. 
398 1025-1-1, Mobile Film Team Schedule, 14 April 1969. 
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grassroots as a means to communicate to the resettlement estate residents the activities and 
services of the government. Colonial authority and influence had to be produced by the very 
negotiation between the mobile film team and the huddled masses. It is interesting to note that 
the staff members who were responsible for the screenings were Chinese volunteers or staff from 
newly established community centers, which was a way for the colonial government to divert the 
energy of the disenfranchised public from politics to leisure. The projection, circulation and 
reception processes of such outdoor screenings expose the continued Cold War politics in Hong 
Kong on the one hand, and the struggles of the colonial government to rule with legitimacy on 
the other. Just as the representations of the overcrowding problem and the progress of Hong 
Kong’s industrial economy are told via the interplay of tradition and modernity, and just as these 
films were produced with the hope of appealing to both global and local audiences, the films that 
were shown by the mobile film team to the resettlement estate audiences continued to struggle 
between the desire to discipline and promote the benevolence of the colonial state on the one 
hand, and on the other hand, to co-opt the local audiences and foster trade relations with the new 
global ideological power represented by the United States Information Services.402  
 
Conclusion 
As demonstrated by my analysis of the work of both the Housing Authority and the 
HKFU, from the early 1950s through to the late 1960s, the colonial government in Hong Kong 
increasingly adopted a more active stance in its outreaching servicing. Yet, a balancing act of 
exclusion and inclusion remained pertinent and integral to the relationship between the 
metropolitan seat of colonial power and the unstable grassroots populace in the new towns. On 
                                                 
402 Films shown by the various community centers to the resettlement housing residents were provided by the 
U.S.I.S., the British Council Libraries, the airline and shipping companies. HKRS 1025-1-1, “Mobile Film Team,” 
1969-1974, Item 1, Memo from Princess Alexander, Warden, Community Centre, To Divisional Superintendent of 
Police, Tsuen Wan Police Station, 7 August 1969. 
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the one hand, a spatial border was created when the squatter population was disbursed to the 
suburban new town neighborhoods; on the other hand, the colonial government reconnected the 
public housing populations through publicity films, which might have paradoxically provided the 
representational arena for social resistance.  
Amidst the politics of Cold War dynamics and fomenting leftist ideology and activities 
which continued to be spilled over the borders from the mainland into Hong Kong since the 
Communist takeover of mainland China in 1949, the year of 1967 witnessed a series of explosive 
urban riots in Hong Kong, which were incited by the Cultural Revolution and leftist activities on 
the mainland. During that year, the mobile film team did not go to resettlement neighborhoods 
for fear of provoking the public. According to the annual report of the GIS, “During 1967, the 
department’s mobile cinema unit temporarily stopped its regular film shows in public since it 
was not desirable to attract large crowds and, instead, the mobile cinema unit concentrated upon 
smaller private shows to clubs, schools, police stations and hospitals.”403 This conscious decision 
of the film team to avoid the crowd at the resettlement estates reveals that the government 
continued to view the population in the new towns as a potential threat to the stability of British 
colonial rule. In the process of the government’s efforts of co-opting the dangerous elements of 
Hong Kong’s local grassroots following the “confrontation,” Hong Kong witnessed a new style 
of colonial rule that increasingly involved the local grassroots elements and local representation.  
Especially after the 1967 riots, Hong Kong people became more vociferous and 
increasingly engaged in local affairs, both social and political. Hong Kong government also 
recognized the importance of the people not just as a problem, or a solution but as partners in 
colonial governance, as well as collaborators that had be coaxed and rewarded. In the late 1960s, 
the government took a more proactive role to achieve this end by traveling to various new towns 
                                                 
403 GIS Report 1967-68, 15. 
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in film mobiles, which were agents of outreach as well as recruiters for new partners in the 
administrative system of colonial Hong Kong.404 The next chapter recounts the history of the 
intersections between the effects of the 1967 pro-Communist induced anti-colonial riots and the 
advent of television as a new medium of narrating the colonial encounter. The aftermath of the 
1967 riots might have led to a certain degree the resolution of the Cold War struggles that had 
plagued colonial Hong Kong politics since the end of WWII; however, the rise of a new visual 
warfare in the living rooms of the Hong Kong grassroots would once again challenged the 
legitimacy of colonial rule in Hong Kong in the post-Cold War era. 
                                                 
404 Similar to the wartime effort of the British film unit’s mobile unit. Films were brought to various battle areas in 
film mobiles and were shown in various locations to boost the morale of troops. See Richard M. Barsam, Nonfiction 
Film: A Critical History, 173. 
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Chapter 4: Televising the Post-1967 Hong Kong Chinese 
Introduction 
	
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After a full day of hard work, it’s now time to relax. After dinner, let’s all sit down and have a 
break. We gather together, chatting happily; TVB has a good show on right now. Merrily, 
happily, laughing and chatting, we here at TVB will spend some quality time with you.405  
 
– lyrics to the opening theme song of Enjoy Yourself Tonight (1967 – 1994). 
 
*+,-./012 
! oBDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRS… 
 
 Life is full of joy but also tears, 
All of us who met beneath the Lion Rock, shared more laughter than sighs…406  
 
-- lyrics to the opening theme song of Below the Lion Rock. 
 
In the late 1960s and increasingly so in the early 1970s Hong Kong’s first free-to-air 
television station, Hong Kong Television, Ltd. (first established in 1967) would become a new 
medium of mass culture and a conduit for the expression as well as manipulation of public 
opinion. This chapter traces the movements of images, of talent and audiences from the big 
screen to the small screen, a movement where the encounters between the Hong Kong people 
and celluloid images projected onto them would transform from a collective disembodied 
experience to an intimate one in the comfort and privacy of one’s home. The gradual shift of 
visual culture from cinema to television was to a certain extent the domestication and 
depoliticization of the very process of local identity formation that was at once intimate and 
                                                 
405 This is my translation. Original in Chinese: “	

  !!""#$%%&'()”  
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violent. Indeed, the emergence of television would despite its potential for democratization 
facilitated the internalization of the colonial encounter in the private realm of the family living 
room.  
The shifting allegiance of a segment of Hong Kong’s local audiences from cinema to 
television also meant that the colonial government had to devise new strategies to make its 
presence felt by entering into the homes of Hong Kong families now mostly living in the modern 
public housing complexes built by the government since the mid-1950s. The emergence of 
television culture also signaled a paradigmatic shift not only between representation and history 
but also between colonizer and colonized encounters. Just as I argued in chapter 2 that 
Zhonglian’s films represented the historicity of the rise of Cantonese as a local expression of 
patriotism, I contend in this chapter that televisual representations would also have an impact on 
the very developments of historical events. That is, television did not merely reflect what was 
happening in the streets but the televised narratives in many ways influenced Hong Kong’s 
colonial government in its response to the demands and needs of the Hong Kong people, 
especially after the eight-month long anti-colonial riots in the streets of Hong Kong in 1967. 
Now more then ever, effective colonial rule meant not only a race for the modernization of Hong 
Kong through public housing initiatives and their cinematic representations but also a subtle yet 
intentional act of rewriting Hong Kong’s collective history in televisual narratives of a new 
reformed colonial patriarchy.  
Was television the new medium and technology for the masses to reconfigure a different 
form of colonizer/colonized relationship? Was television a new democratizing site of 
contestation over the definition of Chineseness and a local sense of belonging in Hong Kong? 
When political propaganda migrated and transplanted from the cinema to television, what 
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ideological stance and discursive and narrative strategies did different stakeholders adopt in 
order to mobilize public opinion to legitimize their stranglehold over culture? We may begin to 
gleam some of the answers to the above queries by examining the historical, political and 
industrial contexts that gave rise to Hong Kong’s longest running variety show, Enjoy Yourself 
Tonight (EYT) and the British Hong Kong’s television unit, Radio Television Hong Kong 
(RTHK) produced Below the Lion Rock (BTLR). As the lyrics to its opening theme song attest, 
EYT epitomizes the rewards of Hong Kong’s recent urbanization and industrialization as well as 
the ethos of the middle and working class families in Hong Kong. The fruits of one’s hard work 
should be spent with one’s family, relaxing in front of the television set, watching EYT. In 
contrast, the lyrics to the opening theme song of BTLR focus on the plight of the underprivileged, 
their joys and sufferings. This show never neglected the realities of the toil and hardships of the 
working class whose labor was the backbone of Hong Kong’s recent economic success. On the 
one hand, EYT offers a moment of performativity and spectatorship, which in turn provided an 
interactive experience for Hong Kong families to construct their sense of belonging to the 
community at large. Yet, as we are reminded by BTLR, the prosperity now enjoyed by Hong 
Kong did not come about without a struggle, a struggle that was at once classed and gendered, 
postcolonial and consumerist. It is precisely this ongoing cultural struggle over an ideological 
consensus over the meaning of being a Hong Konger, which can never be fully won, that this 
chapter recounts. 
Amidst the violence of the 1967 riots, television became a modern form of leisure for the 
Hong Kong family. Yet watching television in late 1960s Hong Kong also became politicized 
and historicized, a process which took place in the intimate and domestic space of Hong Kong’s 
living rooms. In the 1950s, the propaganda wars between different political camps played out in 
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the cinemas and on the streets. But in the late 1960s and early 1970s, as the Cold War came 
gradually to an end in East Asia following Nixon’s visit to the mainland in 1972 the propaganda 
integral to the ongoing survival of colonial rule in Hong Kong penetrated into the private space 
of Hong Kong’s families by way of television. British Hong Kong found a new enemy in this 
ideological warfare: commercial television. Both public and commercial television production 
organs vied for the allegiance of the audiences in Hong Kong by producing competing 
representations of Hong Kong’s way of life. Just as the colonial government manipulated the 
new technology to promote the discourse of public service and the narrative of economic success 
to the Hong Kong people and to contain potential violence in the confines of the home, 
commercial television also gave rise to a new Hong Kong as world city, whose citizens were 
world citizens and cosmopolitan consumers in a truly postcolonial city, one that was, ironically, 
still under colonial rule. As a new mass communication technology, television provided a site for 
the interactive construction of  a Hong Konger in a post-Cold war Hong Kong.   
 
The Competing Discursive Battles During the 1967 Riots
407
 
In 1965, when the Hong Kong’s Secretary for Chinese Affairs, J. C. McDouall 
overturned the decision of the Hong Kong film censorship board and passed the documentary 
film on the 1964 PRC national celebration entitled, A Glorious Festival, with only a few 
excisions, McDouall believed that the political frictions between pro-Communist and pro-
Nationalist factions had dissipated and thus were not as threatening to the stability of Hong Kong 
as they had been in the 1950s (chapter 1).408 However, what McDouall did not foresee was that 
                                                 
407 For an in-depth study of the 1967 riots in Hong Kong, see Cheung Ka Wai, Inside Story of 1967 Riot in Hong 
Kong (in Chinese) (Xianggang luqi baodong neiqing) (Hong Kong: The Pacific Century Press Limited, 2000). 
408 HKRS 1101-2-13, Censorship of Films – Policy, item 12: Letter from Secretary for Chinese Affairs to Secretary 
of Panel of Censors, Re. Film, “A Glorious Festival (National Day of 1964),” 27 September 1965. 
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the left-leaning anti-colonial energy from the mainland would bleed into colonial Hong Kong 
less then two years later, and would challenge the legitimacy of colonial rule in Hong Kong.  
Beginning in May 1967, riots erupted in the streets of Hong Kong. The riots were first 
sparked off by a labor dispute at the Hong Kong Artificial Flower Works factory in San Po Kong, 
Kowloon, owned by Li Ka-shing (who is now one of Hong Kong’s riches men)409 in April, 
which quickly led to riots on May 6. The disputes which began as purely industrial transformed 
into an anti-colonial force led by local Communists who supported the Cultural Revolution on 
the mainland (1966-1976). Many scholars now agree that these protests and demonstrations were 
coordinated by the “Hong Kong and Macao Work Committee,” which was administered by the 
underground CCP branch in Hong Kong.410 The 1967 riots was an important watershed in the 
history of Hong Kong. At the conclusion of the disturbances, colonial Hong Kong emerged on 
the path toward major political and social shifts. The colonial administrators might have come 
out of this crisis still intact. But in order to maintain the legitimacy of its colonial governance, 
British Hong Kong had to continue to mobilize the rhetoric of “law and order”411 in addition to 
that of economic success and progress in its repertoire of the ongoing information warfare. The 
colonial government had to transform itself by adopting a different perspective and mode of 
narration, which nonetheless suppressed the reality of the continued poverty and social inequities 
                                                 
409 For a discussion of Li Ka-shing’s son’s Richard Li’s ventures in satellite television (StarTV), see Michael Curtin, 
Playing to the World’s Biggest Audience: The Globalization of Chinese Film and TV (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2007). 
410 According to Steve Tsang, all foreign political parties were forbidden to operate in Hong Kong beginning in 1949. 
See Steve Tsang, A Modern History of Hong Kong (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2004), 183. Christine Loh 
explains that although the British recognized the PRC government, it had to ensure that Hong Kong remained stable 
for capitalist ventures to prosper and prevent the leftists to disturb this balance. This is the reason why Governor 
Alexander Grantham passed the Societies Ordinance in 1949 to ban all branches and societies affiliated with foreign 
political parties. As such, both CCP and KMT were illegal organization in Hong Kong. See Christine Loh, 
Underground Front: The Chinese Communist Party in Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 
2010), 80. 
411 For a discussion of the British colonial discourse of  “law and order” as it relates to “citizenship, rights and 
legitimacy in local politics,” see Agnes S. Ku, “Negotiating law, rights, and civil autonomy: From the colonial to the 
post-colonial regimes,” in Remaking Citizenship in Hong Kong: Community, Nation and the Global City, ed. Agnes 
S. Ku and Ngai Pun (London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004), 157. 
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among Hong Kong’s most underprivileged. Indeed, the 1967 “confrontation” against British 
colonial rule in Hong Kong not only spelled death knell for pro-Communist activism in the 
colony, but also marked a new phase of psychological warfare that would eventually allow 
British Hong Kong to penetrate into the homes of the Hong Kong residents.  
It may be true that Hong Kong had developed from an entrepôt to an industrial economy 
in the 1960s. Between the early 1950s and early 1960s, the colony witnessed an increase in the 
number of its factories and workers by three and two folds respectively.412 However, labor 
conditions were dire. At the time, it was not unusual for workers to labor for 60 hours per week, 
with no paid vacation.413 It was not surprising that participants of the 1967 riots were mostly 
from the labor class. They were disenfranchised youths born and raised in the British Crown 
Colony of Hong Kong. They might have a better education then did their parents. However, 
these youths had very little chance for social mobility.  
The eventual crackdown of the 1967 riots in Hong Kong exposed as much the deep 
seated angst of the young people in the colony and their dissatisfaction toward British colonial 
rule as the fragmented nature of Communist leadership on the mainland. The Cultural Revolution 
on the mainland was at its most radical stage when the riots broke out in Hong Kong. As purge 
after purge took place within the official ranks of the CCP on the mainland, the Communist 
members in Hong Kong feared that they too would be deemed as not loyal enough to the cause 
of the Cultural Revolution.414 In order to preserve their livelihood, the leftists in Hong Kong 
seized the opportunity when the dispute at San Po Kong took place and manipulated the situation 
                                                 
412 Law Kar, “Wu lushi niandai kan xianggang de guodu” (50s, 60s Hong Kong society) in Xianggang dianying 
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to prove their adherence to the CCP party line discourse. They pushed the disturbances to a new 
level of violence to the point of calling for the end to colonial rule despite the fact that the PRC 
policy toward Hong Kong had long been to maintain the status quo and to allow British to 
continue its administration in Hong Kong.  
Governor David Trench (1964-1971) did not want Hong Kong to succumb as Macau had 
only a few months before, when the colonial Portuguese authorities gave into the demands made 
by the leftist members there. Trench was determined not to allow the protesters in Hong Kong 
“to Macau us.”415 The colonial government responded by firm measures. It was known as the 
“confrontation” in colonial discourse. British Hong Kong sent out police forces to suppress all 
protests. Finally, the riots ended when Zhou Enlai, the premier of the PRC, regained his power in 
Hong Kong affairs and ordered the leader of the Work Committee, Liang Weilin, to end the riots 
and to abandon the “ultra leftist policy.”416 The leftists in Hong Kong, hoping to secure approval 
of the Chinese central government by disseminating the rhetoric of anti-colonial patriotism in 
their leadership in the 1967 riots not only backfired, but also lost the support of many Chinese 
Hong Kong people. 
The rhetoric of patriotism and anti-colonial violence was promoted and inculcated by the 
leftist members during the 1967 riots through core Communist newspapers such as Wen Wei Pao 
and Ta Kung Pao. In fact, the leaders of the Work Committee instructed these pro-Communist 
presses to wage ongoing propaganda attacks and ideological warfare against colonial 
authorities.417 Many years later, Liao Yiyuan, former manager of the leftist film companies, 
Fenghuang and Chancheng, and the leading member of the Hong Kong-Kowloon All Sectors 
                                                 
415 Cited in Christine Loh, Underground Front: The Chinese Communist Party in Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Hong 
Kong University Press, 2010), 102. 
416 Steve Tsang, A Modern History of Hong Kong, 188. 
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Anti-Persecution Struggle Committee (formed on 16 May 1967), would recount in an interview 
the extent of the ideological warfare of exaggeration conducted by the pro-left camp in the press. 
Racist slurs such as “yellow skin dog” (huangpigou) were used to denounce the Hong Kong 
Chinese who supported colonial rule, while the colonial authorities were compared to “white 
skin pig” (baipizhu).418  The pro-Communist press would also misrepresent the Hong Kong 
public and present that they all had the same opinion. This strategy was called “A Thousand 
People with One Face” (qianren yimian).419 Indeed, when Zhou Enlai ordered the leftist leaders 
in Hong Kong to end the riots, it spelled a death knell to Communist influence and public 
support for its cause in the colony. 
Considered by the Hong Kong government as anti-colonial in nature, the 1967 riots were 
labeled as “the confrontation” and was seen by the government as an attempt ‘to force the 
Government into a position of subservience to communist domination.’”420 These riots led to 51 
deaths, 800 injuries, the arrests of 5000 people and loss of millions of dollars in property and 
economic damage.421 The annual report of the GIS called the reporting of the leftwing press on 
the labor related riots in 1967 as  a “campaign of intimidation.”422  In order to counter the “anti-
government propaganda” of the pro-Communist newspapers as well as the “the spreading of 
false and malicious rumours,” the Hong Kong government fought back with countermeasures in 
order to “counter the  spreading of confusion and panic.”423  
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While the reporting of the leftwing press was deemed by the Hong Kong government as 
“propaganda,” the versions provided and disseminated by the colonial government was “the true 
state of affairs.”424 In addition to producing and distributing short films to cinemas which the 
GIS claimed would “help keep Hong Kong’s population confident and firm in their stand with 
the Government against subversive elements,”425 Cantonese language short films were also 
produced and were screened in local theatres to “discourage the ordinary man in the street from 
taking part in demonstrations and to expose the communist aims and methods.”426 The GIS 
report of 1967-68 testifies to the importance of the work of publicity in creating an image of 
stability and effective rule of the Hong Kong government in the trying times of local riots and 
unrest. By the end of the year, the government also put out a number of pamphlets, such as 
Events in Hong Kong – 1967: An Official Report, to ensure the public that the positive 
enforcement of law and order was maintained in British Hong Kong. Below is a direct quotation 
from the booklet. From the below passage, we learn that the government characterized the 1967 
riots as a regressive move against the progress that was won by the colonial government for the 
people and society of Hong Kong: 
Confrontation may continue for some time in one form or another. With this spirit and 
with the firm support that has been given by Her Majesty's Government, the people of 
Hong Kong will continue to overcome whatever new threats they may have to face and, 
with their inimitable energy, will drive Hong Kong on to new peaks of prosperity and 
progress.427  
 
On the one hand, following the 1967 riots, the Communist underground network was 
greatly diminished by the colonial government. Its discursive influence also weakened as the 
circulation of pro-left newspapers declined. Before the riots, the circulation figures of pro-left 
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and CCP-controlled newspapers made up of one third of the total local newspaper market.428 
However, after the riots, the circulation figures of Ta Kung Pao and Wen Wei Pao fell to 10,000 
per day from the pre-riots figure of 100,000.429 The colonial government did not come out 
unscathed. Eight months of violence debunked the myth of Hong Kong’s political apathy as well 
as the invincibility of Colonial Hong Kong government. Furthermore, British Hong Kong 
recognized the importance of public support. As such, the colonial government began to commit 
to devising new strategies to revamp the style of its rule. 
On the other hand, the government desperately attempted to reestablish the image of its 
undisputed and uncontested control in Hong Kong via the help of the film medium. In a made-
for-television GIS newsreel, The Year of the Ram, we witness the major and important events 
that the Hong Kong society experienced in the year 1967. As in quite a number of informational 
and publicity shorts, such as Report to the Gods, the successful resettlement of families from 
boat to land was recounted once again. But more importantly, the valiant efforts of Hong Kong’s 
police force, that is, the agents of law and order in suppressing and controlling the leftist 
elements which incited the start of the 1967 riots were praised. These images selectively 
presented an image of law and order, progress and modernity, prosperity and success of Hong 
Kong under British rule (News were still produced and provided by the GIS until 1970s). 
Furthermore, Hong Kong Today, a monthly magazine film, usually 3-minute long and in color, 
dubbed in Cantonese and English versions, and first produced by the HKFU in June, were not 
only shown in local cinemas but also on television stations in Hong Kong430 and distributed to 
London.431 
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After the suppression of the 1967 riots, the colonial government of Hong Kong concluded 
that this was essentially a “failure of communication” between the government and the people.432 
In order to bridge the people and the government, the Hong Kong government initiated a new 
scheme called, the City District Officer Scheme to facilitate the transparent communication of 
government policies to the local levels through District Offices. In total, ten District Offices were 
established, in such districts as Wong Tai Sin, Mong Kok, Yau Ma Tei, Kwun Tong, etc. This 
new scheme of City District Offices has been described as an “administrative absorption of 
politics,” for it was a means to co-opt the Chinese elites into supporting the colonial 
authorities.433 However, British Hong Kong was not ready to change its governing machinery. 
Hong Kong public still did not have full participation in the drafting of implementation of 
legislations. It would be until mid-1980s when more Chinese could hold high-ranking positions. 
This new scheme merely provided a façade of an “open-and responsible government”434 that was 
reinforced in rhetoric more then in real policies. For instance, following the disturbances, the 
name of “Secretariat for Chinese Affairs” became “Secretariat for Home Affairs,” and “colony” 
became “territory” in the official discourse.435 Nonetheless, many reforms were slow in coming 
and were only implemented after much pressure from student and activist groups. For instance, 
Chinese (written)/Cantonese (spoken) did not become a second official language until 1974436 
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and many labor reforms only became laws in 1973.437 What the government also did was to 
gradually enter into the homes of Hong Kong families through a greater presence in television 
production initiatives. To what extent was this government presence felt in the homes? Could 
Hong Kong’s grassroots resist such a stranglehold over the representation of their way of life? 
 
The Decline of Cantonese Cinema and the Rise of Hong Kong Television 
The gradual entry of the government into television production had much to do with 
Hong Kong’s cinematic landscape from the mid-1960s onward. At the time of the riots, Hong 
Kong’s cinema witnessed a very important change in its production and audience makeup. 
Beginning in 1966, which was the Golden Age and apex of Hong Kong cinema and Cantonese 
cinema in particular when the annual general attendance was estimated at 98,370,000, the 
numbers of both filmgoers and theaters had begun to decline steadily (table 3).438  By 1971, the 
number of audiences had dwindled to fewer than 18, 000,000, which was a decline of 20%.439 
This figure continued to go down in 1974 when the audience figure was at 70,000,000, which 
was a total of 30% downfall from 1966-67.440 Just as fewer and fewer audiences were going to 
the theaters, the production figure for Cantonese cinema was also declining. By 1972, only one 
Cantonese film was produced and none in the following year (table 4).  
The changing social economic milieu of Hong Kong which was conducive to the 
outbreak of the 1967 riots also had a great impact on Hong Kong’s cinematic landscape. As 
Hong Kong was becoming increasingly industrialized and urbanized in the early 1960s, the 
theater business underwent much turbulent change. One of the effects of industrialization was the 
growing cost of real estates. Both the housing problem and the exhibition circuit in Hong Kong 
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were both adversely affected. Residential housing rents skyrocketed as a result. The real estate 
environment in Hong Kong in the early 1960s created instability for the theater business 
(exhibition industry) in Hong Kong. Financiers or property owners would either demolish old 
theaters to construct multi-story buildings, or they would only have theaters occupy one part of 
the building to minimize loss.441  
Within this rapidly industrializing economy, the Cantonese cinema industry witnessed 
further hardships as rents for studio space steadily increased in the late 1960s.442 This resulted in 
the film companies’ decisions to shorten the shooting days even further,443 which in turn led to 
lower quality productions. Cantonese cinema in particular was drawn into the vicious cycle of 
the rise of production costs, declining production values, the small returns of revenues (due to 
the control of theater owners to reduce the number of days that they showed movies as well as 
the ratio of earnings shared between production companies and theater owners), as well as the 
diminishing theater circuits which screened Cantonese movies. A few theaters which had 
previously been showing Cantonese films were renovated and switched to showing Mandarin 
and foreign films.444 Towards the end of the decade, only one line of theaters showed Cantonese 
films as compared to three in the previous years445 which totaled 30 to 40 movie venues.446 By 
the early 1970s, the number of theaters showing Cantonese films had reduced to 4 to 5 theaters 
(table 5).447  
Just as the landscape of Hong Kong’s film industry changed gradually since the early 
1960s amidst the industrializing milieu of Hong Kong, television underwent a long evolution 
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from the late 1950s to the early 1970s to become Hong Kong’s new democratizing medium of 
leisure. Following the 1967 riots, and at the moment of the birth of Hong Kong’s first wireless 
television station (Television Broadcasting, Ltd.), television would eventually become the new 
technology for the expression and construction of local belonging. From its first inception in 
1957, television watching was not meant to be a leisure activity for the masses. It was at first the 
preserve of the upper and middle classes. Towards the early 1970s, television would slowly 
reached the majority of Hong Kong’s grassroots audience. 
On May 29, 1957, Hong Kong’s first wired television network, the Rediffusion 
Television (RTV, Lide yingsheng) was founded.448 Prior to the founding of RTV, it operated as a 
radio station since 1949 as Lide fusheng. It was the first wired television broadcasting company 
in any British colony as well as the first in any city with a majority Chinese community. In the 
first few years of television broadcasting, there was only one channel with four hours of airtime 
daily and the programs were in black and white and in English, covering news and sports. The 
targeted audiences were in the early history of RTV the expatriate community in Hong Kong and 
the Chinese elite with westernized education background. It was only until 1963 when a Chinese 
Channel was added to RTV. Its first local Cantonese productions included such shows as women 
related programs: Women’s World (Nuren shijie), Modern Women (Xiandai funu); language 
learning programs: Daily English Usage (Huoyong yingyu), English Forum (Yingyujiangzuo); 
and entertainment programs: Chinese Film Magazine (Zhongguo dianying zazhi), and Stars 
Lifestyle (Yingxing Shenghuo).449 Such a repertoire proves that RTV was able to cater to the 
different tastes and needs of its viewers. Notwithstanding the addition of a Chinese channel in 
1963, the target audiences of RTV remained the expatriate community and the elite Chinese 
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middle class families. For instance, instillation fee was HK $25. Rental fee for the television set 
was HK $45 per month and monthly subscription fee was HK $25. There was also an annual 
license fee of HK $36 (government fee).450 
While an average working class family in Hong Kong earned a monthly income of HK 
$150 to $200, the cost of a television set could range from HK $300 to $500.451 According to 
American television scholars Lynn Spigel and Michael Curtin, TV Guide, which became a 
national magazine in 1952, “served as a source of scheduling information …[and] as a site of 
critical and fan discourse that bound individuals together.”452 In the case of Hong Kong, 
watching television became a new leisure and an emblem of urban modern living which in a way 
hailed the middle class as consumers into being. In particular, this cultural practice of television 
watching was fueled by reading the television guide. 
The ideology conveyed in the pages of Hong Kong’s first tv guide, Xianggang dianshi 
shuang zhoukan (Hong Kong TV Times) was that of a consumerist culture which solicited 
potential consumers through the advertisements sprinkled in the pages of the TV guide. In 
particular, women were targeted as the primary audiences of television. This is evident in the 
types of programs that RTV produced for its women viewers, such as Women’s World and 
Modern Women. Furthermore, women were coaxed into the consumerist economy through 
advertisements on cosmetic and household appliances. Not only did such women entertainment 
domesticate women’s bodies and confined them in the homes, advertisements in the Hong Kong 
TV Times also had the effect of domesticating and commodifying women’s bodies. 
Advertisements in the such TV guides reinforced the life of a homemaker. She was at once 
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confined within her home but was given the illusion of being a world citizen by way of her 
purchasing power of products from France, the U.S., etc. 
Domesticity became regulated and also glamorized, urbanized and commercialized. In 
order to co-opt women into this discourse of new urban modernity and the illusion of 
cosmopolitanism, various retail businesses aggressively tapped into the purchasing power of the 
newly affluent Hong Kong family. For instance, in the pages of the Hong Kong TV Times, there 
are many advertisements of household and domestic products as well as foodstuff for the 
convenience of a busy housewife. Advertisements were of products imported from all around the 
world. They include such brands as: American brand Libby’s canned and frozen vegetables; 
Swiss recipe Maggi Soup base cubes; U.S. brand Hotpoint (air conditioning); Italy’s Algor 
(refrigerator); and household items and household appliances (Sharp).453 In addition to finding 
advertisements for home appliances, there are those related to women beauty. For instance, there 
are many advertisements selling products that would help breast augmentation, as well as beauty 
salons that provide cosmetic surgeries services, such as Far East Beauty Center – Japanese 
Technology.454 Other beauty products include: Yardley’s face lotion, Coty (crème biologique à 
l’avocat from France),455 and Kaminomoto hair product from Japan.456 Indeed, the act of 
watching and reading the TV guide, which was part of the very emblems of modern 
cosmopolitanism, further commodified middle class women’s bodies and reinforced the mode of 
capitalist economy. But this would change in 1967 when TVB was established. 
In November 1967, amidst the disturbances in the streets of Hong Kong, Hong Kong’s 
first wireless television station, Hong Kong Television Broadcasting, Ltd. (TVB), was 
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established. TVB operated two channels: the Chinese channel, Jade; and the English channel, 
Pearl. As it was completely free, many Hong Kong families rushed out to get their living rooms a 
television set. The 1967 arrival of TVB would not only gradually transform television watching 
into a working class entertainment, but would also spark off the beginning of a discursive and a 
ratings war between TVB and RTV.  
When TVB was first established, there was much debate as to whether this new station 
would bring about a true localization (bendi hua) and popularization of Hong Kong’s media 
culture. That is could Hong Kong produced its own indigenous programming without relying too 
much on imports of foreign programs. One of the main concerns of cultural critics at the time 
was the impact of American cultural imperialism penetrating into the realm of Hong Kong’s 
popular culture. This concern stemmed from the fact that TVB was funded by Hong Kong 
financiers as well as British and American corporations. In particular, the leftwing newspaper, 
Wen Wei Pao was concerned about the “poisonous” impact of American hegemony and the 
penetration of the American way of life.457 The battle between TVB and RTV was characterized 
by some critics as the struggle between the promotion of American lifestyle and British lifestyle. 
The primary basis for this debate is the fact that programming was imported at first from 
England and the U.S. Indeed, in the comfort of one’s own homes, Hong Kong people could now 
access such American and British shows as I Spy, Dr. Kildare, Addams Family, Gilligan’s Island, 
Peyton Place, and the Lucy Show. News from Hollywood was also reported in TVB’s new TV 
guide, the Hong Kong TV Week (Xianggang dianshi), which cost only 20 cents per copy. Other 
important programs include soccer matches from the U.K., Walt Disney’s wonderful world 
programming for children. However, the real battle between the two television stations, RTV and 
TVB, would not be between the types of shows they imported from the U.S. or from England. 
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Rather, the real weapon that would secure the loyalty of the Hong Kong audiences, most of 
whom were ethnic Chinese and spoke the Cantonese dialect, was in fact having the distribution 
rights to old Hong Kong movies as well as the manipulation of the audiences through the live 
show format. 
The ratings war between RTV and TVB had further cultural implications for Hong 
Kong’s identity politics. Fueled by television formats such as the live show and reruns of foreign 
and Chinese movies, not only did television consolidate the emergence of Hong Kong’s local 
culture, one that was built upon Hong Kong’s cinematic tradition, but it would also enforce 
regional identification and encourage the identity politics of diversity. Furthermore, with the 
advent of television, Cantonese, whose existence in the realm of Cantonese movie production 
seemed to have all but disappeared, found a new life in the living rooms of Hong Kong families, 
and would become the language par excellence of Hong Kong’s popular culture.  
It is interesting to note that the decline in the number of theaters showing Cantonese films 
did not mean that Hong Kong people stopped watching Hong Kong movies, in particular 
Cantonese movies. Ironically, the very medium which some scholars believed to have caused the 
fall of Cantonese cinema,458 to some extent salvaged the prestige of Cantonese cinema and by 
extension of Cantonese as the expression of Hong Kong’s post-1967 and post-Cold War popular 
culture. In fact, future Hong Kong talent who received their first training in television would 
later become the creative force behind the birth of the Hong Kong new wave cinema in the late 
1970s and early 1980s.459 Although the fate of Hong Kong movies, and in particular of 
Cantonese movies was extremely bleak in the local theater circuits, old Cantonese films found 
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renaissance as television networks, such as TVB’s Jade channel presented them to the Hong 
Kong public through reruns. 
Shortly following the founding of TVB on November 19, 1967, its battle with the wired 
television network, RTV ensued. In order to attract larger audiences, RTV reduced its monthly 
charge from $25 to $20. In order to diversify their programming and secure higher ratings, the 
two stations also fought over the purchase of old movies.460 In 1968, only a year after the 
founding of TVB, the wireless television station fought a heated battle with RTV over the 
purchasing of the exhibition rights over Cantonese movies. This tug of war between television 
stations led to the steep rise in the price of Cantonese movie distribution rights, from an average 
of $150 per film to an average of $500 per film. The highest bidding price was at the price of 
80,0000 for 400 titles, which was on average $2000 per film.461 Interestingly, the changing 
media conduit led to the permanent revival and continued popularity of Cantonese film tradition 
on television. 
In the late 1950s and even early 1960s when local television production was still slow in 
coming, the revival of Cantonese cinema had already become a regular staple. Even before the 
founding of TVB, Chinese movie reruns was one of the main attractions of the new television 
technology. In the pages of the bilingual Hong Kong television guide, Hong Kong TV Times 
published by RTV,462 we can confirm the popularity of Cantonese movies amongst audiences 
even prior to the founding of TVB. In particular, these audiences wanted to watch films by such 
1950s Cantonese film companies as Zhonglian (Family, Jia; 1953) (chapter 2).463 By writing 
letters to the television station, Hong Kong’s television subscribers were able to express their 
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desire to watch more Cantonese cinema. For the first time, Hong Kong audiences who had 
television subscriptions in the early 1960s could influence television programming. To a certain 
extent, television audiences and television scheduling had an interactive relationship, even 
though the wish of television audiences was not always heeded. 
In addition to showing Cantonese movie reruns, both RTV and TVB also showed 
Mandarin movies and Hollywood movies dubbed into Cantonese. However, according to one of 
the audiences’ letters to the RTV station, dialect films such as Mandarin movies and Chaoyu or 
Chiuchow (Chaozhou) dialect movies (chaoyu pian) were not shown as frequently as Cantonese 
movies on television. For instance, in one of the issues of Hong Kong TV Times,464 audiences 
demanded more Mandarin shows on television by writing to the “Audience Mailbox” 
(guanzhong xinxiang). However, the television programming team explained that the reason why 
there were more Cantonese programming on television was because proportionally there were 
more Cantonese speakers in Hong Kong.465 Nonetheless, the television station would not ignore 
other dialect groups in Hong Kong.466 There was one occasion where a viewer complained about 
the fact that Mandarin movies were not shown on television often, merely once a week, while 
Hollywood films were shown twice a week: “This is unfair for us audiences from other 
provinces (waisheng guanzhong).”467 Another viewer noted that the television station favored 
broadcasting Cantonese movie (yueyu pian) reruns and neglected regional dialect films, such as 
Chaoyu movies.468 He noted that in Hong Kong there were many viewers who spoke the Wu 
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dialect (from Shanghai area) and northern dialect as well as the Chiuchow dialect. They too 
wanted to be able to enjoy entertainment with their native regional flavors.469  
Another incident that demonstrates how identity politics are often expressed by pitting 
self interests against those of the other relates to the Christmas special programming on the 
English channel of RTV.  For instance, in regard to the television station’s programming of 
Christmas special shows,470 a viewer complained that while the English channel had special 
programs during Christmas and New Year’s, the Chinese channel did not. He argued that the 
television station might be biased toward Western viewers. However, he argued that since most 
television viewers were Chinese and Hong Kong had long become a westernized place (pupian 
yanghua de xianggang), Christmas had also become a frequently celebrated festival time for 
many Hong Kongers. Indeed, this Hong Kong viewer wished to receive the best programs on 
two channels, that is, the best from each cultural realm. Hong Kong identity here can be defined 
as a hybridized identity expressed by one’s taste and appreciation for cultural diversity. 
The above concerns expressed by Hong Kong viewers expose several interesting 
characteristics of Hong Kong television as a medium for the expression of identity politics and a 
site for the construction of cultural identity. Firstly, the language of entertainment and popular 
culture became an important expression of audiences’ identity and a sense of belonging within 
the Hong Kong community. Secondly, Cantonese, although spoken by the majority of the Hong 
Kong population, was only one of various Chinese dialects and languages spoken in the colony. 
Lastly, although television was becoming dominated by Cantonese language entertainment 
programming, it still provided a site of regional identity formation and identification. Toward the 
late 1960s and early 1970s, there appeared more dialect films in such dialects as Chiuchow and 
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Mandarin (which were spoken by minority Chinese communities in Hong Kong) on television. 
In fact, as the television schedules in the early 1970s attest, different languages continued to be 
represented by Hong Kong’s television stations such as TVB. In fact, weekly movie reruns 
would include movies from the three dialect groups: Cantonese, Mandarin and Chaoyu. 
Although there was an emergence of Chinese identity, one that was intimately tied to the 
Cantonese dialect, there continued to exist as well a degree of regionalism, diversity and 
hybridity in the Hong Kong community.  
When TVB was founded in 1967, television began to reach out to the masses. As Hong 
Kong’s first “free-to-air” television station, it brought entertainment to almost every Hong 
Kong’s living room. Furthermore, TVB brought Hong Kong closer to world events, when it used 
satellite to broadcast the live events of the 1968 Olympic games and Armstrong’s walk on the 
moon in 1969. By 1973, when RTV (later renamed as Asian Television (ATV) on September 24, 
1982, following a merger) also became a “free-to-air” station and no longer required subscription 
fees, television truly became the medium for the masses.471 In the late 1960s, TVB and RTV 
were arch-enemies. In order to distinguish itself from RTV, TVB called itself “mosin dinsi” 
(wuxian dianshi, wireless television) in colloquial parlance.  In the 1970s, Hong Kong television 
would welcome another “free-to-air” television station, the Commercial Television (CTV). CTV 
began operation on September 7, 1975.472 Its shareholders included such important Chinese 
newspapers as Sing Tao Yat Pao, Wah Kiu Yat Pao and Kung Sheung Yat Pao. It was in 1976 
that CTV founded the martial arts drama series craze (based on the renowned martial arts fiction 
                                                 
471 We should not forget that television was not a common pastime immediately after its inception. In the late 1950s, 
only those who held subscriptions could access the information and entertainment on the wired television networks. 
Even after 1967, when Hong Kong’s first wireless television network was established, only 12.3 % of the population 
in 1967 had television. But within a decade in 1977, 90% of Hong Kong’s households had television. This figure 
increased to 98% in the 1980s. See Eric Kit-wai Ma, Culture, Politics, and Television in Hong Kong, (note 21), 201. 
472 Sixty years of broadcasting history (?), 110-111. 
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writer, Louis Cha’s works) during primetime television. This period marked the beginning of the 
most heated ratings wars during primetime since the founding of television in Hong Kong. 
Despite the sustained ongoing struggles for the distributing rights of old Hong Kong movies, 
TVB would come out as the victor in primetime ratings. Unfortunately, merely after three years 
of operation, CTV folded on August 22, 1978. The primary reason attributed to the folding up of 
CTV is that similar to both TVB and RTV, the station was required under license stipulations to 
broadcast government produced educational programs. Whereas TVB and RTV negotiated when 
to broadcast RTHK public affairs productions on a show by show basis, CTV had to broadcast 
education programs every evening for two hours during the peak hours of primetime television, 
between 9:30pm and 11:20pm. In the cultural battle over the loyalty of television stations, TVB 
would emerge victorious. For more than thirty years TVB’s live variety show, Enjoy Yourself 
Tonight (EYT), would not only dominate primetime television, but would also captivate the Hong 
Kong audiences and become part of their evening entertainment every night. 
EYT was Hong Kong’s most famous and longest running variety show, which received 
the highest ratings for many years on the Jade Network-Channel. For close to 30 years, EYT 
would become the friends of over 80% of Hong Kong families. EYT made its début on the 
second evening that TVB began its broadcasting history on November 20, 1967. It would run for 
more than twenty years until the show ended in 1994. Its popularity, I would argue, lies in its 
ability to appropriate cultural imperialism and transform it into a live performance of Hong 
Kong’s way of life which allowed audiences to participate in from the comfort of their living 
rooms. The show ran from 9:30pm to 11pm, Mondays through Fridays. It consisted of such 
segments as singing, dancing, dramas, games, all of which would often involved the participation 
of the live audiences. Through such interactive performances and segments, EYT successfully 
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interpellated the Hong Kong working class audiences into being. For the first time in Hong 
Kong’s television history, we have a mass entertaining live show where audiences took part in 
the construction of their identity either from their home or in the live audience at the studio.  
The original idea for the show belonged to TVB’s first general manager, Colin Bendall, 
an Australian broadcaster.473 The concept for a live variety show was based on the live talk show 
in Australia called, In Melbourne Tonight, a show hosted by Graham Kennedy (main host) which 
ran from 1957 to 1970. But when it was transplanted onto the colony, it became a variety show 
with dance and music numbers. With the help of the 21 year old script writer, Robert Chua Wah-
Peng (Cai Heping) (from Singapore), EYT was born. This variety show truly reflected the tastes 
and pace of the Hong Kong people at the time. Cai remembered: 
When I arrived in Hong Kong in May 1967, I spent five months observing the daily lives 
of Hong Kong people, and absorbed their culture and experienced their lifestyle. I think I 
was trying to get in touch with their sensibilities in order to understand what kind of 
entertainment was suitable for them.474 
 
At the beginning of the show, the audiences would be welcomed by the opening theme song of 
EYT (which I quoted in its entirety at the beginning of this chapter). The music of the theme song 
was based on a popular song in 1949, entitled, Enjoy Yourself. It was written by Carl Sigman and 
recorded by Guy Lombardo. A Cantonese rendition of the refrain of this song became the 
opening theme song of Enjoy Yourself Tonight. This opening theme song epitomizes the ethos of 
the Chinese people living in Hong Kong in the late 1960s.  
The show employed both old and new Hong Kong film talent. EYT would often feature 
Cantonese stars such as Leung Sing-por (who played the kitchen god in the GIS produced 
publicity short film, Report to the Gods) and Lydia Shum (a famous 1960s Cantonese movie 
                                                 
473 WU Hao, Xianggang dianshi shihua I) (The history of Hong Kong Television I), 45. 
474 My translation. See Cong yijiu erba nian shuoqi:Xianggang guanbo qishiwu nian zhuanji  (75 years of Hong 
Kong broadcasting history), 50. 
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star). The live variety show also presented the opportunity for new stars such as Bruce Lee and 
the Taiwanese singer, Theresa Teng to make their first ever appearances on Hong Kong 
television. The talent on the show presented themselves as the friends of the Hong Kong family, 
accompanying parents and children from after dinner time to bedtime with a closing song 
bidding goodnight to those who watched the show. These stars were indeed champions of the 
working class, bringing joy to their evening after a long day of drudgery and hard work. By the 
end of the show, all the stars would gather on the stage and sing the goodnight song at 11 pm and 
bid farewell to all the audiences in the studio as well as those at home. 
The most famous of its hosts, Lydia Shum, was indeed like a friend to all Hong Kong 
viewers in the late 1960s and onward. Everyone in Hong Kong’s entertainment business referred 
to her as “Fei-fei,” which can be translated as “fat fat” or “fatty.” Fei-fei was overweight, but she 
never subjected herself to fashion trends or the definition of female beauty promoted by fan 
magazines. With her black rimmed glasses and signature bouffant hairstyle, she became the 
iconic figure of primetime television in Hong Kong. In fact, she became a positive role model for 
Hong Kong people and subverted the commodification and objectification of the female body as 
consumers of household items and cosmetics that was prevalent in the TV guides during the 
early 1960s. Fei-fei never became skinny and tailored her body to the demands of Hong Kong’s 
entertainment industry. She even married one of the most dashing young television actors and 
Canto-pop singers at the time, Adam Cheng and had a daughter with him (though their marriage 
lasted for less then a year). Calling Lydia Shum, “Fei-fei” was never a malicious or callous 
address. But rather it was an affectionate address. There was not a single person in Hong Kong 
who did not and continue to love Fei-fei.  Indeed, gradually Fei-fei would become the heart and 
soul of EYT. Hong Kong television for the first time had a woman television personality that 
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would dominate primetime television for close to thirty years. When Fei-fei passed away from 
liver cancer on February 19, 2008, Hong Kong lost one of its most beloved television stars. Her 
body was flown back to Vancouver from Hong Kong to be buried. Recognizing Fei-fei’s 
popularity and importance for the Chinese people in Hong Kong and those living in Vancouver 
and other overseas Chinese communities, mayor Sam Sullivan proclaimed June 1st as Fei-fei Day.    
The live variety show EYT was one of the most visceral experiences on Hong Kong 
television since the late 1960s. Through the interactive viewing experience of EYT, the Hong 
Kong family became the locus of after dinner leisure activity. Through performance and 
spectatorship, Hong Kong in the post-1967 riots and post-Cold War periods actively took part in 
creating a local Hong Kong community together. Furthermore, EYT provided the Hong Kong’s 
audiences with a safe haven away from the surveillance of the colonial government in Hong 
Kong.  
 
Amnesia vs. Nostalgia: Reconstructing Hong Kong’s Collective Memory in Below the Lion 
Rock 
 
British Hong Kong following the war and increasingly so after the 1967 riots became an 
active producer of images in order to secure the favorable opinions and support of the populace 
and the international community. Radio Hong Kong and its reincarnations, served as a 
government arm “whose basic function is to mold public opinion in favor of government 
policies.”475 After the 1967 riots, the government gradually infiltrated into television production 
work and established the Radio Hong Kong Television (RHKTV) (later became RTHK). At the 
conclusion of the 1966 Star Ferry disturbances and the 1967 Communist-instigated anti-colonial 
riots, the streets of Hong Kong became increasingly described and deemed as infested with 
                                                 
475 Janet W. Salaff, Working Daughters of Hong Kong: Filial Piety or Power in the Family (Melbourne: Cambridge 
University Press, 1981), 18. 
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violence and crimes.476 With the temporary downfall of Cantonese cinema in local theaters, and 
with the recent crackdown of leftist cinema theaters during the 1967 riots, theaters were seen by 
the colonial government as breeding grounds for anti-colonial threats and violence. As such, 
television became the new technology for the government to penetrate delicately the private 
space of the Hong Kong family home and to continue its propaganda work masqueraded as 
public service and transparent communication.  
As we recall from chapter 3, the colonial government first penetrated the public housing 
estates through its mobile film teams, which brought publicity films to the resettlement estates 
residents as a way to co-opt them. However, audiences in the resettlement did not always enjoy 
the publicity shorts screened at such outdoor events. Rather, they preferred to watch Cantonese 
movie reruns. It would be in the mid-1970s when the British Hong Kong government was finally 
able to access the intimate and domestic space of the Hong Kong families through public funded 
television programming. In its televising initiative, the colonial government, similar to the EYT 
live variety show, also attempted to co-opt the Hong Kong families into the colonial consensus 
of Hong Kong’s collective memory, one that was constructed by the government from above. In 
the process, the Hong Kong colonial government rewrote the history of Hong Kong where the 
narrative of Hong Kong, from a fishing village to a prosperous industrial economy, was retold 
again and again. 
 In the early 1970s, the almost catastrophic consequences and effects of a series of violent 
disturbances such as the 1956 pro-Nationalist disturbance, the 1966 Star Ferry protest and the 
1967 anti-colonial riots remained still fresh in the memory of the colonial government. The 
government was still quite fearful of the potential threats that the grassroots population living in 
the resettlement estates still presented for the colonial administrators. Indeed, both the 1956 
                                                 
476 The discourse of violence is pervasive in the economic yearbooks and yearbooks of Hong Kong. 
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disturbance, in which the government took twelve days to suppress and where fifty-nine people 
were killed,477 and the 1967 riots were most active and volatile amongst the Hong Kong youths 
living in the resettlement estates. In order to contain the ongoing danger of violence 
spontaneously erupting in the resettlement estates, the colonial government continued to devise 
strategies to contain the violence and co-opt the grassroots populace. 
 Waging an ideological warfare in the mass media was still the modus operandi of the 
Hong Kong government. However, in televising its colonial legitimacy to the Hong Kong public, 
the government now would employ a more nuanced and less heavy handed narrative strategy, 
that of amnesia and nostalgia in order to depoliticize social and political inequities in Hong 
Kong.478 The memory of the violent 1967 riots would not only be suppressed within the leftist 
imaginary of the leftists, but also by the British colonial government. On the other hand, the 
recurrent trope of Hong Kong’s fishing way of life would be mobilized as part of Hong Kong’s 
nostalgia for the past, but a past that was now part of the televised official history of Hong Kong.  
In April 1970, in order to enter the tug of war in the increasingly popular realm of 
television, the Hong Kong government established a public television unit called Radio Hong 
Kong Television (RHKTV) (it was later renamed as Radio Television Hong Kong (RTHK) in 
1976).479 In June 1971, RTHK began limited production activities and by February 1972 became 
                                                 
477 The October 10, 1956 riot was sparked off when the building manager at a resettlement estate took down the 
Republic of China’s flags on the walls to celebrate the Double Tenth anniversary (a national day celebrated by the 
KMT to remember the success of the 1911 revolution). See Christine Loh, Underground Front: The Chinese 
Communist Party in Hong Kong, 87. 
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Dissertation, Harvard University, 2001. 229p 
479 Prior to its venture into television production, RTHK started as Hong Kong government radio station, Radio 
Hong Kong in 1928, offering first English and than English and Chinese transmission (1945). In 1956, RHK 
provided full-day long of broadcasting in the Chinese language. 
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fully operational.480 The former Director of Broadcasting James Burns Hawthorne (1972-1978) 
once noted: “the introduction of the RTHK Television, an outcome of the 1967 disturbances, was 
to propagate the truth, to entertain and to educate the general public.”481 Furthermore, he 
believed that, “One of RTHK’s principal functions is to provide the public with information on 
the Government’s activities and policies.”482 To a certain extent, the RTHK would become the 
successor of the Hong Kong Film Unit (HKFU) in its legacy of propagating the rhetoric of 
colonial authority and legitimacy to the Hong Kong public. While the HKFU produced publicity 
shorts would be screened in theaters and sometimes on television, RTHK programs specifically 
targeted television audiences. 
Once RTHK was established, there had been debates on whether the government should 
have its own public broadcasting station similar to the BBC in the UK or TVOntario in the 
Canadian province of Ontario. The government decided against establishing its own station and 
taking on an omniscient guise as the propaganda producer. Rather, it allowed the privatization of 
commercial television stations by handing out licences. Some have argued that such television 
privatization would encourage the flourishing of watching television as leisure, which in turn 
would ensure that the Hong Kong public stayed away from the streets to hold anti-colonial 
protests. The government, however, continued to exert control over the content of television 
programs under the Television Authority Secretariat (which was established within the 
Information Services Department) since 1964.483 As RTHK did not have its own broadcast 
station, it relied on Hong Kong’s commercial television stations, which were required by their 
                                                 
480 Ho Pui-yin, The Administrative History of the Hong Kong Government Agencies, 1841-2002 (Hong Kong: Hong 
Kong University Press, 2004), 328. 
481 Cited in Eric Kit-wai Ma (Ma Jiewei), Dianying zhanguo shidai (Television’s wartime period) (Hong Kong: 
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482 Cited in Eric Kit-wai Ma (Ma Jiewei), Dianying zhanguo shidai (Television’s wartime period), 93. 
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licenses to broadcast a fixed number of hours of government produced public affairs and 
education programs. For instance, metropolitan imperial rhetoric continued to make its presence 
felt through distributing British Television News and other documentaries on the “British way of 
life” by the COI.484 
As we recall from the previous chapter, the PRO was responsible for explaining the 
policies of the government to the people at large. One debate that is worth exploring is whether 
the Chinese people on the colonial ground were able to express their opinions and talk back to 
the colonial government as suggested by the 1973-74 GIS reporting that it could in fact achieve 
this goal through reaching out to the public: “The division’s role is similar to that of the City 
District Office, but instead of making direct contact with individuals, it concentrates on 
newspapers, television and radio.” Beginning in 1973, “a weekly television programme on 
Chinese press opinion about current topics has been shown on the English networks to give non-
Chinese members of our community a method of learning Chinese opinion on important 
issues.”485  
My focus here is more on the effects of televisual rhetoric of British Hong Kong on the 
Chinese speaking population. Under the administration of Governor Sir Murray Maclehose 
(1971-82), both the technology of television and mass communication were manipulated and 
mobilized to a whole new level of propagandistic nature in the guise of good public service. The 
presence of the colonizer had not so much vanished but internalized by the ethnic Chinese 
community. Under the governorship of Maclehose, narration strategies in mass media became 
modified, whereby the propaganda of the government was masqueraded not so much as 
“paternalistic benevolence” but as objective public affairs information to solicit consensus from 
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the public. The strategy taken by the Maclehose administration, I would argue, was to 
depoliticize entertainment and leisure. Nonetheless, the government recognized that grievances 
of Hong Kong’s underprivileged had to be expressed. Following the 1974 legislation which 
made Chinese the second official language of Hong Kong, Cantonese became the favored 
language of televisual representations produced by the government. Unlike the publicity 
docudramas such as The Magic Stone, where the characters are not given the power of speech, or 
in Report to the Gods, where the Hong Kong people are represented by the kitchen god, the 
Hong Kong people in the publicity shorts produced by RTHK are given the power of not only to 
speak, but to criticize.   
In the early 1970s, RTHK began producing short 5-10 minute long public affairs 
productions informing the Hong Kong public of the government’s new policies. And by mid-
1970s, RTHK would begin to produce one of the most influential drama series, which would 
have a huge impact on the construction of Hong Kong’s collective memory. The RTHK 
production Below the Lion Rock (Shizi shanxia) was first aired on Hong Kong television in 1974 
and ended in the 2000s. This drama series not only dramatized but historicized the everyday life 
in the public housing estates. Below the Lion Rock is one of the most famous mountain ranges in 
Kowloon. Below the mountain ranges were such districts as Wong Tai Sin and Tung Tau Village, 
where many of the public resettlement estates were first built and where Hong Kong’s most 
underprivileged resided and still do.486 The reason why RTHK focused its efforts on dramatizing 
the lived realities of the people living in these neighborhoods is because Hong Kong society in 
the 1970s, despite continuous urbanization and industrialization, was still plagued by the 
problems of overcrowding and the ongoing abysmal living conditions in the first generation of 
public housing complexes built by the government in the early 1950s following the Shek Kip 
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Mei fire (chapter 3). In order to contain the potential violence that the neighborhoods in the 
resettlement estates still presented for the colonial government as well as the discontent 
experienced by the Hong Kong grassroots, RTHK presented the stories of those living below the 
Lion Rock as part of the collective memory of the Hong Kong people. As the 2007 Below the 
Lion Rock Collector’s Edition notes (Companion to the DVD collection): 
As part of the collective memory of native Hongkongers, Below The Lion Rock holds a 
special place in all our hearts…As native Hongkongers, we can all see a little of 
ourselves in Below The Lion Rock. Being all in the same boat together, while reminiscing 
about times past we should also endeavour to turn over a new leaf, and write a brand new 
chapter in the ongoing saga of the place we call home.487 
 
Was BTLR really representative of Hong Kong’s collective memory? If so, it would be a 
televised collective memory actively constructed and mobilized by the colonial government as 
well as the HKSAR government. Indeed, the narratives of BTLR would be seized by the new 
HKSAR government. In the DVD selections introduced by the Director of Broadcasting at the 
time, Chu Pui-hing (1999-??), he claimed that the series touched many people and created a 
collective memory of Hong Kong. However, as a RTHK produced television series, it 
nonetheless reinforced the myth of colonial paternalist benevolence and as such justified the 
continued colonial rule in Hong Kong. It begs the question as to whether resistance from the 
bottom was possible when the façade of benevolence was so internalized and historicized that 
risked becoming “common sense.”  
BTLR first began as a black and white (later became color) television drama that was 
broadcasted on TVB and RTV. It documented the struggles and hardships, as well as the 
endurance and triumphs of the Hong Kong grassroots people. It was first broadcasted between 
1974 and 1979. Subsequently, the show continued three more times, in the mid-1980s, early 
1990s and in the 2000s, each of which revolved around the issues most pertinent and relevant to 
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the social concerns of the time. The first several episodes revisited life in Hong Kong in the 
1950s and 1960s. They historicize the development and process by which of Hong Kong has 
become increasingly industrialized and urbanized. Earlier episodes were between 15 to 30 
minutes long. Each episode touches on the concerns and problems that the ethnically Chinese 
residents of postwar Hong Kong have faced, including the Shek Kip Mei fire, the vicissisitudes 
of the refugees from the mainland and the problems that their children must face in the 
modernizing and urbanizing Hong Kong in the 1960s and 1970s.  
In my analysis below, I attempt to expose the following key narrative strategies employed 
within the BTLR series. The dichotomy of the fishing life versus the life on land would serve as 
the structuring device of all the early episodes of BTLR. Episode after episode, the narrative from 
life on the sea, to life in the squatters, then to the resettlement building blocks, represents the 
linear progression of history in terms of economic success, that, the government reminded us, it 
helped to create and construct. The government was no longer interested in creating more myths 
as in The Magic Stone, but rather in “historicizing myths,” which in turn would not only 
reinforce the colonial legacy of paternalistic benevolence, but also co-opt the new generations of 
Hong Kong youth into internalizing the narratives of “from sea to land,” “from poor to rich,” 
“from fishing village to industrial metropolis,” and thus into supporting the colonial consensus. 
Finally, the Hong Kong family, as represented by the image of the parents and children having 
dinner together, would become the locus around which all decisions would be made. By voicing 
the problems and solutions through the mouthpiece represented by the father figures in the 
stories, the colonial government presented the problems of Hong Kong as the problems of any 
typical family living in the resettlement estates. Through the voicing of Hong Kong 
government’s new policies and initiatives through the figure of the “father” or the “brother,”  the 
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colonial government effectively entered into the homes of the Hong Kong people by disguising 
itself as the firm but flexible and responsible patriarchal authority.  
In the first series of BTLR, individual stories revolve around the family of Uncle Tak (or 
Tak Shuk in Cantonese) and their neighbors and friends in their struggles to adapt to the problem 
of overcrowding in Hong Kong. Tak Shuk and his family are the newly residents of the Hong 
Kong government’s newly built first generation six-stories high H-shaped public housing 
complexes. From their beginnings as part of Hong Kong’s Tanka population or boat people, Tak 
Shuk and his family gradually moved into the newly built resettlement estate in New Kowloon. 
By placing Tak Shuk at the center of the BLTR series, Hong Kong’s history is presented as 
classed and characterized as a linear progression toward the economic betterment of Hong Kong 
society.   
In one of the BTLR episodes, Fisherfolk (Yujia, 1975), the traditional way of life comes 
into full clash and conflict with the new modern way of life in the industrializing Hong Kong 
society. It tells the story and conflict of one fisherfolk family. For three generations, the Chow 
family has been fisherfolk who makes a living at sea. However, the second son of Loi Shuk, 
Kum Shui (literally: Gold Water, which alludes to their way of life as fishermen), who has had a 
few years of schooling on land, now grows restless of his mundane life as a fisherman. With a 
fiancée who now works in a factory, Kum Shui also wants to try his luck working on land. 
However, his father who is the third generation now making a living from fishing, refuses his son 
to give up fishing and shed his identity as part of the boat people community. Despite Loi Shuk’s 
plea, Kum Shui persists in leaving the family business.  
Kum Shui: What’s the use of fishing? 
Loi Shuk: We can make a living. 
Kum Shui: What have we achieved? 
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Loi Shuk: We have bought a fishing boat of our own. And there’s only one year left on 
the mortgage and payment. 
Kum Shui: But by that time, the boat will be so worn out that you will then need to 
borrow more money again to buy a new one. Others who have gone on land, and have 
opened small businesses such as herbal drink shops have, in four years, earned enough 
money to buy a new ship.488 
 
Loi Shuk finally relents and gives some of his own savings to his son, hoping that the latter will 
indeed find a good living on land and break free from generations of fishing out in the sea. 
As part of the publicity for the Hong Kong government’s past and present policy 
initiatives, Fisherfolk attempts to communicate the good intentions of the government’s policies, 
as well as bridge the gap between the government and the Chinese residents of Hong Kong. In 
particular, the segment of the population that the Hong Kong government was still suspicious of 
was the younger generation of Hong Kong born and raised in the colony, whose angst and fervor 
led to the outburst of the anti-colonial riots in 1967. As such, the problem presented in Fisherfolk 
is not that of housing shortage as was the case in the 1964 publicity short, Report to the Gods, 
but rather that of intergenerational conflict, or more precisely the conflict between the traditional 
way of life and the modern way of life. The story is structured around the narrative progression 
from problem to solution, or rather from tradition to modernity, and from the old way of life to 
the new style of living in the newly urbanized Hong Kong metropolis. At the dénouement of the 
film, the conflict between father and son is resolved when the father accepts that the new way of 
life on land would bring hope to the future generations of the Chow family. This reconciliation 
reinforces the legitimacy of a reformed minded and newly urbanized patriarchal order, which 
was the post-1967 colonial government. 
In the end, Kum Shui returns home, with an electric calculator in hand as a gift for his 
father to replace his old abacus (a traditional Chinese-style calculating  tool). Kum Shui is first 
                                                 
488 My translation. 
 215 
laid off when the factory where he works closes down. He tries to find other work. But he 
discovers that with only a few years of education, he cannot compete with other Hong Kongers 
who have had a higher level of education then he does. After months of looking for work to no 
avail, Kum Shui decides to return to his life as a fisherman. 
Father and son reconcile. This intergenerational reconciliation represents not only the 
acceptance of the modern way of life but also an appreciation for the traditional way of life. The 
return of Kum Shui to the sea will be a transitional period for the family.  For three generations, 
their family has been fishermen. And now, for the fourth generation, Kum Shui will also be a 
fisherman. Together, Kum Shui and Loi Shuk make a vow that the Chow family will work hard 
and will eventually save enough money for Kum Shui’s children to attend university and find a 
better living on land. 
Throughout this short episode, there is a minimum of authorial presence in the narration 
and stylistic devices used. Instead, RTHK attempted to include more local flavor. This is 
achieved through the inclusion of documentary footage. In Fisherfolk, the film begins with 
establishing shots of the Hong Kong harbor. In the background, the Lion Rock mountain looms 
behind the endless rows of newly built resettlement estates. And in the foreground lies the harbor 
of Hong Kong. This landscape testifies to the continued coexistence of modern housing, and the 
traditional way of life. Throughout the narrative, documentary footage of fishermen at the market, 
and children swimming by the harbor are sprinkled throughout. We witness the daily life and 
routine of a typical fisherfolk family: mothers cooking, children playing, fathers and brothers out 
fishing. 
However, toward the end of the narrative, a voice-over is heard over the images of the 
buzzing life on the Hong Kong harbour. The voice reminds us that being a fisherman is a noble 
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way of life and there is nothing wrong with it. But he also emphasizes that it is beneficial for 
fisherfolk children to obtain education on land, for only educated young people would be able to 
make use of the new technology and methods in fishing. Up to the final scene of Fisherfolk, we 
have immersed ourselves in the struggles of the boat people in Hong Kong. Yet all of a sudden, a 
new voice disrupts the narrative. Who is he? Why does he have the power to present this 
narration and offer his opinion of the boatpeople? He is, in fact, the oldest son of Tak Shuk. But 
here, he becomes the authorial voice, framing the entire narrative of Fisherfolk. He appears twice 
in this short episode of BTLR, once in the beginning and the second time in the end. On both 
occasions, we see him taking the boat to visit his old friends who still live on the boats out on the 
sea. While he now lives and works on land, it is evident that his roots remain with the sea and his 
social ties with the boat people with whom he grew up. Being both comfortable on land and on 
the sea, he also represents the Hong Konger “in transition,” someone who has “made it” and 
succeeded in adapting to the industrializing economy of Hong Kong.  
Here, we recall once again the narration strategy in the 1964 Hong Kong government 
produced docudrama, The Magic Stone. Whereas in the 1964 Hong Kong government publicity 
short, the fisherman and his wife are denied the power of speech (for they are acting in 
pantomime only), in Fisherfolk, the son of Tak Shuk speaks for his old friends who remain 
fishermen. Yet, the power of speech or rather of narration and of voice was only given to the 
converted and transformed Hong Kong citizen. As the mouthpiece of the Hong Kong 
government, the son of Tak Shuk is the product of success, and remains nonetheless respectable 
of the way of life of the fisherfolk. 
 Resettlement (Qiaoqian, 1976) is another BTLR episode that at first seems to provide the 
conduit for the grassroots to express themselves, but in the final analysis, serves instead as the 
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mouthpiece of the Hong Kong government and its good work in the housing provision policy. 
“Resettlement” begins with an establishing long shot of one of the seven-story high resettlement 
estate complexes, built by the Hong Kong Housing Authority shortly after the devastating fire at 
Shek Kip Mei on Christmas eve in 1953. As the camera slowly pans upward in a nonchalant 
fashion, we discover rows and rows of nondescript units. The camera then cuts to one of the 
floors. A man is standing by the balcony brushing his teeth; it is morning. The camera then 
wonders off to yet another floor and then another. On each floor, we see men and women 
brushing their teeth on the outdoor balcony. The camera then cuts to the surrounding 
neighborhood: kids are walking to school; a day laborer is sweeping the ground; a man is 
preparing his newspaper stand for business. The camera then cuts back to the complex building 
and begins to zoom into one floor: a man is standing impatiently waiting to use the communal 
public toilets. He cannot wait any longer and cuts the line and steals into the now available toilet 
stall. Elsewhere, a woman accuses a young man of pouring urine over her face in a communal 
washing space. And they start to argue. Another argument is sparked off when a young man 
attempted to peep into the female bathrooms. The bickering begins on this morning, like any 
other mornings.  
Looking straight into the camera eye, and thus addressing directly the Hong Kong 
viewers, hailing them into a colonial subject position, and seeing for them, Tak Shuk reports that 
this is a typical morning in the resettlement housing complex.  There are indeed many problems 
living under such abysmal conditions. Fighting over the use of public communal toilets, living 
under the fear of being assaulted in public washing facilities, and fighting over parking spaces, 
form part of the daily realities of the residents who live in the government public housing 
complexes.  
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The interior spaces of the first and second generation resettlement housing blocks, called, 
Mark I and Mark II, were extremely limited, as they were built quickly at the lowest cost 
possible.489 As there was no garbage disposal system, the areas around the buildings often served 
for such purposes. As such, sanitary conditions were hazardous. Furthermore, these blocks 
neither had elevators nor electricity.490 There were however communal facilities for cooking and 
washing and toilets on each floor. In these Mark I blocks, each room was 120 square feet, and 
accommodated for five adults (children at ten and lower were counted as half an adult).491 
The narrative revolves around the family of Tak Shuk. Similarly to other families in the 
public housing complexes, he and his family have now been living there for almost twenty years. 
Despite all the inconveniences of living in a small apartment with no private bathroom or kitchen, 
they have grown accustomed to the dreadful living conditions of the first generation of 
government subsidized resettlement estates. Just as Tak Shuk’s son is the narrator of Fisherfolk, 
Tak Shuk himself is now the narrator and the eyewitness of the history of the government public 
housing project. He reminds us of the kitchen god in Report to the Gods, played by Hong Kong 
comedian, Leung Sing-por. Tak Shuk, in a relaxed manner attenuates the crudity of the hardships 
experienced by the public housing residents. 
The family of Tak Shuk is presented as the representative family of postwar Hong Kong. 
As we recall, Tak Shuk is a friend of Loi Shuk from Fisherfolk. While Loi Shuk’s family will 
continue to fish so that they can make enough money for Kum Shui’s children to obtain a better 
education and to compete in the labor market on land later, Tak Shuk’s family is already living 
on land, and enjoying the benefits that modern living has to offer. Against the backdrop of this 
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narrative about how Tak Shuk and his family live their daily existence in the housing estates is, 
on the other hand, a celebration of Hong Kong’s modern living and housing. Yet, life in this first 
generation of resettlement housing complex has now, after close to twenty years, become close 
to being obsolete and rundown. As the representative of the residents of the resettlement housing 
blocks, Tak Shuk also openly criticizes the government during the mid-1950s. Tak Shuk 
suggests: “Whoever built these complexes should be fired.” This statement is, I would argue, the 
Maclehose administration criticizing his predecessor in order to bolster himself as the more 
benign colonial administration. 
The dinner table is the recurrent narrative prop that represents the solidarity of the family. 
Interestingly, it is also during dinner time where the patriarchy represented by both the Chinese 
father and the British colonial governor was both criticized but in the final analysis reinforced. In 
one of the most artistically executed scenes of this BTLR episode, the public enters into the 
private realm of the family home at the dinner table. In one of the film’s sequences, two parallel 
scenes of two different families discussing the pros and cons of the new housing initiatives under 
the colonial administration of Governor Maclehose are masterfully intercut together. While the 
old generation was suspicious of the government’s proposed ten-year housing project initiative 
(1972-1982), the new generation of youths try to convince their parents of the benefits of living 
at the new style public housing complex.  The proponents of the Maclehose administration’s new 
ten-year public housing policy was not by coincidence led by the argument provided by the 
boyfriend of Tak Shuk’s daughter, who is in fact part of the Hong Kong Royal police force.   
In the middle of the night, the patriarchs of the two respective families wake up and 
ponder on the futures of their children. Their doubts during dinner time are now dissolved by the 
desire for change and a better life. Tak Shuk, throughout the course of the narrative, realizes that 
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“getting used to something” is not necessarily a good thing. To strive for improvement is the 
ethos of this Hong Kong family in transition. In the end, Tak Shuk still continues to live in the 
old style complex. His turn will come one day to move to a newer styled public housing. But for 
now, he and many of his neighbors, continue to bicker with other neighbors in order to survive, 
while hoping for a better future. As such, the decision of whether to stay or to move still rests 
with the patriarch of the family. Female bodies continue to be sites of potential violence and 
assault, and need to be protected by the patriarch, whose authority is once again reified at the end.   
The Below the Lion Rock series continues the legacy of the HKFU in producing publicity 
dramas that disseminated the discourse of progress and development.  In particular, the problem 
of overcrowding and the solution of public housing provided by the colonial government 
continued to be the leitmotif of this series. On the other hand, the “rhetoric of empire”492 of the 
Hong Kong Today series of the Hong Kong Film Unit, which was often heavy handed now gave 
way to a more localized outlook on Hong Kong society in the post-Cold War period. In fact, the 
episodes of the BTLR series are highly self-reflexive, with a documentary flavor to them. 
Nonetheless, the narratives still almost always posited the British colonial government as the 
main actor in effecting change and bringing about modernity to Hong Kong. The narrative of 
“problem-solution” in the mid-1960s government publicity shorts such as Report to the Gods 
was now transformed into a narrative of “problem-looking forward to solution-in-progress.”  
Following the 1967-riots, with the influence of the underground pro-Communist in Hong 
Kong waning, the primary concern of the colonial government was no longer the suppression of 
left-right struggles. With the succession crisis on the mainland still being played out in the 
Cultural Revolution, the colonial government knew that the PRC would maintain the status quo 
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in Hong Kong for the time being. Just as the Hong Kong government was pushed to provide 
public housing for the Hong Kong people following a series of catastrophic fires in the squatter 
areas, British Hong Kong had to entertain the possibility of implementing political reforms when 
it almost faced its own demise during the eight month long riots. It may be true that the colonial 
government introduced the City District Officer Scheme after the 1967 riots. However, the 
government was not ready to provide full political reforms that allowed democratic participation 
in the local levels. Nonetheless, the government was still anxious and fearful that protests would 
erupt again especially in the public housing neighborhoods. In fact, social movements amongst 
radical student groups continued to threaten the colonial authority and demand reforms and 
change from the British Hong Kong administrators.493 Therefore, in order to co-opt the Hong 
Kong grassroots, the government’s RTHK adopted a narrative strategy that spoke to the desires 
and aspirations, fears and struggles of those living in the squatter areas in New Kowloon. 
If the government did not want to and could not provide full citizenship rights for the 
Hong Kong people, at least it provided a televised channel in BTLR for any grievances that the 
grassroots needed to imagine and visualize for catharsis. Although the Hong Kong people 
recognized and learned of the ongoing predicaments of the underprivileged and their abysmal 
living conditions through the BTLR series, there was nothing that they could do about the 
housing policies. I agree with television scholar, J. Ellis that “the formal strategies of televisual 
discourse give rise to the ideological positioning of the TV viewer as a ‘normal citizen.’”494 
However, “the viewer-as-citizen is uninvolved in the events portrayed…The citizenship that it 
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provides as the position for its viewers is a position of impotence.”495 In fact, the government 
was buying time by way of such televised strategies as: 1) consensus through depoliticization; 2) 
amnesia; and 3) nostalgia; that is, by transforming social inequities such as unemployment and 
overcrowding into familial problems, by suppressing the memory of the 1967 riots and lastly, by 
historicizing the myth of “from barren-rock to industrialized metropolis.” When we listen to the 
opening theme song of BTLR, which was sung by one of Hong Kong’s most famous and 
illustrious Canto-pop singers, Roman Tam, we realize that co-optation was through and through 
even on the level of the theme song. The song tells its viewers that although those who live 
below the Lion Rock are poor, they should seek to dissolve their uncertainties through the 
camaraderie of those sailing on the same boat as them. As such, they should strive and work hard 
to write the next chapter of Hong Kong’s history together. Indeed, if Tak Shuk could endure and 
wait patiently for economic and political reforms to come, then the government hoped that it 
could contain the potential threats that the sheer number of Hong Kong’s grassroots presented, 
and convinced the Hong Kong working class people that they too could do the same. 
 
Conclusion 
Some scholars, such as Elizabeth Sinn, have argued that before the 1967 riots, there was 
no such concept as “Heunggongyanh” (Hong Konger).496  Those who lived in Hong Kong 
merely considered themselves as “Hong Kong residents.”497 Similarly, Agnes Ku places the 
moment of the conception of a Hong Kong identity after the 1967 riots when in 1971 the “legal 
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category of Hong Kong belonger” was introduced by the Hong Kong government.498 She 
continues to argue that the emergence of this category exposes as much about the anxieties 
amongst British administrators in London about the restructuring of its citizenship laws amidst 
the decolonization process as about Hong Kong itself.499 The post-1967 moment in Hong Kong 
was indeed a watershed in the history of the British colony. However, what is just as important to 
examine is not so much the moment of the emergence of a distinctive Hong Kong identity but 
rather, whether the concept was locally constructed by the masses or imposed from the top-down. 
Was subversion and resistance from the bottom-up possible? 
Matthew Turner posits that this process is a top-down initiative. He writes: “[i]t was until 
1967 that the rhetoric of ‘citizenship,’ of ‘community’ and ‘belonging’ was first deployed on a 
grand scale as anti-Communist counter-propaganda.”500 It is true that the Hong Kong 
government intensified its publicity campaigns to promote the importance of belongingness to 
Hong Kong society shortly following the devastating workers led riots. For instance, the colonial 
government initiated the festivities of the “Hong Kong Festival” or “Hong Kong Week,”501 
which promoted the local cultures of dances and fashion for one week. This festival is an 
example of cooptation through performativity and leisure. The festivities of “Hong Kong Week” 
was recorded by the Hong Kong Film Unit team and became segments along with the police 
force suppression of the riots in the Hong Kong Today government publicity shorts played in 
theaters and on television. In the early 1970s, amidst the rising popularity of free-to-air television, 
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the government also made its presence felt in the homes of Hong Kong families through the 
RTHK produced BTLR series. But this time, the 1967 riots receded in oblivion. 
I agree with Tai-Lok Lui and Stephen Chiu that, to a certain extent, the notion of a Hong 
Kong identity was imposed from the top-down by the government and it was in a way 
“citizenship from above.”502 Such televised initiatives as BTLR did allow the government “to stir 
up a sense of citizenship among residents” as well as present its continued colonial 
administration of limited political participation by the grassroots community as benevolent 
governance that sought for a “consensus government.”503 But when the government entered into 
the cultural work of televising its own version of the colonial encounter, television has become a 
democratizing medium that provided a channel for audiences to take part in the local 
construction of entertainment and of home. If they could not vote or take part in British Hong 
Kong’s political culture, they could at least vote, in the form of audience ratings, to reject the 
persistent colonial rhetoric of the “armchair conquistadores,”504  and choose instead which 
program they preferred to tune in to. 
Throughout the late 1960s and 1970s EYT enjoyed the highest ratings in primetime 
television. Out of a population of over 4 million people,505 roughly 2 to 2.5 millions of viewers 
tuned in every night.506 There were very few people in Hong Kong growing up during the time 
who never saw this variety show. If popular culture is the site where Hong Kong’s identity is 
constructed as argued by many Hong Kong studies scholars, I would add that television is one of 
the most contested space for this identity formation and consolidation to take place. The 
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government might have created a sense of belonging through historicizing Hong Kong’s 
“collective memory” on television shows such as EYT, which won over the hearts of the Hong 
Kong’s grassroots. Through their daily performances, the stars on EYT became the friends of 
audiences at home. In turn, through watching EYT, the audiences in Hong Kong became part of 
an “imagined community.”507 But the audiences of EYT were more than part of an imaginary 
world; they were active producers and builders of a community through taking part in the 
numerous charity campaigns that the EYT stars held live on TV.  
If “local belonging” was a discourse imposed from colonial rulers from above, I would 
argue that it was also reappropriated by the Hong Kong people, empowered through the act of 
watching television and contributing to charity work. Like Zhonglian before them, television 
personalities on EYT became the new bearers of what I have characterized as the elite service 
mentality of the Zhonglian film workers. Indeed, the show would carry on the torch of charity 
work not only in the local Hong Kong community but also in other Chinese communities. For 
instance, in 1972, TVB held an all-star fund-raising telethon, which included stars that often 
appeared on EYT. The telethon raised the sum of HK $7 million for victims of Hong Kong rain 
disaster on June 18. The popularity of EYT as well as their fundraisers debunked once and for all 
the imperial myth of Hong Kong society as being one of “utilitarianistic familism,”508 where its 
people only cared for the materialistic advancement of their own families and did not care about 
politics or local community affairs.  Indeed, television became the new democratizing 
technology of mass communication, as well as the new source of identification for the Hong 
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Kong people to take part in the construction of a potential civil society and televised Hong Kong 
citizenship in their living rooms. 
 227 
Conclusion: Future Directions of the Study of Hong Kong and Chinese Cinemas 
Summaries  
My dissertation has attempted to trace the intersections between Cold War struggles, 
colonial politics and local identity construction in postwar Hong Kong through an examination 
of Hong Kong cinema and its reincarnation on television between late 1940s and mid-1970s. My 
project traced the meandering paths that Hong Kong’s film and television cultures took in 
different manifestations: from Hong Kong colonial government’s censorship policies to British 
Hong Kong’s film production efforts to garner public support for its colonial rule; from Hong 
Kong’s local film productions to their transnational circulation contexts in order to disseminate 
an alternative cinematic imaginary of patriotism; from the alternative experience of colonial 
Hong Kong’s audiences in the public housing estates to the performativity of the construction of 
Hong Kong local community in the act of watching television.  
Chapter 1 exposed the effects of Cold War politics in the experiences of colonial Hong 
Kong through a cross-section examination of postwar Hong Kong’s highly politicized film 
consumption patterns. In 1950s and 1960s bi-polar world order of Cold War Hong Kong, the 
weakened British colonial administration vied for both recognition and political allegiance from 
the Chinese populations living in the colony alongside both leftist proponents of the CCP and the 
sympathizers of pro-Nationalist forces backed by the American government. One way for the 
colonial Hong Kong government to stabilize the politicized milieu of Cold War Hong Kong was 
through film censorship policies. The ideological struggles between the different political camps 
in Hong Kong for public and international support in the realm of cinematic representations 
culminated in the press battle of 1965. In this press war, the pro-Communist newspaper Wen Wei 
Pao accused the Film Censorship Board of Hong Kong of unfair treatment of mainland Chinese 
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films. As demonstrated by this chapter, British Hong Kong’s colonial administration was far 
from being a laissez-faire one. Rather, it was the very embodiment of a censoring authority that 
suppressed local sentiments as well as contained the very political elements that had the potential 
power to destabilize its already faltering status as the colonial ruler in Hong Kong. 
In chapter 2, I presented the history of an alternative cinematic imaginary constructed by 
the local Cantonese film company in Hong Kong, Zhonglian, from the early 1950s to mid-1960s. 
As Hong Kong’s new cultural elites, Zhonglian not only ignored British Hong Kong’s colonial 
politics but also avoided its film censorship control. The new moral universe of Zhonglian was 
constructed with a renewed understanding of Confucian family ethics in Hong Kong and the 
Chinese diaspora at the time when the political fates of both the mainland and Hong Kong were 
still very uncertain. While the colonial government attempted to influence the cinematic 
imaginary of postwar Hong Kong in order to secure Hong Kong’s allegiance and loyalty, the 
Zhonglian film company also tapped into postwar Hong Kong’s film industry by constructing an 
alternative ethos of patriotism among the Chinese living in Hong Kong and Southeast Asian. As 
an alternative force to be reckoned with, the historical development of the Zhonglian film 
company dislodged once and for all the myth of the preeminence of British colonial rule, its 
invincibility and its legitimacy. The contribution of this chapter lies in its discussion of the ways 
whereby Hong Kong identity politics were both circumscribed by local tastes and the market 
imperatives of Cold War distribution networks of film productions. As such, this chapter proved 
how a focus on Hong Kong as the new center for the understanding of Cold War culture may 
debunk the us/them dichotomy of US/USSR ideological struggles. Indeed, the history of Hong 
Kong film and the Cold War exposes how Hong Kong might have begun to emerge as a 
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postcolonial and cosmopolitan force at the very moment of heated colonial and left-right 
struggles. 
However, what we discovered is that the precarious status of Hong Kong as a British 
colony led its rulers not only to control over what Hong Kong people could see and could not see, 
but also to become a producing organ that manufactured propagandistic cinematic images to 
project itself as the benevolent ruler par excellence for both local and global audiences. 
Following the Pacific War, the prestige of British imperial rule witnessed a rapid decline. At the 
moment when Great Britain frantically held onto its last vestige of old style colonial rule in Hong 
Kong, a large influx of refugees from the mainland flooded into Hong Kong. Chapter 3 traced 
the social reality of the sheer force and energy of the Chinese people. As subaltern bodies, who 
came rushing into the colony at the very moment when the British Empire was falling apart and 
losing its preeminence and image of invincibility, the only way that the colonial government 
could control this large influx of population was through the discourse of its colonial 
benevolence, as well as the manipulation of the rhetoric of the tradition/modernity binary. 
More specifically, chapter 3 recounted the initiatives of the British Hong Kong 
government to control the sentiments of this large influx of colonial bodies and contain them 
within the logic of paternalistic benevolence. This colonial logic was projected through the 
government produced publicity short films, which include civic instruction documentaries and 
docudramas of Hong Kong’s path from a fishing village to an industrial economic city. In order 
to reach Hong Kong’s grassroots now living at the newly constructed public housing estates, the 
Hong Kong government sent out its mobile film teams to screen cinematic propaganda to Hong 
Kong’s new youths. The film projects initiated by the colonial government primarily had two 
goals, namely, to sustain its prestige in the eyes of both local and global audiences and to create 
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apolitical colonial subjects through the discourse of progress and development. Yet, as chapter 3 
demonstrated, the heavy-handed narratives of Hong Kong’s success were not always those that 
captured the imagination and attention of the little kids at the resettlement estates. 
The final chapter of this dissertation took a plunge in a different realm of visual culture: 
commercial television. There are two reasons why an examination of televisual representations 
in the post-1967 period is paramount in our understanding of the contours of British-Hong Kong 
colonial encounters. With the advent of the popularity of television in Hong Kong in the late 
1960s after the founding of the first Hong Kong free-to-air television station TVB in 1967, 
television became the new communication technology which not only shaped the style of 
colonial governance but also provided the conduit whereby local subversive responses could 
manifest themselves.  As I argued in this final chapter, television became the new democratizing 
medium of modern leisure where both the government and commercial television networks could 
reach a wider range of audiences and coax them into the narrative fantasies of their programs. 
On the one hand, the government attempted to co-opt the new generation of youths 
through projecting the myth of economic success in televisual shorts such as Below the Lion 
Rock in order to contain the potential violence that could topple the colonial authority. On the 
other hand, through such commercial television variety shows as Enjoy Yourself Tonight, Hong 
Kong fans were able to take part in the very process of constructing a distinctive local Hong 
Kong community. Just as cinema became an ideological tool of persuasion in the immediate 
postwar period, television became a new site where memories of Hong Kong’s cinematic 
tradition and the colony’s discursive history could be relived through reruns of old movies and 
where a civil society could perhaps be constructed in the very act of watching live television 
programs.  
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Hong Kong Cinema after the 1970s 
It seems paradoxical that Hong Kong’s global status gave rise to the attention to its 
indigenous culture. Or rather, it was perhaps of its local identity that catapulted Hong Kong 
cinema onto the radar of world cinema and international film festivals. This symbiosis between 
the local and global was facilitated by the fluidity and interconnectedness between Hong Kong’s 
television culture and film culture, which continually fueled each other from the very beginning.  
In the late 1960s, as Cantonese cinema gradually met its demise at the hands of the 
business savvy Shaw Brothers and their stylish kung fu and period drama films, which captivated 
the imagination of Hong Kong’s sophisticated youths as well as the Chinese diasporic 
communities in Taiwan and other Southeast nations, Mandarin films reigned supreme over 
Cantonese films in the local film industry. The popularity of Mandarin films also meant that 
Mandarin would become the popular language in expressing diasporic national sentiments. At 
around the same time, Cantonese cinema also came face to face with its most competitive rival, 
that is Hong Kong’s various television stations. However, since television talent was scarce at 
the time, television stations needed the contribution from the seasoned talent from the big screen. 
Soon, Hong Kong television, the number one rival of Hong Kong cinema would help revive 
Cantonese cinema and raise the status of Cantonese as the language of Hong Kong’s popular 
culture and that of the entertainment most preferred by Chinese overseas communities.  
As noted in the last chapter, although Cantonese cinema briefly met its downfall when 
not a single film was made in 1972,509 its path toward gradual revival was marked by the 1973 
produced film The House of 72 Tenants (dir. Chor Yuen) about the vicissitudes of various 
tenants all living together in a tenement complex, which broke box office records. The revival of 
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Cantonese cinema was made possible, ironically, by the popularity of Hong Kong television at 
the time. One of the actresses in this film was no other then Fei-fei from the prime-time variety 
show Enjoy Yourself Tonight (chapter 4). It was on television where Cantonese became once 
again the lingua franca of Hong Kong’s popular culture, triumphing over other Chinese dialect 
programs such as those in the Chiuchow (Chaozhou), and in the Wu dialects. And the popularity 
of Hong Kong’s Cantonese television personalities brought new life to the Cantonese movie 
scene.  
In the late 1970s, the Hong Kong New Wave directors510 which include Ann Hui, Tsui 
Hark, Patrick Tam, Yim Ho, Allen Fong among others who were in their early 30s rose to critical 
acclaim. The rise of this new breed of young Hong Kong talent, who were mostly trained in the 
West (United States and England) was again because of their intimate connections with Hong 
Kong television. The Hong Kong new wave directors first got their training in television 
production at such commercial stations as TVB, RTV, CTV and television production units as 
RTHK. Both Allen Fong and Ann Hui made their award winning television productions by 
contributing to episodes in Below the Lion Rock TV series. After their initial training in 
television, the New Wave directors entered the Hong Kong film circle and revived Cantonese 
cinema and redefined Hong Kong’s art cinema. The films made by the Hong Kong new wave 
directors often dealt with local issues and addressed the fears and aspirations of the local 
audiences. Although the emergence of the Hong Kong New Wave arrived two decades after the 
French New Wave and a decade after the Japanese New Wave, the Hong Kong New Wave in 
many ways captured the same preoccupations as the French and Japanese new wave films. That 
is, just as the French new wave directors were concerned in many ways with the Algerian 
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problem and the Japanese new wave with the American occupation in postwar Japan, Hong 
Kong new wave directors continued to question the boundaries of colonial encounters. The Hong 
Kong new wave films are also self-examinations of Hong Kong’s own identity not only as the 
colonized but also possibly as a new pseudo-colonizer in the face of the large influx of refugees 
from Vietnam since the mid-1970s.511 
More importantly, the return to the story of the disenfranchised and the poor in the 
cinema of the Hong Kong new wave filmmakers testifies to the legacy of the May Fourth 
cultural workers who sought an artistic and linguistic expression that would revive the morality 
of the Chinese nation. It would be precisely their concern for the problems of the Hong Kong 
society and community that consolidated their status as the New Wave breed. To a certain extent, 
the Hong Kong New Wave directors, including Ann Hui, Allen Fong, and Patrick Tam among 
others, carried the legacy of the May Fourth tradition and the service mentality of its wenren 
(literati/cultural elite). I would argue that they would not only elevate the aesthetic quality and 
political purport of Cantonese cinema, but also continued the legacy of the May Fourth 
progressive filmmakers as well as the Zhonglian filmmakers by once again returning to making 
films about the vicissitudes of Hong Kong’s underprivileged in the spoken language of the local 
people of Hong Kong. 
As talent, images and audiences from TV and cinema traversed fluidly, what was local, 
regional and global inevitably bled into each other. Bruce Lee made his first appearance as a 
martial artist to the Hong Kong audiences on Hong Kong’s free-to-air station, TVB. He would 
move to the film industry in the early 1970s starring in a number of Golden Harvest productions 
                                                 
511 In her television works and films, Ann Hui has dealt with the problem of the refugees from Vietnam. They 
include her film made for television, The Boy From Vietnam (1978), and her two feature length films, The Story of 
Woo Viet (1981) and The Boat People (1982). See Dai Anping, Zhang Jianting, Shu Qi, Wang Zhi, Xu Anhua de 
Yuenam Sanbu Ju (Ann Hui’s Vietnam Trilogy) (Hong Kong: Qingwen Publishing, 1983). 
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and would later become an international superstar of anti-colonial affect. And just as television 
provided a training ground for the Hong Kong New Wave directors, their work would inspire a 
new generation of filmmakers such as Wong Kar-wai, Stanley Kwan, and Ching Siu-tung who 
assisted the New Wave directors such as Ann Hui, and Patrick Tam on their films.512 The Second 
Wave directors would in turn produced international art-house anti-hero stars such as Tony 
Leung Chiu-wai, who first began his acting career as a host of a children’s program on TVB but 
would be best known to fans for his leading roles in such award winning international festival 
favorites as Hou Hsiao-Hsien’s A City of Sadness (1989), Tran Anh-Hung’s Cyclo (1995), Wong 
Kar-wai’s In the Mood For Love (2000) and Ang Lee’s Lust, Caution (2007). Indeed, it is 
impossible to discuss Hong Kong cinema without taking into consideration the interrelations 
between history, aesthetics, politics, and commerce, and the movements of stars, capital and 
ideas between the local television culture and the global film world.   
 
Cross-Media Fertilization and Global Audience Reception 
My project explored Cold War and colonial politics in postwar Hong Kong cinema in 
order to expose the complexities of colonizer and colonized relationships, the ongoing 
ideological struggles between left and right as well as the emergence of a local Hong Kong sense 
of community. As demonstrated by my project, historical and political contexts undoubtedly 
enrich our understanding of the various functions of filmic texts. My study of postwar Hong 
Kong cinema in relations to Cold War and colonial politics, not only complicates our 
understanding of Cold War culture, which has been primarily focused on the representation of 
anti-Communist sentiments in American media cultures,513 but it also sheds new light on Hong 
                                                 
512 Stephen Teo, Hong Kong: The Extra Dimensions (London: British Film Institute, 1997), 184. 
513 Michael Curtin, Redeeming the Wasteland: Television Documentary and Cold War Politics (New Brunswick: 
Rutgers University Press, 1995); Stephen J. Whitfield, The Culture of the Cold War, 2nd edition (Baltimore and 
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Kong’s new found role in the Cold War as the nodal point in the dissemination of Chineseness 
and patriotism that extended beyond China, Taiwan and Hong Kong to encompass the diasporic 
Chinese populations in Southeast Asia.  
To further the study of Hong Kong cinema, we should not lose sight of the intertextual 
relationships between Hong Kong cinema and other media forms in the British former colony. 
We need to therefore push beyond the boundaries of not only the disciplines of history and film 
but also those of different cultural and media texts. In the history of Hong Kong’s film industry, 
there had always been intimate cross-fertilizations between different forms of media culture, 
such as Cantonese opera, air-wave programs, pulp fiction, colloquial drama, Canto-pop music, 
DJ culture, television and film. In our study, television played an important and a much needed 
role in the refashioning of the cinematic language of struggles and triumphs of the Hong Kong 
people. As a modern form of art, film had been and continues to be influenced by other forms of 
media. In my opinion, cinema is from the outset an interdisciplinary art form. Both its narrative 
style and expression are borrowed from many other arts and media, such as painting, literature, 
music, radio, and television. Cinema is not an isolated art and medium, but is a part of our 
current multimedia culture.  In order to capture the complexity of film production, creation, and 
consumption in our interconnected and visually dominated society, I suggest that we should 
come out from the comfortable niche of a purely cinematic scholarship and rethink the meaning 
of cinema through an intertextual lens.  
                                                                                                                                                             
London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996); Ronnie D. Lipschutz, Cold War Fantasies: Film, Fiction, and 
Foreign Policy (Lanham, Maryland: Rowan & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2001); Christina Klein, Cold War 
Orientalism: Asia in the Middlebrow Imagination, 1945-1961 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003);  
Cyndy Hendershott, Anti-Communism and Popular Culture in Mid-Century America (North Carolina: McFarland 
and Company, 2003); Steven Casey, Selling the Korean War: Propaganda, Politics, and Public Opinion in the 
United States, 1950-1953 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008); Susan L. Carruthers, Cold War Captives: 
Imprisonment, Escape, and Brainwashing (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009). 
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With the advent of new and digital media and social networks in the 21st century, the 
demographics and makeup of the audiences as well as their viewing habits have been rapidly 
changing. The study of audience, spectatorship and reception of postwar Hong Kong cinema 
remain areas that require much further research. What remains my primary concern is the 
question of how scholars can go about uncovering the voices of the audiences, especially those 
that are underprivileged and disenfranchised socially, politically, culturally and economically. In 
our intellectual exploration of not only access, taste, appreciation and appropriation of film and 
other media forms, we need to address the implications and nuances amongst different segments 
of audiences across age, gender, class and ethnicity.  
According to Michael Curtin, the Chinese audiences around the world are growing in 
number and in influence.514  Indeed, the global Chinese audiences around the world are 
increasingly dictating the business decisions of multinational conglomerates. Another 
phenomenon which have taken place ever since the 1997 Asian Financial crisis is that more and 
more Chinese films were being co-produced with other film companies in other East-Asian 
nations. Just as during 1950s and 1960s Hong Kong’s film industry relied much on the 
distribution of its films to the Chinese overseas audiences in Southeast Asia, Hong Kong cinema 
today could not sustain itself without the audiences on the mainland especially after the handover 
of Hong Kong to the mainland which rejoined once again the socio-economic ties between the 
former British colony and communist China. 
We should also not forget that recent Chinese-language films find popularity not only 
among Chinese audiences but also among other audiences in East Asia and in the West. As 
argued by Rey Chow in Primitive Passions, the appeal of contemporary Chinese films among 
                                                 
514 Michael Curtin, Playing to the World’s Biggest Audience: The Globalization of Chinese Film and TV (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2007). 
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Western audiences was precisely because of the 5th generation directors’ creative constructions 
of film narratives and images based on the refashioning of the Orientalist fantasies of the 
primitive.515 Chinese film directors, especially those from the fifth generation such as Zhang 
Yimou and Chen Kaige who were well aware of the appeal of the exotic, the sensual and the 
primitive among Western audiences returned time and time again to Chinese folkloric traditions 
to find inspiration for new narratives and fantasies for the consumption of global audiences. This 
explains to a great extent the immense fanfare of such Chinese films as Crouching Tiger, Hidden 
Dragon (dir. Ang Lee, 2000) and Hero (Zhang Yimou, 2002). 
Given the recent trends in co-productions between film companies in different East Asian 
nations, and the appeal of Chinese-language cinemas (either from Hong Kong, Taiwan, the 
mainland, Singapore or their co-productions) beyond the geopolitical borders of China, Hong 
Kong, and Taiwan, how one defines Hong Kong cinema or Chinese cinemas needs to be 
revisited. Scholarship written in English on Chinese-language cinema in the past ten to fifteen 
years have tackled such important theoretical issues as the boundaries of such paradigms as the 
national,516 the transnational,517 and the global and diaspora.518 Indeed, as students and scholars 
of the politics and history of Chinese cinemas, we should continue to explore and problematize 
what is global, what is national and what is local in our appreciation of the intersections of filmic 
text and context, representation and history, aesthetics and politics.  
 
Postscript: From Rickshaws to Bullet Trains 
                                                 
515 Rey Chow, Primitive Passions: Visuality, Sexuality, Ethnography, and Contemporary Chinese Cinema (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1995). 
516 Yingjin Zhang, Chinese National Cinema (New York: Routledge, 2004). 
517 Sheldon Lu, ed., Transnational Chinese Cinemas: Identity, Nationhood, Gender (Honolulu: University of Hawaii 
Press, 1997). 
518 Poshek Fu, ed., China Forever: The Shaw Brothers and Diasporic Cinema (Urbana and Chicago: University of 
Illinois Press, 2008). 
 238 
To end my dissertation, I would like to return our discussion of the primacy of 
storytelling and the intersections between Hong Kong films, the stories and society of the 
Chinese people living in Hong Kong that these films depict as well as the often violent 
relationships between representations and history. Politics, history and storytelling enmeshed in 
the realm of postwar Hong Kong cinema and television. Indeed, different stakeholders, both 
colonizer and colonized, in the postwar period had attempted to rewrite Hong Kong’s social 
realities and history through visual representations in order to secure the allegiances of the Hong 
Kong people. Whereas government produced publicity shorts such as Report to the Gods and 
Below the Lion Rock projected the image of the colonial administrators as benevolent and 
responsive to Hong Kong’s postwar crises, Cantonese local filmmakers from Zhonglian ignored 
the colonial rulers in their social realist films and focused instead on the resilience and solidarity 
of the Chinese communities in their struggles to survive. By the late 1970s, locally produced 
Cantonese dialect long running drama series became a regular staple on commercial television 
channels in Hong Kong. In 1979, ATV (Asia Television Limited) (formerly RTV), broadcasted 
the 76 episode long drama Fusheng lujie (Gone With the Wind), which retold Hong Kong’s 
history yet once again. This drama series recounts the history of postwar Hong Kong from 1949 
until 1980 through the struggles, triumphs and tragedies of the mainland refugees who arrived in 
Hong Kong to find a better life. More specifically, this drama exposes the meandering 
relationships between Hong Kong, the city, and its inhabitants through the tale of inter-familial 
saga of three families from different dialect groups in Hong Kong (Shanghainese, Chiuchow and 
Guangdong). Indeed, Fusheng lujie also retells the process whereby postwar Hong Kong’s 
regionalism gave way to the emergence of a Hong Kong where all of them, and their children 
would call home.  
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Ah Cheung (played by Yueh Hua) is the main protagonist of the film. At the outset of the 
first episode, he and his wife are among the passengers on board the train from Guangdong to 
Hong Kong in the fall of 1949. Like many others, he is leaving China in order to find a better life 
in Hong Kong amidst the unrest wrought by the struggles between the CCP and the KMT. A few 
years later, Ah Cheung becomes a rickshaw puller in order to make ends meet. He later becomes 
best friends with Ah Nin, who is a Chiuchow native. Together, they work as rickshaw pullers for 
American soldiers in Hong Kong during the Korean War. Eventually they both find riches 
through their association with the Shanghai tycoon and former mafia, Mr. Cheng. Yet, as Hong 
Kong witnesses industrialization and urbanization, and as their children grow up as the new 
Hong Kongers, Ah Cheung, Ah Nin and Mr. Cheng’s fortunes take a drastic downturn. While Mr. 
Cheng is murdered, Ah Cheung will become an alcoholic who is supported by Hong Kong 
government’s welfare system of HK $100 per month. In the final episode of this ATV drama 
series, we are in February 1980. Ah Cheung and his friend, Ah Nin, take the first inaugural ride 
of the Mass Transit Railway.519 In the train station, Ah Cheung, who is still heartbroken over the 
abandonment of his adopted daughter who has left him to stay with her biological father in 
Australia, is now completely drunk, yet, continues to drink from his bottle. After a station guard 
reprimands Ah Cheung for drinking alcohol on the grounds of the MTR, Ah Cheung complains 
to Ah Nin, how impolite and insolent the guard is; Ah Cheung reminisces that he himself was 
already pulling the rickshaw in the 1950s when the guard perhaps was still a baby. Here, 
rickshaw represents a way of life that has long past. In modern Hong Kong, the new mode of 
locomotive, as represented by the MTR marks the progress of Hong Kong in the post-Cold War 
period.  
                                                 
519 The construction of the Mass Transit Railway system first began in 1975. The first train lines were opened in 
February 1980 which ran from Kwun Tong to Shek Kip Mei. See Ho Pui-yin, Ways to Urbanisation: Post-War 
Road Development in Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2008), 154. 
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Fusheng lujie is yet another example of Hong Kong’s visual representation’s 
preoccupation with the history of the colony. In this series, the narrative and hence history begins 
with the arrival of the train in the autumn of 1949 from Guangdong, bringing Ah Cheung and his 
wife to Hong Kong.  The film ends when Ah Nin boards a train to leave for the mainland to live 
out his final days. In the end, their quest for a home in Hong Kong turns futile. Can we say then 
that the Hong Kong represented in this drama series is on “borrowed time” in a “borrowed 
place”?520 The characters in this drama search frantically for material comfort and economic 
success. Yet, one after the other, they meet their demise in suicide, murder, madness, death and 
self-imposed exile. In the final analysis, no one seems to be able to contain Hong Kong’s future. 
If visual representations in film and television in Hong Kong’s popular culture have the tendency 
to rewrite history over and over again, then the recurrent image of the moving train is able to 
deconstruct history or rather transforms time into space by moving forward, never backward. In 
this series, the image of the moving train becomes a trope for hope, but also for modernity and 
for the future, albeit an unknown one. The real protagonist of this ATV drama and in many other 
Hong Kong cinematic and televisual representations is the city of Hong Kong itself, which 
refuses to be tamed by any historical narrative. 
The use of train as a trope for modernity in the history of cinema is not new. In fact, one 
of the first films made by the silent French filmmakers, Auguste and Louis Lumière, L’Arrivé 
d’un train en gare (Arrival of a Train at a Station, 1895) shows a train arriving into a station. 
This film reportedly caused some of the members of the audience to scream out loud in horror 
for they believed that the train was going to run them down. This fascination with trains as a 
symbol of modern change and the convergence of time and space became the perennial 
                                                 
520 Richard Hughes, Hong Kong: Borrowed Place, Borrowed Time: Hong Kong and Its Many Faces (London: Andre 
Deutsch, 1976). 
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preoccupation of such directors as Japan’s Yasujiro Ozu, Taiwan’s Hou Hsiao-hsien, and Hong 
Kong’s Wong Kar-wai. In one of Wong Kar-wai’s films, 2046 (2004), the history of Hong Kong 
is not only retold, but the past also becomes the vantage point towards the future. 
“2046” in Wong’s film, 2046, does not signify a year in time, but rather a place where 
travelers and dreamers go in search of lost memories, things past, for it is a place where nothing 
ever changes. Interestingly 2046 is also the final year of the policy of mainland China towards 
the Hong Kong SAR, which states that the central government on the mainland will allow Hong 
Kong to maintain its way of life for 50 years following the 1997 handover. By conceiving 2046 
as a timeless place, Wong Kar-wai attempts to create an optimistic yet eerie prophesy of Hong 
Kong’s political future in this cinematic universe. Gone is the recurrent image of the rickshaw 
which inhabits the cinematic spaces of Hong Kong’s popular culture from the 1950s through 
1970s. Here, ultra-speed bullet trains bring their passengers to a place of the future. However, in 
2046, Hong Kong’s futuristic landscape is also intricately interlaced with its own past. We learn, 
as the film progresses gradually, that 2046 only exists in the figments of Mr. Chow’s imagination 
as he feverishly writes his futuristic saga of unrequited love and buried memories. It is May 1967, 
the most tumultuous period in Hong Kong history. Amidst the violence of the “confrontation” 
where the pro-leftist activists threatened to topple British colonial rule in Hong Kong, Mr. Chow 
(played by Tony Leung Chiu-wai) is in fact trying to heal his own heartbreak through the very 
process of constructing Hong Kong’s future, where his personal history also inhabits.  
In 2046 we never experience what it is like to be in “2046,” for no one who goes there 
ever wants to return. The only man who decides to return is the Japanese character in Mr. 
Chow’s futuristic novel (played by the Japanese pop idol Kimura Takuya). However, while on 
board the train coming back to the present, he refuses to tell anyone his secret. The only clue 
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provided in the film that gives us a glimpse of what “2046” may be like appears in the closing 
credit sequence at the end of the film. Fragments of Hong Kong’s audio-history can be heard on 
the audio track of the film. The clearest audio segments include the announcement of the TVB 
broadcaster welcoming the first color television programming on TVB, as well as the former 
Prime Minister of Great Britain, Margaret Thatcher promising to the world that Hong Kong’s 
way of life will remain unchanged for fifty years. As such, 2046 is a meta-history that offers a 
social commentary on not only the 1967 riots, but also the Sino-British Declaration in 1984 
which decided the fate of Hong Kong in 1997 and 2046, but more importantly, on the role of a 
Hong Kong man, a journalist, in his quest for a personal history in Hong Kong.  
Since the end of WWII, Hong Kong’s fate has existed in a precarious balance of political 
anxiety and ideological contest. Its future is always uncertain. Its colonial reality had always 
been reinforced by the mobilization of its history as representation and rhetoric. It is a city where 
the colonial and postcolonial converge; with a future that is always nostalgic for the past; in a 
time that not only moves forward but also backward; a history that also anticipates its future; a 
transit space that remembers and bridges two homes, the mainland and Hong Kong, which is 
both diasporic and cosmopolitan, homebound yet nodal and outward reaching. Indeed, Hong 
Kong is a paradox. Its existence was perhaps a historical accident, but its continued existence has 
been made possible by the incessant imaginings of the many Hong Kong artists, filmmakers and 
televisual personalities who rewrote and are rewriting Hong Kong’s history as well as challenge 
the colonial manipulations of both cinematic and televisual images of its last colony, for 
audiences in Hong Kong and abroad. 
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Table 1  
Censorship Information on Feature, Short Films, and Newsreels, 1952-1960 
 
1952-1953 
 
Appeal Board Country #censored Passed 
clean 
Passed 
with 
cuts 
Banned 
Films 
submitted 
Ban 
confirmed 
Appeal 
Upheld 
Passed 
with 
Cuts 
American 412 375 23 14 14 9 3 2 
British 57 54 3 2 2 2   
Chinese 
(Hong Kong) 
(Mandarin) 
73 53 16 4 4 3 1  
Chinese 
(Hong Kong) 
(Cantonese) 
186 126 56 4     
Chinese 
(Formosan) 
5 1  4 3 3   
French 18 14 4  1 1   
Italian 6 5 1      
Indian 5 5       
Russian   1      
Swedish 1 1       
Japanese 6 5   1 1   
Danish 1   1 1 1   
Chinese 
Mainland 
1   1     
 
Newsreels, Shorts, etc. 
 
Appeal Board Country #censored Passed 
clean 
Passed 
with 
cuts 
Banned 
Films 
submitted 
Ban 
confirmed 
Appeal 
Upheld 
Passed 
with 
Cuts 
Newsreels         
American 259 257 2      
British 60 60       
Hong Kong 
(Cantonese) 
11 11       
Hong Kong 
(Mandarin) 
4 4       
Formosa 2 2  1     
Chinese 
(mainland) 
1   1     
Russian 7 7       
Shorts, etc.         
American 388 385 2 1     
British 13 13       
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Table 1 (cont.) 
 
Chinese 
(Hong Kong) 
10 10       
Russian 21 14 1 6     
 
1953-1954 
 
Feature Films 
 
Appeal Board Country #censored Passed 
clean 
Passed 
with 
cuts 
Banned 
Films 
submitted 
Ban 
confirmed 
Appeal 
Upheld 
Passed 
with 
Cuts 
American 382 360 8 14 16 14 2  
British 58 57 1      
Hong Kong 
(Mandarin) 
48 42 5 1 1 1   
Hong Kong 
(Cantonese) 
140 119 19 2 2 2   
French 20 15 3 2 1 1   
Italian 3 3       
Indian 12 11  1     
Russian 22 3 - 19     
Swedish 1 - 1      
Japanese 19 16 2 1     
Polish 1 1       
 
Newsreels, Shorts, etc. 
 
Appeal Board Country #censored Passed 
clean 
Passed 
with 
cuts 
Banned 
Films 
submitted 
Ban 
confirmed 
Appeal 
Upheld 
Passed 
with 
Cuts 
American 255 255       
British 73 73       
Hong Kong 
(Cantonese) 
10 10       
Hong Kong 
(Mandarin) 
2 2       
Shorts         
American 293 292  1 1 1   
British 14 14       
Chinese 
(Hong Kong) 
10 10       
Russian 12 7  5     
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Table 1 (cont.) 
 
1954-1955 
 
Appeal Board Country #censored Passed 
clean 
Passed 
with 
cuts 
Banned 
Films 
submitted 
Ban 
confirmed 
Appeal 
Upheld 
Passed 
with 
Cuts 
Feature         
Chinese 
(Mainland) 
14 4  10     
French 25 17 6 2 1   1 
German 3 3       
Holland 1 1       
Hong Kong 
(Cantonese) 
189 161 27 1 1 1   
Hong Kong 
(Mandarin) 
46 38 7 1 1   1 
Indian 39 38 1      
Japanese 5 5       
Polish 1 1       
United 
Kingdom 
45 44  1 1  1  
USA 246 220 12 14 10 6 3 1 
USSR 22 6  17 1  1  
Newreels         
United 
Kingdom 
99 97 2      
USA 202 198 4      
Shorts         
Argentina 1 1       
Mainland 31 10  21 3  3  
French 4 4       
United 
Kingdom 
6 6       
USA 188 188       
USSR 4 2  2     
 
1956-1957 
 
Appeal Board Country #censored Passed 
clean 
Passed 
with 
cuts 
Banned 
Films 
submitted 
Ban 
confirmed 
Appeal 
Upheld 
Passed 
with 
Cuts 
Feature         
Mainland 21 11 5 5 4 2 2  
French 21 18 2 1 1   1 
Hong Kong 
(Cantonese) 
249 218 31      
Hong Kong 
(Mandarin) 
62 54 8      
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Italian 6 5 1      
Indian 18 18       
Japanese 
(dubbed in 
English 
6 5  1     
Japanese 
(dubbed in 
Mandarin 
23 23       
Mexican 2 1  1     
Philippines 1  1      
Taiwan 3 1 2      
United 
Kingdom 
53 53       
USA 221 221 1 9 7 4 2 1 
USSR 18 17  1     
Newsreels         
USA 166 166       
UK 99 99       
Shorts         
Mainland 31 20 5 6     
Japanese 6 6       
Korean 1 1       
Portuguese 12 12       
United 
Kingdom 
9 9       
USA 128 128       
USSR 2 2       
 
1957-1958 
 
Appeal Board Country #censored Passed 
clean 
Passed 
with 
cuts 
Banned 
Films 
submitted 
Ban 
confirmed 
Appeal 
Upheld 
Passed 
with 
Cuts 
Feature         
Austria 1 1       
Mainland 32 21 4 7 4 3  1 
France 17 11 4 2     
Germany 6 5 1      
Hong Kong 
(Cantonese) 
164 136 26 2     
Hong Kong 
(Mandarin) 
59 44 11 4     
Italy 4 4       
India 36 36       
Japan 8 7 1      
Korea 2 2       
Mexico 2 2       
Philippines 5 3 2      
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United 
Kingdom 
73 67 3 3 3 2 1  
USA 313 289 8 16 12 5 4 3 
USSR 16 11 4 1     
Newsreels         
Hong Kong 5 5       
United 
Kingdom 
109 108 1      
USA 105 101 4      
Shorts         
Mainland 51 41 2 8     
Hong Kong 6 6       
India 17 17       
Japan 7 1 2 4     
United 
Kingdom 
1 1       
USA 196 196       
USSR 2 1  1     
Advertising 
films 
140 140       
TV films         
16 mm 713 711  2 1  1  
35 mm 113 113       
Rediffusion 
Newsreels 
283 273 10      
 
1958-1959 
 
Appeal Board Country #censored Passed 
clean 
Passed 
with 
cuts 
Banned 
Films 
submitted 
Ban 
confirmed 
Appeal 
Upheld 
Passed 
with 
Cuts 
Feature         
Czech 1 1       
Mainland 18 9 6 3 2  1 1 
France 18 12 2 4 3   3 
Germany 17 14  3     
Hong Kong 
(Amoy) 
1 1       
Hong Kong 
(Cantonese) 
162 136 25 1 3 2  1 
Hong Kong 
(Mandarin) 
73 57 15 1 2 1  1 
Hong Kong 
(Swatowese) 
1 1       
Hungary 1        
India 23 23       
Italy 8 8       
Japan 20 15 4 1     
Korea 2  2      
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Philippines 4 4       
Sweden 1   1     
Taiwan 1 1       
UK 54 52  2 1 1   
USA 246 230 4 12 8 2 1 5 
Feature 
16mm 
        
Mainland 1   1 1 1   
India 1 1       
UK 1 1       
USA 14 13  1     
Newsreels         
UK 97 94 3      
HK 4 4       
USA 103 95 8      
Shorts         
Cantonese 2 2       
Mainland 91 65 7 19 7 5 1 1 
France 5 4  1 1   1 
Germany 6 6       
Hong Kong 4 4       
Japan 17 9 4 4 1 1   
Korea 1 1       
UK 3 3       
USA 161 159 1 1     
USSR 6 6       
Taiwan 1   1 1    
 
1959-1960 
 
Appeal Board Country #censored Passed 
clean 
Passed 
with 
cuts 
Banned 
Films 
submitted 
Ban 
confirmed 
Appeal 
Upheld 
Passed 
with 
Cuts 
Feature         
Mainland 16 13 1 2 2  1 1 
East 
Germany 
2 1  1    1 
France 25 21 1 3 3 2  1 
French – 
Italian 
6 5 1      
Hong Kong 
(Mandarin) 
68 65 2 1     
Hong Kong 
(Cantonese) 
166 154 11 1     
Hong Kong 
(miscellaneou
s) 
5 5       
Hungary 1 1       
India 32 32       
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Italy 17 15  1 1  1  
Japan 57 43 10 4 2 1  1 
Mexico 1   1     
Philippines 2 2       
South Korea 1   1 1   1 
Taiwan 1  1      
UK 57 51 1 5 6 2  4 
USA 183 168 6 9 5  1 4 
USSR 12 12       
USSR – 
China 
(mainland) 
1 1       
W. Germany 5 5       
Unascertaina
ble 
2 1  1     
Feature 
16mm 
        
UK 2 2       
USA 12 12       
Newsreels         
HK 8 8       
UK 52 52       
USA 105 99 6      
Shorts         
Belgium 1 1       
Mainland 95 86 3 6 2  1 1 
France 2 2       
Hong Kong 14 14       
Italy 4 4       
Japan 14 13  1 1   1 
Portugal 3 3       
Taiwan 2 1  1     
UK 12 12       
USA 212 210  2     
USSR 8 8       
W. Germany 3 3       
TV 
(rediffusion) 
        
Films 16 mm 1,677 1,671 4 2 1 1   
Films 35 mm 21 21       
Rediffusion 
newsreels 
313 309 4      
 
Source: Annual Report of the Public Relations Officer (various years), and Annual Report of the Director of 
Information Services Department (various years) 
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Table 2 
Estimated Total Population in Hong Kong (1881-1982) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Year Population 
1881  160,402 
1891 221,441 
1897 246,880 
1899 359,310 
1901 368,987 
1911 456,739 
1921 625,166 
1931 840,473 
1941 1,640,000 
1945 600,000 
1947 1,800,000 
1953 2,302,700 
1961 3,209,500; 3,129, 648 (census) 
1966 3,785,300 
1971 3,936,630 
1976 4,402,990 
1982 5,133,800 
 
Sources: Hong Kong Annual Report, various years; Hong Kong Statistics 1947-1967 (Census & 
Statistics Department, Hong Kong, 1969), 13-14; Hong Kong Digest of Social Statistics 
(Research Department, The Hong Kong Council of Social Services, 1990), 28; The Demographic 
Situation in Hong Kong (Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, United 
Nations, 1974), 6; Demographic Trends in Hong Kong, 1971-8 (Census and Statistics 
Department, Hong Kong, 1984), 3. 
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Table 3 
Box Office Grosses, 1965-1973 
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Year Total Admissions 
1965-1966 93,693,037 
1966-1967 98,370,341 
1967-1968 95,608,936 
1968-1969 88,613,856 
1969-1970 84,881,982 
1970-1971 79,426,759 
1971-1972 74,178,157 
1972-1973 69,425,135 
 
Source: I.C. Jarvie, Window on Hong Kong: A Sociological Study of the Hong Kong Film 
Industry and Its Audience (Hong Kong: Centre of Asian Studies, University of Hong Kong, 
1977), 132-136. 
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Table 4 
Production Figures for Cantonese, Mandarin and Chiu Chow Films (1952-1974) 
 
Year # of Films -- 
Cantonese 
# of Films -- 
Mandarin 
# of Films -- Chiu 
Chow 
1952-1953 186 73  
1953-1954 140 48  
1954-1955 112 55  
1955-1956 189 46  
1956-1957 249 62  
1957-1958 164 59  
1958-1959 162 73 1 
1959-1960 166 68  
1960-1961 222 52 11 
1961-1962 222 41  
1962-1963 193 39 21 
1963-1964 188 44 20 
1964-1965 182 42 8 
1965-1966 143 40 18 
1966-1967 111 56 1 
1967-1968 104 63  
1968-1969 83 72  
1969-1970 63 95  
1970-1971 22 116  
1971-1972 1 126  
1972-1973 0   
1973-1974 3 198  
 
Source: I. C. Jarvie, Window on Hong Kong: A Sociological Study of the Hong Kong Film 
Industry and Its Audience (Hong Kong: Center of Asian Studies, University of Hong Kong, 
1977), 129. 
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Table 5 
Number of Theaters in Hong Kong, 1956-1976 
 
 
Number of Theaters in Hong Kong
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
Y
ea
r
19
60
19
67
19
69
19
71
19
73
Year
Number of
Theaters
 
 
 
Year Number of Theaters 
1956 64 
1960 71 
1961 73 
1965 80 
1966 88 
1967 95 
1968 97 
1969 107 
1970 111 
1971 109 
1972 97 
1973 88 
1975 87 
1976 83 
 
Source: Xianggang nianjian (Hong Kong yearbook) (Hong Kong: Wah Kiu Yat Pao); Xianggang 
jingji nianjian (Hong Kong economic yearbook) (Hong Kong: Jingji daobao she); and GIS 
Report (various years) 
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List of Figures 
 
Fig. 1 
Isometric View of a Mark I Resettlement Block 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: David Drakakis-Smith, High Society: Housing Provision in Metropolitan Hong Kong, 
1954 to 1979, A Jubilee Critique (Hong Kong: Centre of Asian Studies, University of Hong 
Kong, 1979), 46. 
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Fig. 2 
Diagrammatic Metropolitan Land Use Zones, 1979 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: David Drakakis-Smith, High Society: Housing Provision in Metropolitan Hong Kong, 
1954 to 1979, A Jubilee Critique (Hong Kong: Centre of Asian Studies, University of Hong 
Kong, 1979), 33. 
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Fig. 3 
Picture of children at an outdoor GIS mobile film team screening  
 
 
 
Source: “Colour movies thrill children”, Star, 9 January 1968. 
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Fig. 4 
Cover of Colonial Cinema showing African audiences at an outdoor screening 
 
 
Source: Colonial Cinema Vol IX, no. 2, cover. 
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Acronyms 
 
ATV   Asia Television 
BTLR   Below the Lion Rock 
CCP   Chinese Communist Party 
CDO   City District Office 
CFU   Colonial Film Unit 
COI   Central Office of Information 
CTV   Commercial Television 
DIS   Director of Information Services 
EYT    Enjoy Yourselves Tonight 
GIS Government Information Services (Information Services Department, 
formerly PRO) 
GPO   General Post Office 
HKHA   Hong Kong Housing Authority 
HKFU   Hong Kong Film Unit 
ICAC   Independent Commission Against Corruption 
KMT   Kuomintang 
MOI   Ministry of Information 
MTR   Mass Transit Railway 
PLA   People’s Liberation Army  
PRO   Public Relations Office (later renamed as GIS) 
PRC   People’s Republic of China 
ROC   Republic of China 
RTV   Rediffusion Television 
RTHK   Radio Television Hong Kong 
RHKTV  Radio Hong Kong Television 
TVB   Television Broadcast, Ltd. 
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Chronology 
 
1839-1842 The First Opium War 
1842 Treaty of Nanking, Hong Kong Island was ceded to Great Britain 
in perpetuity 
1856-1860   The Second Opium War or the Arrow War 
1860    Convention of Peking; Kowloon ceded to Britain 
1885    Lumière brothers’ first film screen at the Palais… 
1894-95  The Treaty of Shimonoseki; the first Sino-Japanese War;  
1898 New Territories were leased to Britain for 99 years 
1905    The Abolition of the Civil Service Examinations in China 
1911  The 1911 of revolution began with the Wuchang rising 
1912 Republic of China founded with Dr. Sun Yat-sen as the first 
provisional president. 
1921, July The first meeting of the Congress of the Communist  
Party was held in Shanghai 
1931, September  Japan attacked Manchuria after the Mukden Incident 
1937, July – 1945, August The War of Resistance (the Second Sino-Japanese War) 
1939    The founding of the Colonial Film Unit 
1941-1945   The Pacific War 
1941, December 7 Japan attacked Hong Kong 
1941, December 25 British surrendered Hong Kong 
1942, February British surrendered Singapore 
1946, July – 1949 The Civil War on the Mainland between the CCP and the KMT 
1949, October The founding of the People’s Republic of China, with Mao Zedong 
as the Chairman and Zhou Enlai as the Premier  
1950-53   The Korean War 
1951 Deportation of Hong Kong’s artists suspected by the colonial 
government in Hong Kong to be communists 
1952  The founding of the Zhonglian film company 
1953, December 25 Shek Kip Mei fire, rendering more than 50,000 squatters homeless 
The censorship regulations were promulgated in Hong Kong 
1954 The beginning of the public housing project in Hong Kong 
1956, October  The Double Tenth riots at Sham Shui Po 
1957, May The founding of Rediffusion Television (RTV) (English Channel) 
1959-1969  Hong Kong Film Unit 
1963  The opening of the Chinese channel at RTV 
1966, April Kowloon disturbances sparked off by the proposed increase of 5 
cents in first-class Star Ferry fare. 
1966, May – 1976  The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution on the Mainland 
1967, May The Communist-led riots in Hong Kong, which lasted for eight 
months 
1967, November 19 The founding of the Television Broadcasting Ltd. (TVB), which 
was Hong Kong’s first commercial free-to-air television station 
1967, November 20  The first broadcast of Enjoy Yourself Tonight in color 
1970  RTHK was founded 
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1971 Ten-year Public Housing plan under Governor Murray Maclehose 
1972 Zero productions for Cantonese language films in Hong Kong 
1973 RTV was given a license by the government to operate as a free-to-
air television station, which meant that all television stations from 
then on would be free-to-air 
1974, February Anti-corruption commission established (ICAC) in Hong Kong 
1974 Chinese became the second official language of Hong Kong 
1975    The death of Chiang Kai-shek 
1976 Death of Zhou Enlai (January), death of Zhu De (July), death of 
Mao Zedong (September) 
1979 The first MTR train runs from Shek Kip Mei to Kwun Tong 
1982 The beginning of negotiations between Deng Xiaoping and 
Margaret Thatcher 
1984, December  The Sino-British Joint Declaration was signed in Beijing 
1989, June 4   June Fourth Student Crackdown in Tiananmen Square 
1997    The handover of Hong Kong to China sovereignty 
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Glossary 
 
ai guo       
Asia Television Limited    
baipizhu       
bendi hua      
Cai Chusheng     	
 
cai dan       
Cathay (Guotai)     
Changcheng      
chaoyu pian      
Cheung Wood-yau (Zhang Huoyou)   
Cheung Ying (Zhang Ying)    
cubao      	     
cuzhi lanzao       
dishi       
edu juxin      ! 
ertong buyi      "#$% 
Fei-fei      

 
Fenghuang     &' 
fusheng lujie       
geting      () 
guanhua     *+ 
guanzhong xinxiang     ,-./  
guochan yingpian aihao zhe    
guoyu       
Heunggongyanh (Xianggang ren)  012 
haiwai guer     345" 
huangpigou     6 7 
hui zuguo qu     89: 
Hung Sin-nui  (Hong Xiannu)  ;<= 
jiankan      >? 
jiaoyu yiyi     @ABC 
Kong Ngai (Guang Yi)   DE 
Kung Sheung Pao    FGHI 
Lee Tsing (Li Qing)    JK 
Liao Yiyuan     LMN 
lide fusheng     OPQR 
lide yingsheng     OPSR  
Lo Dun     TU 
Loke Wan-tho (Lu Yuntao)   VWX 
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lunli pian     YZ 
Lydia Shum Din-Ha     
mai hua     [\ 
mai pianhua     [\ 
Ming Pao (Ming Bao)    ]I 
mosin dinsi (wuxian dianshi)   ^<_ 
Mui Yee (Mei Qi)    `a 
neirong jiankan    bc>? 
Ng Cho-fan (Wu Chufan)   d
e 
Ouyang Yuqian    fghi 
Pak Yin (Bai Yan)    j 
pupian yanghua de xianggang  klm\P01 
qianren yimian    n2Mo 
qiri xian     pHq 
renmin      2r 
renren weiwo, wowei renren   22stuts22 
Robert Chua Wah-Peng (Cai Heping) 	vw 
Shaw (Shaoshi)    xy 
Shek Kip Mei     z{| 
Sheng yiqi sheng, si yiqi si   M}u~M}~ 
shensheng quanli      
Shizi shanxia      
Siu Yin-fei (Xiao Yanfei)   j 
Ta Kung Pao     FI 
Tak Shuk (De Shu)     
tongxin heli     ! 
Tsi Lo-lin (Zi Luolian)    
Union Pictorial (Zhonglian Huabao)  I 
Wah Kiu Yat Pao (Huaqiao Ribao)  HI 
waisheng guanzhong    4,- 
Wen Wei Pao (Wen Hui Bao)  I 
wenhua shamo     
wenyi       
women reai zuguo ye reai yinni  t9 
Wong Man-lei (Huang Manli)  6 
xianggang     kmP01 
Xinlian       
yiqun fengnu de xuesheng   M¡¢£P¤ 
yiqun gongren     M¡F2 
yiren yipiao     M2M¥ 
Yong Siu-yee (Rong Xiaoyi)   cB 
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yueyu pian     ¦ 
zheng zhi xuanchuan     !" 
zheng zhi xing      # 
Zhonglian      
Zhu Shilin     §z¨ 
ziyou yingren     ©ª«2 
zuguo      9 
zuopai gejie fanying kanbao douzheng weiyuan hui ¬­®¯°±²³´µ¶· 
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